Uruguay in the 1960¹s was distinct among other South American counties for its affluence and
sociopolitical stability. Economic prosperity had fostered the growth of a large middle class and a stable
welfare-state government that allowed a wider degree of democratic and civil freedoms larger than any
other South American government. Because Uruguayan society was so peaceful, the Army and Police
were very small. In 1968 there were only about 12,000 men in the armed forces and fewer than 22,000
police to keep order in a population of about 3 million.
A slump in the demand for wool and meat, Uruguay¹s two principal exports, after the Korean
War brought mass unemployment, inflation, and a steep drop in the standard of living. the social
tensions this produced, along with the corruption of the overblown state bureaucracy (one in five
working Uruguayans was employed by the federal government in some fashion), gave the impulse for
an effective urban guerrilla movement to emerge.
(snip)
The economy failed to improve, and a series of corruption scandals in 1970 and 1971 further
undermined public support for the government. It seemed that the Tupamaros were on the verge of
creating the Œclimate of collapse¹ that would lead to the government¹s fall. In November 1971
presidential elections were held. An alliance of left-wing parties called the Frente Amplio emerged to
challenge the rule of the two traditional political parties. The Tupamaros, gave vocal support to the
Frente Amplio while continuing their campaign of provocation. However, the murder of Dan Mitrione
in August 1970 and the continual civic disruption pushed more and more people away from support of
the Tupamaros. The Frente Amplio suffered from the association and got less than 20% of the votes in
the elections. The new Uruguayan president, Juan Maria Bordaberry, suspended civil liberties and
declared a state of Œinternal war¹ with the Tupamaros in April 1972. The Army, which until this point
had been playing only a supporting role to the Police and Metropolitan Guards in the
counterinsurgency, was ordered into action. They relied on mass arrests, torture, and large cordon-and-
search operations. These saturation tactics captured most of the guerrillas and forced the remainder to
flee the country. By November 1972 the Tupamaros had ceased to be a threat to Uruguay.
The government had won, but only at the cost of destroying democracy in Uruguay and
alienating large sections of the population. The Army, which in ten years had gone from consuming 1%
of the national budget to over 26%, was not about to go meekly back to barracks. In their view, they
had just cleared up the Œpolitician¹s mess,¹ and were not going to let it happen again. The military
leadership pressured President Bordaberry to maintain the declared state of internal war. By mid-1973
all left-wing political activity had been suppressed and the national legislature indefinitely dissolved.
Uruguay, once the most tolerant and democratic country in South America had become another garrison
state. This was the only permanent legacy of the Tupamaros, although they had advanced further and
offered a more serious challenge to established power than any other urban guerrilla movement.
http://www.islandnet.com/~citizenx/TWTupas.txt