How a nuclear near-miss in ’95 would be a disaster today - by Ted Postol

[bananas]

https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/01/25/how-nuclear-near-miss-would-disaster-today/TG4nhiUzPyFtcV0QGybj6J/story.html

How a nuclear near-miss in ’95 would be a disaster today

Twenty years ago, a string of coincidences nearly set off a US-Russia nuclear crisis, but calmer heads prevailed. The risk is much higher today

By Theodore Postol January 25, 2015

On Jan. 25, 1995 — 20 years ago today — the launch of a lone scientific rocket from a small island off the northwest coast of Norway set off Russia’s nuclear attack early warning system.

As the rocket took off, it initially passed above the horizon of the curved earth into the field of view of Russian radar. After the motor shut down, the rocket then coasted to higher altitudes — into the middle of the major attack corridor between the US intercontinental ballistic missile fields at Grand Forks, N.D., and Moscow. Unknown to the scientists who launched it, one of the rocket’s stages finished its powered flight at an altitude and speed comparable to that expected from a Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile. This combination of events exactly fit the template of an attack scenario under which nuclear weapons are intentionally exploded at high altitudes so as to blind early warning radars before a major bombardment of Russian nuclear forces.

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Today the situation is far more dangerous.

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One positive development that will make us all safer is that Russia will shortly no longer have holes in its network of early warning radars. Yet efforts to modernize the large and expensive network of ground-based radars has been accompanied by a decision to abandon the current space-based satellite early warning system. So even with this vital new radar early warning system, without the benefit of space-based assistance, Moscow could still have no more than six to seven minutes warning of a Trident submarine attack. That small window of time is inadequate for reflection, assessment, and decision-making. This dangerous shortfall could greatly increase the chances of unrecoverable accidents involving the central strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States.

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And finally, Russia should have access to specialized satellite sensor technologies. Both the Americans and the Europeans have this technology and could supply it, helping to correct this dangerous shortfall by equaling the nuclear playing field.

Such measures could easily be taken without any risk of transferring sensitive technical information about how to fabricate such sensors and might well increase our chances of surviving future dangerous early warning mishaps.

Those we can expect to occur with certainty.

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Theodore Postol has been an adviser to the US Navy’s chief of naval operations on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems and on missile defenses. He is professor emeritus of science, technology, and national security policy at MIT.

[Diclotican]

1. bananas

bananas

I do rembember it - as it was a rather tense episode between Russia and Norway back in 1995. And it made for some rather intersting headlines in newspapers (internet was still rather new, and not many was using it back in 1995, compared to today) - but the most intersting part was the lack of information between Norway and Russia - the norwigian authorities had informed their russian counterparts allmoust 6 mounts in advance about the missile lunch from Andøya misile range, as it was a regular things to do as a way of making sure the russian government do know about it - and any "misunderstanding" could be migrated as best human posible..

But even then - even after all this something was going really bad between the ones who got the information about the missile lunch at Andøya - and to authorities in Kremlin who should have been informed about the missile lunch, and it show how badly the russian was prepared when the information of a posible attack from Norway against Russia, as a pretext for a general invation of Russia - could end up as it did - all the way up to preparing the President of Russia for transport out of Kremlin, to a secure base underground - the infamous underground train going from Kremlin to some of the suburbs of the city was prepared for a hasty retreat if deemed nessesary - and the government itself was near warfooting... Thankfully someone was looking tvice for what it really was - or was able to get hold about the nessesary information - and was ready to risk both his own life - and millions of others by informing the right pepole - who then again informed others, up to the russian President - who then could put in place counterorderes to all nessesary departments - and to instill the infamoust last train out of Kremlin (so to say) as the missile who was shoot out from Andøya was cleary not a danger to Russia anymore...

On the other side - I doubt many in Norway really did know how close call it was back in 1995 - at least not the sivilian population know how bad it was -and who close it was for a nuclear standoff in 1995 - over a missile lunch from Andøya - That knowlede was maybe open for the military - and some sivilians who had clearly knowlegde about it all - but for the general population - (my self included) it was more like a joke - where we made some rather stupid jokes about Russias behavour... If we had know how close it was, i doubt we would have made this stupid jokes..


Today - when Russia have no satelite coverage to speak about - if any - i think the posiblity of a missrable miscalculation if a missile is fired off - and is turning the wrong way into Russia - or to the border would be bigger today than it was back in 1995 - even if they is able to build a more advanced radar coverage system - it is still bound by the same laws as all ground based systems are... And the consequenses of a miscalculation there is horrible - both for Russia, and for the rest of the world... A nuclear standoff becouse of pure miscalculation is a dangrous future.... So the idea about either give Russia some axcess to western satelites - to at least give them some security over posible misunderstanding - or to outright give Russia axcess to know-how, how to build advanced satelites, who they could build themself - and make the Russian shortfall when it come to satelite coverage, absolutely do have some merit - if anything - to mae sure a stupid miscalculation could not end up in a horrible war where millions is killed - and where the survivors after the fact - would know one thing - a horrible miscalculation ended the world as we know it...

Diclotican

[AverageJoe90]

2. This was a worrisome incident, no doubt, but......

There are a few misconceptions surrounding this story that need to be addressed: Firstly, regarding Postol's statement, the situation is NOT *more* dangerous than in '95; for one, if anything at all, it's less dangerous because there are fewer nukes now than there were then, and many of Russia's nukes are continuing to rot away, and those would be potentially useless in the event of a launch.

The story of Yeltsin singlehandedly stopping the attack is also false as well(for full disclosure, I don't remember if this was mentioned in the story or not: I first read this 5 days ago, and I've since been unable to go back, as I've supposedly reached my free article limit. ), btw.

All in all, we were much closer to the balloons flying in September 1983 than in Jan. '95, just over three years after the Cold War ended.

[caraher]

3. Sorry, I'm going to take Postol's analysis over yours

I don't think the number of available nukes is a good barometer of the danger - it really doesn't take many to constitute a catastrophe. I suggest the right number of operable nukes to serve as a threshold for concern is one, and I think Putin can muster a lot more than that! I wouldn't count on all of them being inoperable, either. What matters most to the danger level is the likelihood of use.

Moreover, Postol specifically addresses technical and political factors that would give Russia an itchier trigger finger today than in 1995 - surveillance gaps, tension over the Ukraine, the plummeting price of oil, increased Russian military activity, and the cancellation of the cooperative threat reduction program. If the "Doomsday Clock" from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is a decent barometer of tension, in 1995 it was at 14 minutes to midnight; today it is at 3 minutes to midnight. (Admittedly, part of today's figure comes from their wanting to make a statement about climate change.)

[AverageJoe90]

4. Sadly, the Doomsday Clock isn't as good of an indicator as it used to be.

If it were, the clock would be somewhere between 7 to 9 minutes, and not 3; sorry to break it to you, but tensions overall were much worse in 1984, the last time it was there, than today.