I don't know much about the International Strategic Studies Association or if this is accurate but it does give an interesting perspective"
Talk about taking a "Ba'ath" and still feeling dirty
ISSA Special Topical Studies
Iraq War 2003: Background, Lessons and Follow-On
http://www.strategicstudies.org/September 2, 2004
The US “Intelligence Wars” and the War on Terrorism
Snip
Consequently, the core of the forces considered “loyal” by the CIA and the US Embassy was comprised of “recycled” and “rehabilitated” Ba’athist security and intelligence veterans. Rhetoric about the democratic character of the Administration, despite the draconian emergency regulations notwithstanding, already on the eve of the transfer of power from the US to his Government then designate-Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi made sure that both the Iraqi public and the Arab world had no illusions about the real nature of his Government.
As first reported by Paul McGeough of The Sydney Morning Herald, in late June 2004, a few days before he assumed power, Allawi visited the Al-Amariyah security center in south-western Baghdad in order to inspect the interrogation of terrorist suspects. There, Allawi drew a pistol and summarily executed six prisoners who were lined in the courtyard. He told the gathered security officials that these prisoners “deserved worse than death” in view of their past killing. Interior Minister-designate Falah al-Naqib was present and congratulated Allawi. The “proof” of Allawi’s resolve and ruthlessness immediately spread throughout the power-centers of Baghdad. Allawi’s and Naqib’s offices issued denials to the Western media only after McGeough broke the story. However, with all other components of the Iraqi power structure collapsing and with the revolt escalating out of control, Washington had no option but to accept this “denial” and keep endorsing Allawi as the only strong-enough leader capable of keeping Iraq unified.
With the US behind him, Allawi continued to consolidate his power through what Arab and Iranian senior officials termed “a quasi-coup in Iraq...”
The Arabists of the CIA have both an explanation why the US has found itself in such a quagmire, and a “solution” — a way out of the Iraqi quagmire — both of which, they are convinced, will secure their triumph. The CIA argues that by securing their “strong man” — Allawi — in power, it would be possible to consolidate a stable enough regime in Baghdad, thus permitting an honorable withdrawal and continued access to the Iraqi oil and markets.
To ensure Allawi’s endurance in power, the CIA is now bribing a large number of Iraqi leaders and “wannabes” to manipulate and truncate the elections of January 2005. The Arabists insist that they are saving the Administration’s posture by pursuing “realpolitique”, namely, the empowerment of an authoritarian administration led by CIA assets. The emergence of such a government in Baghdad, they argue, is neither a perfect solution, nor a defeat. Given the escalating guerilla warfare, this is the best exit strategy which the US can realistically hope for. (Although this Arabists’ approach sounds pragmatic and practical, it is factually wrong. The CIA does not really control Allawi. Determined to survive in power, Allawi has just completed his deal with Tehran fully cognizant that the mullahs are adamant on winning a decisive historic triumph in Iraq, Allawi or no Allawi.)"