Abbas aide: Israel never offered a serious two-state proposal

[IndianaGreen]

Last update - 18:25 15/03/2009

Abbas aide: Israel never offered a serious two-state proposal

By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent and Haaretz Service

An aide to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on Sunday lambasted Prime Minister Ehud Olmert over his assertion that Israel had been prepared to sign a peace agreement, but was held up the Palestinians' "weakness and lack of courage."

"The fact that we haven't reached (a peace agreement) so far is due to the weakness and lack of courage on the part of the Palestinian leaders," Olmert told ministers during his last weekly cabinet meeting in Jerusalem. "Everything else is just excuses and efforts to derail the talks."

"We were ready to sign a peace deal but the Palestinians unfortunately did not have the courage to do so," he said.

Abbas' aide Nabil Abu Rudeina told AFP that Olmert's assertion was "completely false."

"The proposals did not include conditions for the creation of an independent Palestinian state on all Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital," he said. "Israel did not present a single map and not a single serious position that could lead to a real peace on the base of two states."

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1071175.html

A rerun of Barak's "generous offer."

[PDJane]

1. It has been thus

since before the state of Israel came into being and it will be thus until the international community forces the state of Israel to get along with its neighbours....or until the state of Israel is subjected to matching weaponry.

[stray cat]

2. And Arafat was the picture of reasonableness and practicality?

[Duckhunter935]

3. Both sides are just as guilty

It would be nice if some would at least recognise the right of Israel to exist. It would be nice if Israel would stop the settlements.

[Idealism]

4. The PA recognizes Israel as a precondition for Israel not withholding monies owed to them

It was done years ago.

[stray cat]

5. A rationale response - absolutely right

[Recursion]

17. PA recognized Israel years ago and got nothing for it

Well, they got less than nothing, in that Israel increased the pace of settlements in the West Bank.

[LeftishBrit]

25. Couldn't agree more. Good succinct summary!

[Idealism]

6. There are two sides to every story always

Even within military intelligence:

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5783

Does Israeli Intelligence Lie?

All of the suffering in Gaza — indeed, all of the suffering endured by Palestinians under Israeli occupation for the last eight years — could have been avoided if Israel negotiated a peace agreement with Yasser Arafat when it had the chance, in 2001.

What chance? The official Israeli position is that there was no chance, "no partner for peace." That’s what Israeli leaders heard from their Military Intelligence (MI) service in 2000 after the failure of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David. Arafat scuttled those talks, MI told the leaders, because he was planning to set off a new round of violence, a second intifada.

Now former top officials of MI say the whole story, painting Arafat as a terrorist out to destroy Israel, was an intentional fiction. That’s the most explosive finding in an investigative http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1053882.html">report just published in Israel’s top newspaper, Ha’aretz, by one of its finest journalists, Akiva Eldar.

[shira]

7. more revisionist history... more make-believe fantasy for the dupes and haters

Arafat's involvement in Intifada 2:
http://www.ujc.org/page.aspx?id=10761

Shlomo ben Ami's firsthand account of Camp David/Taba
http://www.weizmann.ac.il/home/comartin/israel/ben-ami.html

[Idealism]

8. Weird how the European Union and others disagree with you:

http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/moratinos.html]

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/pressman.pdf

Shlomo ben Ami is not an impartial judge. Even Israel's military intelligence disagrees with you. But you have all the answers shira... I would google "confirmation bias" if I were you.

[shira]

9. Let's finish this discussion

with what precisely does the EU disagree with Shlomo ben Ami?

And how about Arafat's crony admitting that the Intifada was planned right after Camp David?

[Idealism]

10. His crony? You mean the man Arafat chastized publicly for not "doing enough" for peace?

Why do you insist on the simplistic view that the Intifada was "all Arafats' fault?"

You have been corrected on Taba so many times, yet you still bring that up, why? You accuse others of being "hateful" when they repeat idiotic sayings, yet when you repeat something found to be demonstrably false, I suppose you don't consider yourself "hateful."

