Support Holt's Verified Voting bill - easy action link

[Duncan]

from eff email:

* Action Alert: Best E-voting Bill Reintroduced - Lend
Your Support!

In 2004, thousands of EFF activists helped Rep. Rush Holt's
Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act (VCIAA,
HB 550) garner immense support before the session ended.
The bill contains several critically important election
reforms, including the requirement of a paper audit trail
for all electronic voting machines, random audits, and
public availability of all code used in elections. HB 550
was recently reintroduced, and it already has over 100
bipartisan cosponsors.

The momentum is on our side, and it's more important than
ever to ask your representative to support this bill -
many counties across the country are choosing voting
equipment now. Tell Congress to stand up for election
reform!

link:

<http://action.eff.org/site/Advocacy?id=109>

[wtbymark]

1. Done........ty

[Land Shark]

2. Don't support "HOLT" support whatever IDEAS in Holt you support

These bills will all be amended, and may become Trojan Horses. That's not just a maybe, arguably the amendments have been promised to us by certain powerful members of the majority party.

In my mind though, anything that preserves a barrier between the voter and their ballot is both a recipe for fraud (most voters will not closely check a paper ballot IF THE TOUCHSCREEN IS THE PRIMARY WAY TO ENTER VOTES) as well as legitimizing an improper process (no person can vote your ballot for you, and no person or corporation can hide behind a computer and do the very same thing)

[Duncan]

3. The link provided lets you edit a letter.

I know bills are used for trojan horses all the time, but when you support a bill it is usually with a letter indicating exactly what it is that you support. Failing to support bills due to fear of them being twisted around is not an effective means of changing things.


Here is some more info on Holt's bill:


http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/04/02/int04009.html

http://www.verifiedvoting.org/article.php?id=5582

[rigel99]

5. I"m with Landshark NO SUPPORT for Holt Bill , NO COMPROMISES

no waiting for lying 2 faced republicans to deliver on promises.
they are unelected officials and cannot be trusted to do anything
but propagate their power base and corporate interests.....

If the DRE machines are allowed to count the votes in secret, we have a privatized and forever 'fraudulent' election system. The Holt bill allows secret vote counting....

HOLT, nice try, but suggest you visit this link....

the Georgians and Californians are proposing the RIGHT BILL to protect our right to vote...

http://www.msongs.com/vvpb.htm

[garybeck]

6. it's worse than that

Holt's bill doesn't only allow secret ballot counting.

it also allows secret ballot CASTING.

Many people are confused by the wording in regards to the paper audit trail. The voter does NOT VERIFY THEIR VOTE, THEY ONLY VERIFY THEIR AUDIT TRAIL, which in all likelihood will never be counted.


Holt's bill still allows unverified computerized voting which is extremely open to fraud.

Don't be fooled folks, those are not ballots. they are not counted unless there's a recount. and the 2% audit just doesn't cut it.

having said all that, I question whether we should be "not supporting" the bill. Having a paper trail that can be used for recounts is not good enough but it is better than what we have now. and there are other provisions in the bill that do have value.

I feel if we try to stop this bill from passing just because it's not all we want, we will shoot ourselves in the foot.

the other side of the coin is that if it does pass it could provide a false sense of security to voters. but I still think having this become law would be better than not.

[rigel99]

8. THE minute we pass this bill

they will say, we gave you VVPAT and that's what you activists have been screaming for, so that's it..

it's much much better to hold the high road. Why? Because legal litigation will be on our side but that will take a few months to enact. The legal will give legs to the legislative. HOLT will look pretty silly when his bill advocates what will be legally proven as a FRAUD RIDDEN DRE system.

COMPROMISING IS NOT AN OPTION. We are not in the business of begging for our lives at gunpoint. We are in the business of writing a better bill (With Clinton/Boxer or Conyers) or best yet, California and Georgia in the state senates.....

sorry, a bill once enacted becomes law. I will not spend one second supporting a bill that does anything less than provide 100% counting of Paper election night......

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

13. many advantages to this bill

If there had been paper ballots on voting machines in Burke County NC, we could have found out who the voters meant to vote for, instead of having a 10% undervote rate.

