Lucas County (OH) Final Report from Recount

[LiberalHeart]

(Note: I've edited this trying to get the chart to display right, but can't get the spacing right. It's from Excel. Maybe someone here would know how to post it correctly? The counted column should be "votes counted".)

A friend of mine who was the coordinator for the Green Party's recount of Lucas County, OH, has sent me the following report -- along with permission to post it here:

Unofficial Totals – Lucas County Recount of Presidential Election 2004


Bush % Bush Votes* Kerry % Kerry Votes* Counted

Official Count 39.55 87,146 60.20 132,646 220,345

Recount 39.54 87,158** 60.21 132,721** 220,430*

* Calculated from % and votes counted. May be different from final figures.

** Includes ballots which were counted after determining voter intent which was not done in the count in November.

Conduct During the Recount

The administration and staff of the Lucas County Board of Elections was very helpful answering all of the questions asked by the witnesses both thoroughly and honestly. After an initial period of tension, all involved settled into a benevolent accommodation of those witnessing.

It is my opinion that the leadership and staff of the BOE did the best and the most conscientious job they could within the parameters of their tasks. Attention to detail and fastidiousness to fairness and bipartisanship was outstanding. I commend them.

Recommendations

1. All software, both for the main computer database program and the optical scan machines and cards, must be public information and open to inspection including review by professionals in the technology. To my knowledge this was not the case of the computer at the Lucas County Board of Elections or the scanning machines and cards used in the 2004 presidential election.
2. A paper trail must be part of any general election voting system including individual ballots. This is the case with optical scan system presently in place and works very well including the ability to assess voter intent on those ballots where the voter had difficulty following the directions precisely. This system should be maintained with some alteration. See recommendation 1.
3. The materials handling system for the precinct boxes should be improved by investing adequate amounts of money to purchase metal (rather than cardboard) boxes, preferably with a system of recording whenever the box is opened or closed and by whom.
4. Recounts should include comparing machine tapes with the numbers in the poll books and register. A full reconciliation of the precinct box should be made in front of the witnesses.

The testing of the machines for the 3% manual count should include a purely randomized choice of precincts (preferably from a random number generating mechanism) and not just involve the comparing of the total count with the machine count. The 3% test should not merely be done to prove that the optical scan machine works, but rather that the totals are correct in 3% of the precincts. The totals should match the official canvas count minus the absentee ballots (which are held separately from the precinct box) plus or minus variations made by determining voter intent on those ballots which could not be counted without such a determination. See note on voter intent.

5. Poll workers should be trained and paid adequately to attract people that can deal with the technology that is being used. There should be a sufficient number of workers for one to be permanently assigned to each scanning machine for voter assistance during the voting period. Technicians should be available to keep all optical scan machines working properly. After watching the recount when the technician needed to intervene on several occasions, it became apparent that such support is critical during the actual election procedure at the polling locations. I doubt that this was the case.

Note on Provisional Ballots: All other issues aside, there is some logic in having provisional ballots counted only at their proper precinct because the order of the candidates rotates alphabetically among the precincts and only the machine card for that precinct (and therein the right order of candidates) can read the ballot. The ticking marks (I think that is the term) on the bottom of the ballot allow it only to be read by the card programmed for its precinct, so only the machine with that specific card for the ballot’s precinct can read that ballot. I believe provisional ballots were from the tablet of ballots for the precinct.

Note on Voters Putting the Ballots in the Wrong Machine: As stated above, the ticking marks on the bottom of the ballot are unique to each precinct. Only a machine with a computer card programmed for that precinct can read that ballot. If a ballot is placed in the wrong machine, it will be rejected – spit out. Further, the over-ride mechanism on the machine will still not allow the ballot to be accepted.

Note on Determining Voter Intent: There has been some discussion about the ability of the official recounters to determine the intent of the voter and therein seen as changing the ballot to some. The judgements made in these instances were always made by a Democrat and a Republican. They were always shown and explained to the witnesses during the time I was there. In no case did I find any of their decisions even questionable; they were obvious.

As an example, a vote was cast for a candidate by marking the circle next to the name plus marking the circle next to the write-in line and writing in the name of the same candidate. Without the allowance to determine the intent of the voter, the ballot would be recorded as an over-vote (two circles filled in) and the candidate would not receive the vote. This was not a common error but occurred several times. The error was resolved by covering the circle next to the write-in designation with a white sticker so the machine could not read the
redundant mark. Thus, the vote was recorded for the candidate with the mark by his name and this voter’s vote was counted.

