UN agent: Apartheid regime in territories worse than S. Africa

[Classical_Liberal]

UN agent: Apartheid regime in territories worse than S. Africa
By Aluf Benn

South African law professor Prof. John Dugard, the special rapporteur for the United Nations on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, has written in a report to the UN General Assembly that there is "an apartheid regime" in the territories "worse than the one that existed in South Africa."
As an example, Dugard points to the roads only open to settlers, from which Palestinians are banned.

In his report presented early this month, Dugard is highly critical of Israel for its "continuing violations of human rights in the territories." He said Israel is blatantly violating the International Court of Justice's ruling on the separation fence, and has declared it will not obey it.

The report was disseminated among the member countries ahead of the September General Assembly session meant to discuss the fence.........

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/468456.html

[Name removed]

1. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[Classical_Liberal]

2. The Arab countries aren't responsible for creating the refugee crisis

in the first place, and furthermore the Palestinians want to live on the West Bank and not in some other Arab country. The settler need to live in exclusive communities was hardly the fault of the ARabs and is in fact the source of all the animosity. Settlers ethnically cleans Arabs and the Arabs fight back to prevent this. If Israel hadn't ethnically cleansed them in 48 and weren't contiuning the practice to this very day, none of this would be happening. None of it. What settlers do has nothing to do with Arab dictatorships. Also segregating people on race and judging them on race is just dumb, lazy thinking. It is also not liberal, or democratic. White racist in America use the incarceration of Blacks to justify resegregation of the US.

[Gimel]

3. Ethnic cleansing

of Jews was carried out not only in Europe, but also in the Middle East and Egypt and Tunis as recent as 1967.

[Classical_Liberal]

4. Incidences that occurred after Israelis started doing to to Arabs.

.

[Gimel]

5. No proof

Nothing is offered to back up your allegation.

[Classical_Liberal]

6. I assume the readers know about 1948

There has been more than enough Benny Morris printed in this forum. Futhermore 1967 was when occupation/settlements began. I assume people know this as well.

[Gimel]

7. Wrongs

So the wrongs in Europe leading up to Jewish immigration (beginning about 1920) and the efforts of the fedayeen to fight them, justify more wrongs and more ethnic cleansing, in your rational?

Actually, the attacks on Jews in Egypt and Tunis were during the 6 Day War, and before settlements.

If you justify attacks on Jews anywhere in the world for what you see as settlers illegal activities, why is Jewish life so cheap? Benny Morris is not the expert. Many more accounts were first hand, and before Benny was born.

[Classical_Liberal]

8. Post number 4 is where the justifications began and it wasn't

me the posted it. Mine was post number three, where I was saying Israel had a responsiblity to resolve the refugee crisis because it caused it.

[Gimel]

9. Is there another Classical_Liberal here?

Or maybe an impostor? Post #3 is mine, and post #4 is Classical_Liberal.

Anyway, it requires cooperation. One side can't solve the problem for the other side, which obviously rejects any solution offered. If there was a will to live together, it would have been possible long ago.

[Classical_Liberal]

10. No real solution has been offered. Ever.

Israelis have never offered the West Bank, or compensation. They won't unless leverage is applied either.

I counted the original post, as you have probably guessed.

[Gimel]

11. They won't

offer if it continues to be a terrorist's base. As a matter of fact Oslo did just that, and Camp David offered 97% of the West Bank. It was rejected out of hand, and a war started.

The Arabs weakness is not realizing that they are weak, and won't win the wars they start.

[Classical_Liberal]

12. The Camp David offered nowhere near that

http://www.gush-shalom.org/media/barak_eng.swf

http://www.gush-shalom.org/generous/generous.html

There have also been long lulls in terrorist violence.

[Gimel]

13. Long lulls are not peace

You may think they were lulls, but you are not taking into account snipper attacks and attacks on women and children in settlements or kibbutz homes. There have been no extended time when there were attacks that were either carried out, threatened and prevented or failed to be executed for technical reasons.

[Classical_Liberal]

15. If you don't count all the times when there was hardly any violence

you won't get anywhere, because you are depending on human perfection. There was also no period of time when the settlements stopped or even slowed which were wrong and immoral at the outset.

[Gimel]

23. A moral judgment

Balance that with the morality of attacks on innocent people, including children an babies.

Your views are only your personal alignment with one side of the conflict.

[Classical_Liberal]

25. The people who were killed if they didn't surrender their homes

were innocence too. Many of them were also children. The fact that someone kills the armed robbers family doesn't excuse the armed robber for robbery. It is actually important who started the fight.