If we had paper ballots on the machines in Carteret County, 4,436 votes would not have been irretrievably lost.

If we had paper ballots on the machines in Catawba County, we might have discovered if the undervote rate increase of 40% to 150% over 2000 was due to voters just not voting for many contests, or if it was due to the change from optical scanners to DREs.

If we had paper ballots on the machines in Guilford County, we might have found out if 354 voters realy went to the polls for a single issue election in 2003 and just didn't bother to cast votes.

If we had paper ballots on the machines in Wake County in 2002, then we wouldn't have lost 436 votes.

With the paper ballots, we certainly could have found out what happened in these cases.

Also, if we had paper ballots, we could have audited the touchscreen machines in Craven County, after voters reported that the screens changed the vote from who they voted for to someone else.

People that oppose Holt's bill seem to be oblivious to the fact that gigantic sums of federal funding are going to be given to the states, and with instructions to purchase voting machines.
Holt bill opponents have not offered a viable solution.

If we don't pass Holt's bill, we are at the risk of getting 100% paperless voting. Once states purchase the equipment, it will be even more difficult to turn back the tide.

Then we will have 1 choice - ballots or bullets.

Not supporting the bill and yet not offering any better legislation is in effect supporting the spread of paperless voting.

If you do not want paperless voting, then Holt's bill is the only alternative being offered at this time.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

11. more paperless voting anyone?

The Holt bill does not cause electronic voting.
It requires a paper ballot for every vote.
Without this bill, paperless voting will spread all over the country, all over each state.

Next will be video cameras or audit feedback if we don't get paper ballots for each vote, whether computer or not.

For the purists, that say it is their way or the highway, I say - folks - keep expressing your support for the Holt Bill. It prevents paperless voting. Prevents it.

To kill this legislation is to leave the door wide open for 100% paperless voting.

For those that refuse to support the Holt Bill, rather than trying to kill it, how about someone getting a bill introduced for hand counted paper ballots only?
Certainly this should be easy as pie, shouldn't it?
So easy that no one has done it.
Or is it easier to oppose the Holt Bill, rather than provide an alternative?

While attacking the Holt bill here in DU may be effective at stifling it's support among democrats that read this forum,
this attack leaves folks with no alternative to paperless voting.

It leaves them with what they already have, or puts them at risk of worse.

The Holt bill does not SPREAD electronic voting, it limits electronic voting to the requirement of providing a paper ballot for every vote, with audits.

It certainly is not a trojan horse for paperless voting.
It prevents it. There is nothing to prevent paperless voting right now, and voting machine companies and some election directors strongly oppose a paper ballot for each vote.

Voting machine companies know that if we had a paper ballot for each vote, that we would have 10 times more proof that their crappy machines don't work. We already have seen massive failure with paperless machines.

However, if it Holt's bill doesn't pass, it is most certain that more and more states will adopt paperless voting. Who should we thank for that when that happens?

[garybeck]

4. Holt's bill does some good things but let's not over praise it

the fact remains, even if Holt's bill passes, it will still be perfectly legal for DRE electronic voting machines to cast an UNVERIFIED electronic ballot. This is bad. It is disappointing that no one has proposed legislation to prevent unverified voting.

Holt's bill only calls for the voter to verify their Audit Trail, which is only used in recounts and audits. The voter still can not verify their actual ballot.

Please do not give people the false impression that this bill corrects the problem with electronic voting. As long as DRE machines can legally cast an unverified electronic vote, we still have big problems.

[Bill Bored]

7. It's quite agonizing.

If we don't support it, we may not get paper-anything. And any bill can be screwed up by the majority party -- that's a given.

But if they wanted to pass a bill to give every DRE in the country the ability to count your parking tickets, they could probably do it on their own, so we might as well support something that has a chance of doing some good.

Just don't think that it's the end of the fight, or that we can't do better at the state level or in court or elsewhere.

When we BE the media, we can explain this to people. No false sense of security.

DREs are legal at the moment. While this is debatable, no court has yet declared them not to be. Until then we have to try to make them as Democracy-friendly as possible where they do exist, and keep them away from everyplace else.

