Implications of an Iranian Bomb

[William deB. Mills]

Whether Iran is secretly trying to build nuclear arms or not, the longer US/Israeli economic war, terrorist attacks on nuclear scientists, cyber-war, and diplomatic marginalization continue, the more Iranian national security officials are likely to view nuclear arms as essential defensive weapons. In this dangerous context, the US obviously needs the clearest possible understanding of what is in the interests of US national security (NOT the same as being in the interests of some particular elite faction with its own agenda).

Renown political scientist Kenneth Waltz has just published what, in the short-sighted US political context, constitutes a breakthrough essay in Foreign Affairs Jul/Aug 2012 on "Why Iran Should get the Bomb." It's only four pages and is critical reading before the election. His point is simple: given the Israeli nuclear threat, an Iranian bomb would be likely to increase regional stability by creating a deterrent balance. This argument is standard international relations theory with lots of historical evidence to support it, but it is important because a major US political scientist got the article published in the leading US international relations journal...not an academic journal but one policymakers (if they are literate) read.

Waltz's thesis is particularly interesting because the minute one considers it, one comes face to face with the great taboo of US foreign policy: the distinction between US national interest and Israeli national interest. Let's assume he is correct that an Iranian bomb would increase regional stability (by giving Iran security since Israel would no longer be able to attack). Of course, one can offer lots of conceivable if unlikely counterarguments. But let's just make that assumption. Then, US national security is satisfied: no Iranian-Israeli war, we all get on with life. But are Israeli interests met? The answer to that depends on whether one defines Israeli national interests as equivalent to those of the Netanyahu faction (which would suffer a real defeat of its expansionist plans in the West Bank and its overall desire for regional supremacy) or as equivalent to the interests of those Israelis who favor a small, democratic, pluralist Israel (the vision of the wave of European Jewish immigrants who settled in Palestine in the 1940s).

Whatever one's opinion about Israeli interests, it would be a real step forward for American interests if we could start as a society to discuss this whole issue openly and calmly.

[shockedcanadian]

1. I cannot say I agree with this

I haven't read the thesis so it may not be fair to reply, but in general, I think this thesis is flawed for this particular region.

The world needs LESS nukes not more, regardless of which country. The M.A.D (mutually assured destruction) policy of the 70's and 80's between the U.S and Russia is a far cry from the situation in the M.E. Iran is a rogue nation, like Iraq, who currently does not have stable leadership (have they ever?), furthermore I don't think Israel has any intentions of a first strike nuclear policy do you? If they were to ever be drawn into a war with any of their neighbours it would be with ally assistance and it would be a conventional war.

Consider the frightening rhetoric that was traded between Pakistan and India a few years ago when they were arguing once again about Kashmir. Both nations have nukes, both threatened in a round about way to use them.

[William deB. Mills]

2. Nukes or No Nukes for Stability?

You are discussing slightly different points than I was making. Waltz makes an important corrective analysis in response to a highly biased American attitude. Whether he is ultimately right or wrong, his point is worth considering. Surely, I would concur with you that no nukes is better for stability than nukes (see here, for example). But since Washington refuses to hold Israel responsible for introducing nukes to the Mideast, Waltz argues that a nuclear balance trumps a one-sided situation, and I agree with that. People who perceive a nuclear threat get a little crazy. I admit, however, that the Indo-Pakistani situation a few years back (2003?) provides very scary evidence to the contrary. But if I were advising Obama, I would counsel that he focus on Mideast nuclear disarmament (briefly, the incentive for Iran to cooperate would be putting restraints on Israel). That's my bottom line on a very complicated issue. Point is, we aren't even trying.

As for the issue of whether or not the Israeli threat, loudly trumpeted at every occasion by the Netanyahu-Lieberman clique, to attack is genuine and might turn nuclear, I'd rather not trust the Israelis to control themselves. They have a very very bad record. Israel has become absolutely obsessed with using extreme violence to resolve problems and gain influence. And an Israeli attack against Iran in my opinion (note that I am just a political scientist, not a military expert) is highly unlikely to succeed even over the short run unless Israel uses nukes. More than enough comments on this topic by high Israeli officials and a few American officials are on the record to convince me of this. (See, for example, comment by ex-Mossad chief Meir Dagan here.) What politicians whose careers rest on Israeli military superiority would do if a conventional Israeli attack were clearly and publicly defeated is anyone's guess.

I think the whole issue of Iranian nukes could be resolved if negotiators would focus on searching for resolution rather than victory. Many opportunities for incremental, positive-sum agreements exist.