There were also instances where the voter intent was clear but X’s or √’s were used instead of filling in the circles as directed. These ballots were altered in the presence of a Democrat and a Republican by filling in the circles, or if not possible, making a new ballot (including an explanation on the ballot stub of the new ballot and placing the original with an explanation in the spoiled ballot envelop). These altered or new ballots were shown to the witnesses.

Note on Ballots Put through the Machine More than Once: There was also concern about ballots having to be entered into the machine more than once during the recount which raised the fear that it caused a multiple count. If the machine could not read the mark, it rejected it – spit it out. The ballot is designed so the circles indicating votes are related to uniquely placed black lines on the sides of the ballot. The position of these lines is peculiar to each voting circle. Thus, if the machine can not read the marks when the ballot is run through the machine right side up, top first, because of some physical aspect of the mark, it is rejected when no count is registered. The ballot can then be run through bottom first or even face down. This characteristic allows the machine to read the marks from various aspects (not everyone makes perfect circles) and at the polling place, a ballot can still be read even if it is not perfectly aligned face up top first. Note that if the machine double counted the ballot, it would not reconcile with the poll book and register and the number of ballots used.

Note on the Probability of Fraud: The checks and balances within the system using the paper ballots and optical scan machines are significant. A tape from the machine that records the votes along with the computer card containing the vote totals is included in the locked box that travels from the precinct to the substation and then to BOE. This tape is reconciled at the polling place with the poll books and register. All ballots are accounted for. The tally is either sent to the BOE main computer via modem from polls in outlying areas, or uploaded at the BOE for urban areas. (There is a concern here if the card is not with the precinct box.) These uploads are aggregated into the election night report of vote totals.

An official canvas is then conducted at the BOE with BOE staff where the ballots are re-run through the machines and the tape is reconciled again with the poll books. As in the recount, counting stations are manned by one Republican and one Democrat at all times. The uploading of cards generates a final official report. During this period, precinct boxes including poll books, registers, ballots (used, spoiled and unused), machine cards and tapes, and boxes holding all absentee ballots are locked in a room with double locks which can only be opened by two keys – one held by a Republican and one by a Democrat. (There are rumors these locks are not fully functional.)

The significance of relating these details is that any modification in the votes would have to be a zero sum manipulation so the poll book and register number along with the paper ballot inventory would not be off.

If vote totals were changed by the software in the main computer at the time the aggregate report was generated, the precinct figures would not match the precinct tapes reviewed at the time of the official canvas.

Therefore, if this procedural information as stated is correct (as told to me), any manipulation of data (votes) would have to be in the precinct software. Again, it would need to be zero sum (the vote given to one candidate instead of another rather than a straight addition) so that ballots cast would remain the same and match the poll book. (Adding fraudulent ballots is a complicated matter that could be done from the time the supposed locked precinct box is transported from the polling place to the substation. Only during that time is the box in the control of a single person; thereafter an R and a D are always present. I did not see the locking device used (a metal or plastic sealing mechanism placed through two holes that secure the hinged cover to the bottom of the box and can only be removed by cutting it off). The boxes used are heavy cardboard; metal would be preferable as discussed in the recommendations.

Whether or not there is the logic capacity to alter totals within the computer cards and/or the optical scan machine itself is not known to me. The statement below is purely speculative.

The logic would have to be in its simplest form something resembling: if candidate A reaches a given number, then thereafter ballots for A would be given to B or every second and third vote would be given to B. This would have to be preprogrammed from the main database software into the machine card each time a card is programmed for that precinct. I do not think precincts are always read by the same machine and different machines were used in the recount from those at the polls.

The machine cards from the precincts used in the election are not considered the official record but still exist. The cards used in the recount are different and cards were reprogrammed for counting different precincts. Therefore, any programming anomalies (fraud) would have to be from the main program and downloaded anytime a card was made for the given precinct.

There was no evidence of this during the recount. If the devil is in the details, he remains invisibly cloaked in program language.

[bones_7672]

1. zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz ... n/t

[righteous1]

2. What? You didn't find this to be a compelling read??? (sarc)