Does this make sense?

[rigel99]

9. TIME TO POST SOME GOOD NEWS HERE

OK, so here is my good news.

1. I got GA to give me the Diebold contract they signed for DRE machines. In the past they have blocked access but today said I could copy it at some mutually agreed to time. THIS IS HUGE.

2. I have spoken with my attorneys in preparation for suits. Needless to say, there is 90% assurance, that I will get access to the CD that proves that Diebold does not ACCURATELY tally our votes.

I don't want to sound cocky. I have spent about 3 months giving up thousands of my own personal dollars and very quietly putting a case together.

BUT YOU GUYS HAVE TO BELIEVE ME WHEN I SAY, There are lawsuits in play right now that will invalidate DRE machines for vote counting.

Legislative bills can enact all day long, but will be struck down by courts when this legal precedent is set.

Let's not all waste our time chasing balloons that will do nothing but give us hot air.

Let's all put our enegies into things that will 'invalidate' the use of DRE machine for vote counting.

For example, check your state's election code.

There is a statute in Georgia whereby the county elections folks have a meeting to 'approve' and allow DRE machines... that same statute can be used to go back to paper.

It could really be that simple....

[kster]

12. Thanks rigel99

for all the effort your putting into this.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

10. thanks, I took action

Thanks for posting that link.

So much better than having paperless DREs.

With a paper ballot and audits, we are in better shape than before.

Some critics would rather have all paperless voting or nothing, but that is why republicans keep getting "elected" president.

The turning point is here: it is either with paper or without.
Holt's bill calls for audits, not 100 percent, but audits.

The alternative is "No Audits"

Paperless e-voting is not new, has been around for 20 years.
While I am sure that everyone here in Democratic Wonderland would agree to hand count paper ballots, preaching to the choir is easy and without challenge.

I encourage you not to be blasted by the few loud folks that insist on either it is their way (all paper, but unfortunately these folks have not gotten any legislation introduced or even drawn up) or the highway (paperless voting).

Electronic with paper is a gigantic step in the right direction.

[rigel99]

14. VISIT MY WEBSITE to see the costs of Audits....

to see how much money AUDITS COST CITIZENS..

would you like to quit your 120K a year job,
give up about $10K in out of pocket costs
take on a 2 year ACLU lawsuit against the state

just to audit the friggin state?

that's what an audit is... visit this website to see that auditing a BROKEN SYSTEM is like. It's like they think that the GOP won't rig the audits.. who's going to do the audits... where is the money to pay for that labor and manpower... with a Ken Blackwell conduct an honest audit???? where are the answers to these questions... Bottom Line, Legislative efforts have failed nationwide and our biggest/best solutions are left to street activism and law suits....

the audits mean we look at the data over time (time = fraud as we've seen In OH as they shut down recounts, etc) (days and weeks go by and the data gets manipulated and/or modified, the audits and the paper are not valid, conflict seriously and we the citizens have to SUE SUE SUE to get any results... I have the powerpoints that show what Diebold audit is like, it's all trash.... the paper records don't represent what the user chose but instead what they flipped as it got saved to the PCMCIA card. the person can be shown one thing on the paper inside the window and what goes into the ballots


GOLLY you poor folks.. you're spending time on the wrong issue..
but go ahead, convince yourself you're doing something good while the rest of America is getting further away from representative government.

WE WON"T HAVE TO BEG FOR AUDITS WHEN THERE IS A LAWSUIT SAYING DRE MACHINES ARE PATENTLY fraud ridden and the counties, one by one, go back to paper. It's in the election code.... we have more power as citizens and everytime we put power in the hands of UNELECTED OFFICIALS, I think you election reform folks are either naive or not paying attention, that these guys are not going to vote themselves out of power... the audits are the way they compromise with us and hope we settle down...

well this person is not settling down....
http://www.countpaperballots.com/donate.htm

[Wilms]

15. Unduly Harsh n/t

[rigel99]

16. HERE's WHY WE NEED TO COUNT THE PAPER BALLOTS

Trusting any part of an electronic voting system is like trusting Bernie Ebbers to be 'a little' honest about his Worldcomm dealings... Today Ebbers is convicted of all 11 counts and faces 85 years in jail.. we need to swiftly convict DRE machine vendors as being UNWORTHY of another single penny toward counting our votes!!!!!

check out this website....
www.voterchoice.org
**** following from the website....

