Shortly after Iran's 1979 revolution toppled the Shah, Yasir Arafat turned up in Tehran to celebrate. With Arafat in town, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini announced the Islamic Revolution would march until "the liberation of Jerusalem." Crowds responded with waves of applause.
After all, in 1970s Iran, support for the Palestinians had emerged as a litmus test of commitment to the revolutionary ethos. Unsurprisingly, an anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian stance quickly became a central tenet of the Islamic Republic. The government lavished financial support on groups opposing Israel, and the keys to the de facto Israeli embassy in Tehran were turned over to Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization. Across Iran, billboards urging JUSTICE FOR PALESTINE dotted the country, and every major city soon had a "Palestine Square" and a "Palestine Street." State television described suicide bombings as "martyrdom operations." The Iranian government even proclaimed a "Jerusalem day," on which government workers were "encouraged" to take part in protests against the "bloodthirsty Zionist state."
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Iranians under the age of 30 — who comprise more than two-thirds of the population today — express little interest in terrorist groups, anti-Zionism, and radical politics in general. In places where young people congregate, Iranians constantly question their government's support for terrorist groups. "I see the way people look at me when I travel," complained one young Iranian. "Immediately, they think, 'Watch out for the Iranian, he might be a terrorist.' I blame our government for cultivating this image by supporting radical groups." Meanwhile, on campuses, rumors abound that Palestinian militants and Hezbollah fighters are imported from Gaza and southern Lebanon to help quell recent student unrest — tales that make the groups even more unpopular. Reformist newspapers and reformist clerics have begun questioning Iran's hard-line stance on Israel. Abdollah Nouri, a former Interior minister and close confidant of Khomeini, has bluntly criticized the Islamic Republic's desire to act "more Palestinian than the Palestinians."
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Of course, despite this growing pragmatism, the Iranians won't be making an appearance in the Knesset anytime soon. For one thing, many Iranian officials would find it difficult to cut ties with Shia Hezbollah, largely because of the long-held political, familial, and cultural links between Lebanese Shia, pro-Hezbollah clerics and their Iranian counterparts. What's more, Iran's pragmatic conservatives will drive a hard bargain to give up their hard-line position. "From their perspective, it is in the national interests to maintain the relationship
, for it's one of their biggest bargaining chips" in any talks with the United States, remarked a Tehran-based observer. "They're not going to give it up for free."
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AFSHIN MOLAVI is the author of Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys Across Iran (Norton) KARIM SADJADPOUR is an analyst with the International Crisis Group. This article appears courtesy of The New Republic.
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/1103/israel_iran.php3