[shira]

11. so Arafat's crony made it up and that's what you wish to believe

Are you in any way aware of Arafat's talent at talking peace in english while inciting violence and war in arabic?

And you have no examples from the EU report on Taba that calls into question any of Shlomo ben Ami's account. Why not just admit it?

[Idealism]

13. So you believe that Israeli intelligence does in fact lie?

That is what you are saying. That you believe the press releases of politicians over military intelligence?

[shira]

14. these quotes are from Arafat's closest cronies, and your prize witness Yossi Beilin

Now pay attention, because here's what Beilin is on the record saying:

"Barghouti told me that he wanted to continue the use of violence...he thought he could control the violence he unleashed and end the intifada in a few weeks.."

"The evidence that he was responsible for directing terrorist acts was overwhelming and his punishment was determined accordingly."

"In spite of the fact that Barghouti was responsible for the Second Intifada... we are nonetheless talking about the most important elected parliamentarian and the most pragmatic and influential on the Palestinian street. His arrest was a big mistake and an act of stupidity. .. not releasing him would be an even larger mistake."

You know who Barghouti was? The man Yossi Beilin says was responsible for the 2nd Intifada? He worked for Arafat. Here are Barghouti's own words in the London based Al Hayat (Sept 29, 2001)

"I knew that the end of September was the last period (of time) before the explosion, but when Sharon reached the al-Aqsa Mosque, this was the most appropriate moment for the outbreak of the intifada....The night prior to Sharon's visit, I participated in a panel on a local television station and I seized the opportunity to call on the public to go to the al-Aqsa Mosque in the morning, for it was not possible that Sharon would reach al-Haram al-Sharif just so, and walk away peacefully. I finished and went to al-Aqsa in the morning....We tried to create clashes without success because of the differences of opinion that emerged with others in the al-Aqsa compound at the time....After Sharon left, I remained for two hours in the presence of other people, we discussed the manner of response and how it was possible to react in all the cities (bilad) and not just in Jerusalem. We contacted all (the Palestinian) factions."

Now let's go back to ben Ami's interview:

Q: Are you suggesting that the intifada was a calculated move by the Palestinians to extricate them from their political and diplomatic hardships?

"No. I am not attributing that kind of Machiavellian scheme to them. But I remember that when we were at Camp David, Saeb Erekat said that we had until September 13. And I remember that when I visited Mohammed Dahlan and from his office spoke with Marwan Barghouti, he also said that if we didn't reach an agreement by the middle of September, it would not be good. There was a tone of threat in his words that I didn't like. So, when you look at the course of events and see that the violence erupted exactly two weeks after September 13 , it makes you think. One thing is certain: the intifada absolutely saved Arafat."

You still think ben Ami's lying? How could Barghouti, Erekat, and Dahlan know about the Intifada without Arafat knowing about it?

And here are those damning accusations I gave you previously:

Al-Faluji had made similar statements as early as December 2000. Raed Lafi, correspondent for the PA affiliated daily Al-Ayyam reported then that at a Gaza symposium Al-Faluji said: "The PA had begun to prepare for the outbreak of the current Intifada since the return from the Camp David negotiations, by request of President Yasser Arafat, who predicted the outbreak of the Intifada as a complementary stage to the Palestinian steadfastness in the negotiations, and not as a specific protest against Sharon's visit to Al-Haram Al-Qudsi ."

Al-Faluji continued: "The Intifada was no surprise for the Palestinian leadership. The leadership had invested all of its efforts in political and diplomatic channels in order to fix the flaws in the negotiations and the peace process, but to no avail. It encountered Israeli stubbornness and continuous renunciation of the rights... The PA instructed the political forces and factions to run all matters of the Intifada..."(3)

And a different source:

Al-Faluji's statement at the time were backed by Fatah Central Committee member, Sakhr Habash, who said in an interview with the PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida: "In light of the information, analyzing the political positions following the Camp David summit, and in accordance with what brother Abu Ammar (Arafat) said, it became clear to the Fatah movement that the next stage necessitates preparation for confrontation, because Prime Minister Barak is not a partner who can respond to our people's aspirations. Based on these assessments, Fatah was more prepared than the other movements for this confrontation. In order to play the role given to it, the Fatah coordinated its administrative, civilian and sovereign apparatuses, and was not surprised by the outbreak of the current Intifada... The Fatah movement believed that the phenomenon of comprehensive struggle would appear at the final settlement stage..."(4)

Here's yet another source, just days before the Intifada erupted - showing there's absolutely no way Arafat didn't know what was happening under his own nose:

Another official publication of the Palestinian Authority, Al-Sabah, dated September 11, 2000 -- more than two weeks before the Sharon visit -- declared: "We will advance and declare a general Intifada for Jerusalem. The time for the Intifada has arrived, the time for Intifada has arrived, the time for Jihad has arrived."

And another Palestinian source pointing the finger at Arafat:

Arafat advisor Mamduh Nufal told the French Nouvel Observateur (March 1, 2001): "A few days before the Sharon visit to the Mosque, when Arafat requested that we be ready to initiate a clash, I supported mass demonstrations and opposed the use of firearms." Of course, Arafat ultimately adopted the use of firearms and bomb attacks against Israeli civilians and military personnel. On September 30, 2001, Nufal detailed in al-Ayyam that Arafat actually issued orders to field commanders for violent confrontations with Israel on September 28, 2000.

It's not just one source condemning Arafat, but many. From all directions.

You're wrong.

Source:
http://www.peacewithrealism.org/pdc/sharon.htm

[Idealism]

15. Ben Ami is probably not lying, just isn't equated with the truth of this matter

He may think he is telling what he believes to be the truth, but military intelligence briefs the politicians on all levels and they in turn brief others, and the disagree with what the politicians were told. The information comes from the intelligence apparatus, and the intelligence apparatus assigned to the Arafat knew that what they were reporting was not being correctly disseminated. It is not an usual thing: the CIA has a long history of this. The Iraq War is just the most recent (perhaps) in that extensive history.

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5783
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1053882.html

Be that as it may, the hard question remains: Why did MI not tell the government and the Knesset loudly and clearly that the disengagement might well pave Hamas' road to power and to control over Gaza? Was this a professional glitch, or a case of tailoring assessments to fit politics?

MI's credibility and reliability in the critical years between the 2000 intifada and the 2005 disengagement continue to trouble Colonel (res.) Ephraim Lavie. Since his 2002 retirement from the Palestinian section of MI's research unit, a section he headed for four years, the reticent Middle East expert, who is now the director of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University, has been knocking on every possible door. He is demanding a thorough investigation of how the Palestinian sector intelligence assessment was presented to the decision makers and the public.

Lavie had a rich career in the intelligence unit 8200, as Arab affairs adviser to the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories and in MI's research unit. In 1997 he graduated cum laude from the National Security College. After leaving the IDF he entered academia and recently completed a doctoral thesis on Palestinian society. In an April 2004 letter to Ze'evi-Farkash, Lavie wrote: "The conception underneath the 'no partner' approach became a model with grave national implications. Its consequences are manifested in the unilateral disengagement plan for Gaza and in the construction of the separation fence in Judea and Samaria." Lavie added that he had discovered, from conversations with former Shin Bet and Mossad espionage agency personnel, that their organizations had also seen the same disparity between oral and written doctrine, which had helped deepen the mistaken conception.

[shira]

16. so confessions from Arafat's top people and Yossi Beilin mean nothing, right?

[Idealism]

18. Why are you changing the subject from Taba to the Al-Aqsa Intifada?

Yossi , just like almost all Israeli officials, gets their sequence of events from military intelligence analysis and reports. Yossi is not a Mossad agent assigned to garner intelligence on Arafat, so he would not know as much on the subject as those who WERE assigned to Arafat. I believe the people whose job it was to find these things out, especially when I have seen this thing over and over in the intelligence apparatus. Yossi, I have no doubts, got his intelligence from the same MI reports that were prepared for all government officials with access.