. WHY DO GEORGIANS NEED IMPROVED ELECTRONIC VOTING LEGISLATION?

After Georgia implemented new electronic voting machines statewide, the Free Congress Foundation recently identified Georgia as having the worst voting systems implementation in the nation. Georgia received a report card grade of F- on a national average of C+. Officials in a variety of other states across the nation have already found that the voting machines, software and procedures used in Georgia are seriously flawed. For example:

· In California, Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, permanently banned electronic voting machines that are of the similar series and use software identical to those used in Georgia. (AVTS-R6, Diebold Version 4.3.14, Jan. 15, 2003). He also decertified all electronic voting machines for use until identified security measures could be met. His actions were based on a unanimous recommendation in 2004 from the California Voting Systems and Procedures Panel.



* In Maryland, the same electronic voting machines used in Georgia are the subject of a lawsuit filed in 2004 by TrueVote MD against the state for: “improperly certifying the Diebold AccuVote-TS electronic voting machines used in Maryland and then failing to either correct or decertify the machines…” Sworn depositions and supporting research indicate that similar improper certification occurred in Georgia. Governor Ehrlich and the Maryland General Assembly ordered studies from SAIC and RABA technologies, which respectively found 26 security weakness and “considerable security risks” with the same type of electronic voting machines and software that are used in Georgia.



* In Nevada, the Secretary of State requested a voting machine security assessment by the State Gaming Commission Electronic Services Division chief who concluded on November 26, 2003 that: “I believe the Diebold electronic voting machine, operating on the software analyzed in the John Hopkins report and the SAIC Risk Assessment Report, represents a legitimate threat to the integrity of the election process”. The Johns Hopkins report found: “With respect to the Diebold AccuVote TS and TSx, we found gross design and programming errors”. These series of machines include the electronic voting machines and software that are being used to conduct elections in Georgia.



· In Ohio on July 16, 2004, Secretary of State, Kenneth Blackwell, halted deployment of Diebold electronic voting machines that were originally planned for the 2004 primaries and general election after a state ordered study by Compuware found that the machines had the highest number of security risks of any machines evaluated. Blackwell required that the security risks be corrected before the Diebold machines can be implemented in Ohio. Once again, these machines are the same type running the identical software as those currently being used to conduct elections in Georgia.



In summary, four different states and seven different state authorized or state recognized reports have concluded that the same basic voting systems, software and procedures used in Georgia are inadequate to conduct elections in their states. The people of Georgia deserve better.



3. WHY IS THE GEORGIA VOTING SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION RATED AS THE WORST IN THE USA?

In 2000 and prior years, most Georgia voting was conducted on punch card and optical scan equipment that had inherent external audit trails and few problems. This equipment allowed voters to verify that the correct number for each candidate was selected for the ballot while also allowing poll workers to verify that the correct totals were produced for each number. Roughly 53% of Georgia voters used optical scanning equipment and about 83% of the voters had a system that produced some form of paper, which could be used in a recount.



Today, no citizen in the state can verify whether or not his or her vote in an election was recorded correctly. Also, no poll worker in the state can audit whether or not votes were summarized correctly at the precinct, city or state levels. In addition, no tangible physical evidence of voter intent is retained for counts, recounts, audits or elections challenge proceedings. Subsequently the state has no capability for an election recount but only a reprint of unverifiable election results. After electronic voting machines were implemented in Georgia during 2002, the number of Georgia voters who can cast a verifiable, auditable ballot was reduced from roughly 83% to 0%.


