Winter waiting game

[bemildred]

In the course of Operation Warm Winter, held in the Gaza Strip at the beginning of the week, the commander of the 74th battalion of the Barak Armored Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nir Ben-David, noticed three young Palestinians in civilian clothing entering a house at the edge of the town of Jabalya. Using two Kalashnikov rifles and an RPG missile, the three then opened fire in the direction of the tanks. When an Israel Defense Forces unit responded to the fire, the Palestinians abandoned their weapons and fled the site. According to the General Staff, this act was one of cunning, not cowardice.

The operation by the Givati Brigade and the Armored Corps, which the army has described as a relative success, illustrated the difficulty of countering a terror organization that occasionally uses guerrilla tactics and quasi-military fighting methods. Hamas is adopting a strategy of disappearance: If it wants to, it will clash with the army, in uniform and with weapons. Yet, if it so desires, it can also shed its uniforms, enter houses and pull out the weapons from the cache only once it discovers a military force's weakness.

Colonel Ilan Malka, the Givati Brigade commander in charge of Warm Winter, received clear instructions: to deploy, within a few hours, at a certain longitude, northeast of Gaza City; to prevent the launching of Qassams; to arrest wanted men; and to seize weapons. Although Hamas' defensive system is separated into battalions and brigades, the two brigade commanders in whose sector Malka operated did not demonstrate much determination in checking the Givati advance. From the moment it became clear that the IDF was stronger, they focused their efforts on attacking the force's tail end, inflicting losses and gaining pictures that would help in the battle for public opinion. Had Hamas succeeded in catching a burning Israeli tank on video for 15 seconds, it might have been satisfied. But it did not get the shot. It only attained the desired image yesterday morning, when an explosive device destroyed a military jeep next to Kibbutz Ein Hashlosha. A dramatic event, caught by the cameras, can change the Israeli public's view on the need for a major ground operation in the Strip. The destruction of two APCs in Gaza in May 2004, resulting in 11 dead in 24 hours, increased public support for then prime minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan. The ratio of casualties in this week's fighting - three Israeli dead versus about 120 Palestinians (many of them civilians) - did not eradicate the fear of additional losses. According to estimates by political officials, a major ground operation could result in 200 to 300 casualties, a number they use to explain Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's reservations about the move. As for the General Staff, it thinks the casualty estimates are exaggerated.

The IDF does not believe that the mission of a comprehensive operation - meaning the capture of parts of the northern Strip and the capture or encirclement of parts of southern Gaza - is impossible. It even believes that remaining in the area afterward constitutes a reasonable challenge. The great difficulty lies in arranging an exit strategy: How do they prevent a future threat to Sderot and Ashkelon once the IDF withdraws? Won't Hamas again declare victory once the IDF pulls out, as it did this week in Jabalya?

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/961726.html

[pelsar]

1. hamas tries to kill those delivering food.....

from the article:

Hamas shelled the Sufa crossing at a time when 60 trucks with food were entering Gaza.
____

lets clarify a few events:

Hamas, the govt of Gaza is not just sending "lame" missiles into israeli and Palestinian cities, they're also complaining that Israel has cut off the supplies...and then when supplies do enter... they try to blow them up!

perhaps someone might explain to me why israelis should risk their lives to send electricity to gaza, send supplies when the gaza govt is busy trying to kill them?

[azurnoir]

2. The predictable zinger

comes at the end of the article

The head of MI, Major General Amos Yadlin, estimates that under cover of the downing of the border fence in Rafah, dozens of terrorists connected to Al-Qaida infiltrated the Strip. And what if Al-Qaida succeeds in taking over?

This theory was floated just prior to last weeks operation and here it is again just after.

Wonder if this was discussed with Condi while she was there?

[bemildred]

3. That seems most unlikely to me.

I thought is was just "here comes the boogyman" propaganda. I can't see why Hamas would allow al Qaeda (whomever that might be) to horn in on their turf, which they have gone to a good deal of trouble to get control of. Then there is the Sunni-Shiia issue, and the fact that they are outsiders, and the fact that Hamas has no reason to care a fig about OBLs project for global conquest, and the poor example that Iraq provides as to what to expect down that road, etc. etc. On the other hand, it makes a great boogeyman, although why one would need something additional in that regard to Hamas and/or Hizbullah themselves I don't see either. I suppose al Qaeda is a better known "brand" so to speak, so maybe it's felt to be a more effective threat for PR purposes.

[azurnoir]

4. Edited the title line

and took out true, thank you that could be mis-understood. I do not believe this either, and agree it is "boogeyman" propaganda, although despite already having the Hamas/Hezbollah bad guys adding AQ to the mix could be a PR bonanza especially in the US and possibly bring more "direct" American aid on board.

[bemildred]

5. Yep. nt

[Vegasaurus]

6. Did you ignore what pelsar wrote?

They try to blow up THEIR OWN HUMANITARIAN AID!

WHAT KIND OF IDIOT DO THAT?

[hifalutin]

7. Hamas does not want aid

if aid comes in, what will they have left to bitch about?

They prefer the pictures of misery, hunger and poverty stricken civilians to use as their propaganda tools against Israel.

I'm learning fast here, thanks to you all!

[azurnoir]

8. What does that have to do with AQ? n/t