[OhioStateProgressive]

27. the lulls were just long hudnas(nt)

[Gimel]

14. Camp David proposal

Under the settlement outlined by the President, Palestine would have sovereignty over 94 to 96 percent of the West Bank and it would as well have land belonging to pre-1967 Israel equivalent to another 1 to 3 percent of West Bank territory. Palestinian refugees would have the right to return to their homeland in historic Palestine, a right that would guarantee their unrestricted ability to live in Palestine while subjecting their absorption into Israel to Israel's sovereign decision. In Jerusalem, all that is Arab would be Palestinian, all that is Jewish would be Israeli. Palestine would exercise sovereignty over the Haram and Israel over the Western Wall, through which it would preserve a connection to the location of the ancient Jewish Temple.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380

Barak did not make an offer, and Arafat rejected the Clinton proposal.

Your first link mentions Oslo, not Camp David, the second talks about a Barak proposal which was not put forward at Camp David.

Here is a brief on what actually happened at Camp David:

If there is one issue that Israelis agree on, it is that Barak broke every conceivable taboo and went as far as any Israeli prime minister had gone or could go. Coming into office on a pledge to retain Jerusalem as Israel's "eternal and undivided capital," he ended up appearing to agree to Palestinian sovereignty—first over some, then over all, of the Arab sectors of East Jerusalem. Originally adamant in rejecting the argument that Israel should swap some of the occupied West Bank territory for land within its 1967 borders, he finally came around to that view. After initially speaking of a Palestinian state covering roughly 80 percent of the West Bank, he gradually moved up to the low 90s before acquiescing to the mid-90s range.

Even so, it is hard to state with confidence how far Barak was actually prepared to go. His strategy was predicated on the belief that Israel ought not to reveal its final positions—not even to the United States—unless and until the endgame was in sight. Had any member of the US peace team been asked to describe Barak's true positions before or even during Camp David—indeed, were any asked that question today—they would be hard-pressed to answer. Barak's worst fear was that he would put forward Israeli concessions and pay the price domestically, only to see the Palestinians using the concessions as a new point of departure. And his trust in the Americans went only so far, fearing that they might reveal to the Palestinians what he was determined to conceal.

As a consequence, each Israeli position was presented as unmovable, a red line that approached "the bone" of Israeli interests; this served as a means of both forcing the Palestinians to make concessions and preserving Israel's bargaining positions in the event they did not. On the eve of Camp David, Israeli negotiators described their purported red lines to their American counterparts: the annexation of more than 10 percent of the West Bank, sovereignty over parts of the strip along the Jordan River, and rejection of any territorial swaps. At the opening of Camp David, Barak warned the Americans that he could not accept Palestinian sovereignty over any part of East Jerusalem other than a purely symbolic "foothold." Earlier, he had claimed that if Arafat asked for 95 percent of the West Bank, there would be no deal. Yet, at the same time, he gave clear hints that Israel was willing to show more flexibility if Arafat was prepared to "contemplate" the endgame. Bottom lines and false bottoms: the tension, and the ambiguity, were always there.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380

No fancy maps and graphics, no animations and cartoons. Just the two parties who could have made a deal, but didn't.

[Classical_Liberal]

16. No it talked about what was offered at Oslo and later on at

Camp David. Your article in fact reiterates that ARafat wasn't responsible for the breakdown of talks. From the article.

"To begin, Barak discarded a number of interim steps, even those to which Israel was formally committed by various agreements—including a third partial redeployment of troops from the West Bank, the transfer to Palestinian control of three villages abutting Jerusalem, and the release of Palestinians imprisoned for acts committed before the Oslo agreement. He did not want to estrange the right prematurely or be (or appear to be) a "sucker" by handing over assets, only to be rebuffed on the permanent status deal. In Barak's binary cost-benefit analysis, such steps did not add up: on the one hand, if Israelis and Palestinians reached a final agreement, all these minor steps (and then some) would be taken; on the other hand, if the parties failed to reach a final agreement, those steps would have been wasted. What is more, concessions to the Palestinians would cost Barak precious political capital he was determined to husband until the final, climactic moment.

The better route, he thought, was to present all concessions and all rewards in one comprehensive package that the Israeli public would be asked to accept in a national referendum. Oslo was being turned on its head. It had been a wager on success—a blank check signed by two sides willing to take difficult preliminary steps in the expectation that they would reach an agreement. Barak's approach was a hedge against failure—a reluctance to make preliminary concessions out of fear that they might not.

Much the same can be said about Israel's expansion of the West Bank settlements, which proceeded at a rapid pace. Barak saw no reason to needlessly alienate the settler constituency. Moreover, insofar as new housing units were being established on land that Israel ultimately would annex under a permanent deal—at least any permanent deal Barak would sign—he saw no harm to the Palestinians in permitting such construction. In other words, Barak's single-minded focus on the big picture only magnified in his eyes the significance—and cost—of the small steps. Precisely because he was willing to move a great distance in a final agreement (on territory or on Jerusalem, for example), he was unwilling to move an inch in the preamble (prisoners, settlements, troop redeployment, Jerusalem villages).