Yossi was at Taba, and the EU report and his own claim that Taba ended because of Barak and the upcoming elections. All sides agreed at the time that this was true. I don't know why ben Ami made incorrect statements blaming the failure on Arafat, just like I don't know why ben Ami said the Palestinians stonewalled when the EU report clearly states they made counter-proposals and even brought opposing maps. But you rather believe that "the palestinians offered nothing in return." What the fuck do you think they did all that time at Taba? Just sat there and said "NO!" 50000 times?

Listen to how rediculous you sound. You are not using reasoning.

[shira]

19. Robert Malley quotes Clinton, and so does ben Ami

they both agree that the PA side wasn't making counterproposals and that this pissed off Clinton big time. You sound ridiculous for trivializing their eyewitness accounts of the situation.

[Idealism]

20. Eyewitness account of Bill Clinton? Really?

Sorry, the EU envoy was the most neutral arbiter at the talks, and I believe them. Considering everyone agreed at the time, I believe what was agreed upon and was written in the Morantino's document. How bat-shit insane are you to believe that for the dozens and dozens of hours spent negotiating at Taba, the Palestinians made no compromises and no counter-proposals? Do you not recall the quotes of ben Ami (At the time) saying how much progress was being made, and how close they were to a deal?

Do you not recall Bill Clinton lying under oath about the Lewinsky affair? Why is he incapable of lying about the I/P issue benefiting Israel when he clearly favors them?

[shira]

21. so what do you believe are Agha and Malley's motivations for this:

"These compromises notwithstanding, the Palestinians never managed to rid themselves of their intransigent image. Indeed, the Palestinians' principal failing is that from the beginning of the Camp David summit onward they were unable either to say yes to the American ideas or to present a cogent and specific counterproposal of their own. In failing to do either, the Palestinians denied the US the leverage it felt it needed to test Barak's stated willingness to go the extra mile and thereby provoked the President's anger. When Abu Ala'a, a leading Palestinian negotiator, refused to work on a map to negotiate a possible solution, arguing that Israel first had to concede that any territorial agreement must be based on the line of June 4, 1967, the President burst out, "Don't simply say to the Israelis that their map is no good. Give me something better!" When Abu Ala'a again balked, the President stormed out: "This is a fraud. It is not a summit. I won't have the United States covering for negotiations in bad faith. Let's quit!" Toward the end of the summit, an irate Clinton would tell Arafat: "If the Israelis can make compromises and you can't, I should go home. You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything. These things have consequences; failure will mean the end of the peace process.... Let's let hell break loose and live with the consequences."

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380

Agha and Malley aren't credible sources because ____________ ? Seriously, I've never heard any pro-Palestinian, here at DU or anywhere else, claim that Malley is a dubious source.

[Idealism]

22. You should reread that post, I claimed MEMRI was the dubious source

but continue with the straw men attacks.

Are you confused about what you are talking about? The Morantinos Document was about Taba, not Camp David.

[shira]

23. MEMRI's quoting of Abu Mazen lines up with Malley/Agha and ben Ami

do you agree?

Also, let's at least agree on where Malley/Agha and Shlomo ben Ami verify each other's accounts of the PA not negotiating and counter-offering at Camp David. In other words, do you have any major problem with this (from Agha/Malley):

"These compromises notwithstanding, the Palestinians never managed to rid themselves of their intransigent image. Indeed, the Palestinians' principal failing is that from the beginning of the Camp David summit onward they were unable either to say yes to the American ideas or to present a cogent and specific counterproposal of their own. In failing to do either, the Palestinians denied the US the leverage it felt it needed to test Barak's stated willingness to go the extra mile and thereby provoked the President's anger. When Abu Ala'a, a leading Palestinian negotiator, refused to work on a map to negotiate a possible solution, arguing that Israel first had to concede that any territorial agreement must be based on the line of June 4, 1967, the President burst out, "Don't simply say to the Israelis that their map is no good. Give me something better!" When Abu Ala'a again balked, the President stormed out: "This is a fraud. It is not a summit. I won't have the United States covering for negotiations in bad faith. Let's quit!" Toward the end of the summit, an irate Clinton would tell Arafat: "If the Israelis can make compromises and you can't, I should go home. You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything. These things have consequences; failure will mean the end of the peace process.... Let's let hell break loose and live with the consequences."


