By Victor Kotsev
TEL AVIV - Many hailed Egypt's opening the Rafah crossing into Gaza on Saturday as a historic move. Such it may well be, but its real significance is not that it strengthened Hamas or that it delivered a slap in the face to Israeli and American policies.
There is some reason to believe that its timing was chosen to express Egypt's dissatisfaction with the glamorous spectacle, starring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and United States President Barack Obama, which took place a week or so ago. <1> But this is little more than a petty auxiliary intrigue. The real question, as I have argued several times previously, is whether Egypt is prepared to take responsibility for the Gaza Strip, and whether Israel has any impetus to force it to do so.
To be sure, the Palestinians and their allies celebrated the opening of the crossing. Hamas lauded the "courageous and responsible decision
which falls in line with Palestinian and Egyptian public opinion". Residents of Gaza marked the "start of freedom", as one woman put it to The New York Times.
The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, whose reconciliation with Hamas triggered off the opening of the crossing, also welcomed the move. Yet there was little trace of the victory celebrations that followed far less auspicious recent events such as the end of Israel's Operation Cast Lead in 2009 and last year's bloody confrontation at sea between Israeli commandos and pro-Palestinian activists seeking to breach the Israeli blockade.
The international community responded with cautious optimism. The European Union "welcomed" the opening, even though as a violation of the Rafah agreement of 2005 <2> it contradicted previous EU policies. The Rafah agreement has been inactive for several years following Hamas's takeover of Gaza in 2007.
Israel protested mutely; <3> previously, Israeli officials expressed fears that "Opening Rafah would help Hamas build a formidable terrorist military machine" (to quote a Jerusalem Post article dated a month ago). However, reports suggest that the Netanyahu government was actually pleased by the development.
"Paradoxically, security officials in Israel are satisfied with the opening of the Rafah Crossing," Alex Frishman wrote in the Israeli news site Ynet. "Nobody will say it out loud, yet in internal discussions at the highest levels we see a sense of relief in the face of the unilateral Egyptian move. Officials are saying that we may finally be moving towards full disengagement from the Gaza Strip." <4>
A number of prominent Israeli analysts, furthermore, have opined that the Jewish state benefits from Egypt's decision. Their main arguments are that Israel's security would not be harmed, since the move only ads an official seal to a reality that has been established on the ground for several years by the hundreds of underground smuggling tunnels that connect the Strip to the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, and that Israel would now be able to practically dump responsibility for Gaza on Egypt.
"For all intents and purposes, the opening of the crossing spells the end of Israel's closure of the Strip," Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel wrote in Israeli daily Ha'aretz . <5>
The Israeli government is unlikely to disengage from Gaza in the immediate future, mostly for fear of compromising security and the already-strained relationship with Egypt. However, while officials remain tight-lipped, they clearly are not averse to the idea. Even controversial Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who is often portrayed by Israeli and foreign media as a right-wing loose cannon, played with it last summer. <6>
I argued then that this was a petty attempt by Lieberman to get back at Netanyahu during a temporary falling out between them, and that its goal was to rattle slightly Netanyahu's relationship with then-Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak by implicitly advocating the so-called "Egyptian option" that has gained traction with some Israeli right-wing circles in the past few years. (Essentially dumping Gaza on Egypt). <7>
After the Arab uprisings and Mubarak's ouster earlier this year, everything changed. As many an analyst's eyes turned to Jordan, where the majority of the population is Palestinian, the parallel "Jordanian option" (establishing a Palestinian state in Jordan and parts of the West Bank) gained limited prominence. Necessarily, this also buoyed discussions of the fate of Gaza, which is separated from the West Bank and Jordan by Israeli territory, and in the past months a few muted voices within the political establishment made the case for disengagement.
Oddly, Hamas also recently appeared to welcome full Israeli disengagement, perhaps hoping that it would avoid being subjected to Egyptian rule (something that is not imminent, anyway) and would instead strengthen and take root in the West Bank, piling pressure on Israel from two sides.
Some Israeli pundits have argued that a full disengagement from Gaza would give Israel a legal basis to use greater force in a future military conflict with Hamas.
"In February", according to the Jerusalem Post, "Hamas leader in Gaza Mahmoud al-Zahar called on Egypt to provide electricity and water to the Gaza Strip and to open the Rafah crossing to allow free movement of goods and vehicles to and from the territory."
Such a move could easily lead to a situation where Israel cuts off all connections to the Strip and leaves the responsibility to Egypt to prevent a humanitarian disaster there.
When I sat down with Gershon Baskin, a prominent Israeli peace activist, director of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, and one of the architects of Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas' drive to seek independence at the United Nations in September, <8> he appeared dismissive of the idea of disengagement. He expressed his strong doubts that Israel would end its blockade, and claimed that Egypt would do its best to prevent taking responsibility for the strip.
Being forced to take responsibility for Gaza is Egypt's greatest fear, Dr Baskin explained, and pointed out that only human traffic is currently allowed into the Strip. In the past few years, the Mubarak government turned down several projects to use its territory in order to improve the situation in the Strip, and despite the opening of Rafah to human traffic, the overall policy is unlikely to change dramatically.
Among these projects was an American offer to build a water desalination plant for Gaza in northern Sinai and plans to use Egyptian ports as a trade outlet for the Strip; even ideas to use for the latter purpose a defunct Egyptian airport in close proximity to Gaza were apparently circulated. However, Baskin emphasized, the Egyptian government loudly proclaimed in the past days that Israel was still responsible for humanitarian assistance to the Strip.
It was the Palestinian reconciliation that triggered off the opening of Sinai to Palestinian civilian traffic (except for males aged 18-40, who need a visa to enter Egypt). For almost a month, Cairo delayed implementing the decision, and some Israeli analysts speculated that it had no intention to do so.
Last week, however, immediately following Netanyahu's trip to Washington, the interim Egyptian government finally set a date. In light of its hope to restart the peace negotiations, it is possible to read some frustration with both leaders' speeches behind the timing of the announcement.
Egypt's move, nevertheless, was likely primarily driven by domestic considerations. As American think-tank Stratfor explains:
in full:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MF01Ak03.html