Wolfowitz's thoughts on Intelligence analysis

[finecraft]

Came across this on the cia.gov website. The article is from 1996:

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/davis.htm

from the article:........."Ambassador Wolfowitz believes effective
management of uncertainty and related challenges to sound decision-making requires close cooperation between policy and intelligence officers. The analyst and the collector have to know the operational agendas of policymakers and to understand the continuous and largely informal processes by which they come to decision. Similarly, policymakers have to get close enough to intelligence to provide direct guidance to the collection and analytic processes."

snip...."In his view, moreover, the serious policymaker cannot ignore a 10-percent likelihood that could have a major impact on US security, much less a 40-percent likelihood. Throughout the Cold War, much of US defense expenditures were directed to the highly unlikely prospect of a Soviet nuclear attack. Policymakers, individually and collectively, have to grapple with resource planning and deployments based on a complicated calculus concerning not only odds, but also interests and resources.

Successful policymakers do not delegate this challenge either to intelligence analysts or to their own staffs. According to Ambassador Wolfowitz, the policymaker has to be the analyst of last resort in making assessments for the President and other principals."


Could this explains how the intelligence "got it" so wrong....doing it by the "Wolfowitz Stovepipe Method"? Maybe Cheney was following the "Wolfowitz Doctrine" on intelligence analysis by visiting the CIA 10 times?

[Wickerman]

1. or its nice cover for the "fuck it, we're going into Iraq

come hell or high water, intelligence be damned, just give me a reason, any reason will do."