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How is one to explain the Palestinians' behavior? As has been mentioned earlier, Arafat was persuaded that the Israelis were setting a trap. His primary objective thus became to cut his losses rather than maximize his gains. That did not mean that he ruled out reaching a final deal; but that goal seemed far less attainable than others. Beyond that, much has to do with the political climate that prevailed within Palestinian society. Unlike the situation during and after Oslo, there was no coalition of powerful Palestinian constituencies committed to the success of Camp David. Groups whose support was necessary to sell any agreement had become disbelievers, convinced that Israel would neither sign a fair agreement nor implement what it signed. Palestinian negotiators, with one eye on the summit and another back home, went to Camp David almost apologetically, determined to demonstrate that this time they would not be duped. More prone to caution than to creativity, they viewed any US or Israeli idea with suspicion. They could not accept the ambiguous formulations that had served to bridge differences between the parties in the past and that later, in their view, had been interpreted to Israel's advantage; this time around, only clear and unequivocal understandings would do.

Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of what is known as the Haram al-Sharif to Palestinians and the Temple Mount to Jews. The Americans spent countless hours seeking imaginative formulations to finesse the issue of which party would enjoy sovereignty over this sacred place—a coalition of nations, the United Nations Security Council, even God himself was proposed. In the end, the Palestinians would have nothing of it: the agreement had to give them sovereignty, or there would be no agreement at all."

Malley/Agha write of this "trap" that Abbas mentioned in his interview with the PA's newspaper Al Hayyam. You have been denying all along that the PA wasn't simply at Camp David and said 'No' to everything proposed without offering their own counterproposals. But are we now in agreement, and if so, what changed your mind?

[Idealism]

24. Do you not realize Camp David and Taba were two different events completely?

[shira]

26. Of course I know that

but do you NOW agree with Shlomo ben Ami, Dennis Ross, and Robert Malley WRT Arafat and the PA saying 'No' to everything at Camp David without so much as a counter-proposal in response?

[Idealism]

27. Seems you don't, or else you would know the Morantino's Document was only on Taba.

Did you not even bother to read the paper? It isn't long and it has been posted to you at least a dozen times.

Arafat at Camp David was unwilling to compromise on the right of return of some 700,000 Palestinians. Israel was unwilling to accept that high of a number, flat out rejecting the concept. Later, at Taba ben Ami proposed 15,000 as an acceptable number of refugees accepted by Israel within 5 years of signing an agreement.

Similarly, Israel was unwilling to compromise on security issues at both Camp David and Taba. Israel wanted Palestine to have no weapons, no military, and limited sovereignty over their territory. Arafat said he would accept Palestine being labeled as a "limited arms country." This was not accepted by Israel at the time, but might have been if these talks didn't fall through.

Taba was the best shot at peace, as it built on Camp David and Oslo. Both sides agreed they were "days away from peace." Arafat may be more to blame for Camp David ending after two weeks, but Barak is more to blame for Taba ending after only a week. Taba, just due to chronology, was more important as there was more progress made.

Now, can you admit that Barak ended Taba and is to blame for that?

[Violet_Crumble]

12. Sometimes simplistic views are the easiest and most convenient ...no thinking involved...

In the case of repeated claims that Arafat was responsible for the outbreak of the Second Intifada, it's a claim that's based on the convenience of simplicity, ignorance of what happened, and/or the urge to make Arafat a scapegoat for everything.

Here's what the findings of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee were (for those of you who aren't aware, it was a US fact-finding team led by George Mitchell)

'We have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the to respond with lethal force.

However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or that the made a consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted accordingly.

The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that followed: the decision of the Israeli police on September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-palestine/document/mitchell043001.pdf