Barak's principles also shed light on his all-or-nothing approach. In Barak's mind, Arafat had to be made to understand that there was no "third way," no "reversion to the interim approach," but rather a corridor leading either to an agreement or to confrontation. Seeking to enlist the support of the US and European nations for this plan, he asked them to threaten Arafat with the consequences of his obstinacy: the blame would be laid on the Palestinians and relations with them would be downgraded. Likewise, and throughout Camp David, Barak repeatedly urged the US to avoid mention of any fall-back options or of the possibility of continued negotiations in the event the summit failed. "



Anyway, I don't think this version of events helps your case. It looks like Barak didn't care about negotiating with Arafat at the outset. It looks like Barak had no intention of actually dismantling the settlements at the outset. Thus Barak was the problem.

[Gimel]

18. The blame

While all the participants are criticized and shown to have faults, Arafat came expecting one thing and refused to consider any alternatives.

While Barak had some expectations, Clinton was supposed to help them overcome differences. In the end, the offer given to Arafat was 97% of the WB, which is what you disputed, and Arafat rejected it.

[Classical_Liberal]

19. The article you posted disputes this.

The article you posted supports Gush Shalom.

[Gimel]

20. Percentage of WB to be given over

Palestine would have sovereignty over 94 to 96 percent of the West Bank and it would as well have land belonging to pre-1967 Israel equivalent to another 1 to 3 percent of West Bank territory.

That is from the section I quoted in post #14 above.

You disputed that and referenced Gush Shalom. If you now agree with me, congratualtions.

[Classical_Liberal]

21. It said it was the US presidents plan, not that it was ever offered

by Barak. This is what it said about Barak. furthermore in that very post you admitted that Barak rejected Clintons proposal. So how could Barak offer something he rejected.

The final and largely unnoticed consequence of Barak's approach is that, strictly speaking, there never was an Israeli offer. Determined to preserve Israel's position in the event of failure, and resolved not to let the Palestinians take advantage of one-sided compromises, the Israelis always stopped one, if not several, steps short of a proposal. The ideas put forward at Camp David were never stated in writing, but orally conveyed. They generally were presented as US concepts, not Israeli ones; indeed, despite having demanded the opportunity to negotiate face to face with Arafat, Barak refused to hold any substantive meeting with him at Camp David out of fear that the Palestinian leader would seek to put Israeli concessions on the record. Nor were the proposals detailed. If written down, the American ideas at Camp David would have covered no more than a few pages. Barak and the Americans insisted that Arafat accept them as general "bases for negotiations" before launching into more rigorous negotiations.

According to those "bases," Palestine would have sovereignty over 91 percent of the West Bank; Israel would annex 9 percent of the West Bank and, in exchange, Palestine would have sovereignty over parts of pre-1967 Israel equivalent to 1 percent of the West Bank, but with no indication of where either would be. On the highly sensitive issue of refugees, the proposal spoke only of a "satisfactory solution." Even on Jerusalem, where the most detail was provided, many blanks remained to be filled in. Arafat was told that Palestine would have sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City, but only a loosely defined "permanent custodianship" over the Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest site in Islam. The status of the rest of the city would fluctuate between Palestinian sovereignty and functional autonomy. Finally, Barak was careful not to accept anything. His statements about positions he could support were conditional, couched as a willingness to negotiate on the basis of the US proposals so long as Arafat did the same.

[Gimel]

22. It was the culmination

of the weeks of discussions between the two parties and Clinton. If Arafat had shown more interest, it would have been accepted by Barak as well.

Barak was not willing to go on record with the offer as Arafat would then claim that as the beginning of negotiations after a 4 year Intifada murdering thousands of innocents on both sides.

[Gimel]

24. you've misread

You charged:

furthermore in that very post you admitted that Barak rejected Clintons proposal

I said in my post on the Camp David:

Barak did not make an offer, and Arafat rejected the Clinton proposal.

Barak did not reject Clinton's proposal. That was Arafat. Arafat did not make a counter proposal, and the one offered to Arafat was what Clinton determined was the best offer Barak would approve. Your post above explains in the first paragraph why Barak appears not to have made an offer at all.

[idontwantaname]

28. if you were arafat is this an offer you would accept?

hey gimel.
i hadnt seen you posting for a while... good to see you back.

anyway
im sure this has been gone over already... or is maybe off course...

but have you seen the map of Baraks offer?

it designates most of the regions natural resources to the settlements leaving the palestinians with few wells.

it also breaks up the west bank into clusters surrounded by israeli controlled territory.

if you were arafat is this an offer you would accept?

[Violet_Crumble]

17. Benny Morris is an expert...

It does help when discussing him to have actually read his work. See, he makes heavy use of primary sources (that's first hand accounts written at the time for those who don't know)...

Violet...

p.s. Classical Liberal has never justified attacks on Jews anywhere in the world, but you already know that....

[Jim Sagle]

26. "Special rapporteur, " huh? His rap is SPESHHul for sure.