Reply #3: Holy shit, this is a Republican boondoggle if there ever was one

[whistle]

....rammed through by the Pentagon fascists without the required modifications identified three years before. More death traps for our troops just like unarmored Humvees not meant for combat patrols were used for that purpose once they were put into operation in the war. :wtf:

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Why the V-22 Osprey is Unsafe

G2mil has attempted to expose the largest scandal in US military history for several years. A total of eight articles about the unsafe and costly V-22 Osprey have appeared, one in the last issue while the others can be read by following this link: V-22 articles. In early 2004, an outside aviation expert briefed top Generals at Headquarters Marine Corps about lingering safety concerns over the V-22. This copy was provided by a concerned former Marine Corps officer:
Lingering Safety Concerns Over V-22

by XXXXXXXXXXX

from XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

12 December 2003

After three years of careful study and analysis of the V-22 following the tragic crash at Marana, Arizona in March 2000, several safety-related issues continue to concern me about the safety of flight of V-22 within a combat or hostile environment. The significant mission advantages V-22 offers have been addressed elsewhere; the focus of this paper is limited to safety concerns that remain after completion of all modifications implemented since the last mishap at New River.

From my point of view, there are six critical issues whose operational consequences need to be understood by decision-makers as these may affect the future operational safety of this aircraft and the survivability of air-crews in a combat environment. The six issues are:

1. The V-22’s lack of an auto-rotation capability, or even a demonstrated all engine inoperative safe landing capability, remains cause for concern. V-22 fails to meet the ORD threshold requirement for a survivable emergency landing with all engines inoperative from a large portion of its operating envelope.

2. V-22 flight characteristics in VRS (vortex ring state) are problematic for roll control and the aircraft is susceptible to un-commanded rolling as a result of saturation in the roll channel of the flight control system when the aircraft is operated into VRS. This aircraft response to VRS phenomenon is drastically different than that of any conventional helicopter.

3. The V-22 is prone to roll PIO (pilot-induced oscillation) in helicopter mode during high gain pilot tasks such as shipboard operations, precision hover in confined areas, or precision hover/landing in obscured visibility.

4. The V-22’s high vibratory loads, coupled with a very flexible structural design and complex hydraulic system, is problematic for hydraulic, electrical, and mechanical systems and is likely to lead to high failure rates for these systems. Many such failures have safety implications.

5. The V-22’s susceptibility to wake or tip vortices from other aircraft is problematic for roll control and can result in un-commanded rolling of the aircraft. At low altitude, this could lead to a loss of an aircraft.

6. The V-22’s high down-wash velocity field has the potential to produce significant detrimental effects on hovering operations in desert environments or over water.


The six issues are discussed in the body of this paper. These should be closely monitored in future operational testing and evaluation, and corrective actions taken where possible through equipment changes, training, and changes in tactics, procedures and techniques. Many of these concerns, however, are inherent in the V-22 design and may be difficult to extenuate. Understanding the substance of the issues is key to understanding the operational consequences.

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http://www.g2mil.com/V-22safety.htm