4. WHY DO GEORGIANS SPECIFICALLY NEED ELECTRONIC VOTE COUNT PROTECTION?

Electronic voting machines can be accidentally or intentionally programmed to record and count the vote differently than what was intended by the voter. Here are some examples of things that could happen:

* The ballot screen can be interpreted incorrectly when a ballot is recorded;
* Ballot recording can be programmatically distorted during a certain date range;
* Ballot recording can be programmatically distorted after a certain number of ballots are processed;
* Ballot recording can be programmatically distorted after an abnormal combination of votes on a ballot;
* Ballot recording or accumulations can be distorted after receiving a signal or false results via a modem.
* Default selections for undervotes can be improperly chosen contrary to voter intent
* Counts can accumulated incorrectly from the voting machines to precinct totals;
* Counts can be accumulated incorrectly from the precincts to county totals;
* Counts can be accumulated incorrectly from counties to the statewide totals;

These security risks can be averted with basic external audit procedures that are employed in almost any American business system. Such protective procedures were ignored in 2002 when electronic voting was implemented in Georgia, therefore, our current voting systems are now wide open to the abuse, errors and fraud described above.



5. WHAT LEGAL RIGHTS DO GEORGIANS HAVE TO PROTECT THEIR VOTE COUNT?

Evidence indicates that Georgia elections are being conducted in violation of U.S. Supreme Court rulings, the Help America Vote Act and several sections of the Georgia code. For example:



* The U.S. Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), confirmed its previous decisions on vote counting by stating: "It has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote . . . and to have their votes counted". In United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, the Supreme Court stated that it is "as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's vote counted is as open to protection . . . as the right to put a ballot in a box".



* The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), Public Law 107-252, that was used to federally reimburse funds spent by Georgia for electronic voting machines requires that: “the voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with manual audit capacity”.



* The state of Georgia is obligated to enforce "fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections" according to Title 21, Chapter 2 and Subchapter 31 of the Georgia code.



The U.S. Supreme Court has protected the right of citizens to have their vote counted, the Help America Vote Act has mandated a permanent paper record with manual audit capacity and Georgia requires “fair, legal and orderly conduct of primaries and elections”. These precedents are currently being ignored in Goergia.


6. WHAT ELECTRONIC VOTING PROBLEMS DOES GEORGIA HAVE THAT NECESSITATE LEGISLATION?

Although the office of the Secretary of State has reported that no significant problems exist with electronic voting in Georgia, here are some documented examples that indicate otherwise:



* Unsecured Software – Four states and seven state authorized or recognized reports concluded that the same basic voting software used in Georgia was too unsecured to conduct elections in those states.



* Illegal Software Patches – A sworn deposition a Diebold contractor, and public statements from city and county elections officials have documented that multiple illegal software patches were installed several times on different occasions after Diebold machines were supposedly certified for the 2002 election.



* Improper Certification - No documentation has been produced to prove that electronic voting machines were certified for the 2002 election. Upon request, Clifford Tatum, Assistant Director of Legal Affairs at the Election Commission replied: "we have determined that no records exist in the Secretary of State's office regarding a certification letter from the lab certifying the version of software used on Election Day."



* Unlawful Acquisition Secrecy - The State of Georgia agreed to purchase electronic voting machines in May of 2002 through a secret, confidential contract that the Georgia Technology Authority claimed is exempt from the state’s Open Records Act in a response to an August 2003 Open Records Act request.



* Incorrect Undervote Reporting –Documentation obtained from county election officials have shown that the undervote reporting percentages provided by the Office of the Secretary of State are not accurate.



* Inappropriate Vendor Conduct – Diebold employees, who have not taken a sworn oath to uphold Georgia election law, have been granted abnormal access to election results during elections. This includes electronically connecting to county servers for real time monitoring of election results, repeatedly transmitting inaccurate county results and handling voting machines that contained memory cards with completed absentee ballots.



* Stolen Equipment – On June 10, 2002, six Diebold servers with Gem software and other equipment were stolen from a Bibb county Ramada Inn. The Gem software installed on county servers in Georgia does not have controls to prevent the stolen servers from being used to observe, intercept or distort election results.



* Negligent Ballot Control – Several cases have been documented where thousands of ballots were misplaced and not counted on election night. In addition, machines have failed and been swapped out without any controls being placed on the ballots that are contained by either machine involved in the swap. Worst yet, no procedures exist to ensure that the memory card issued for a voting machine is the same card that supplied the count for that machine.



* Uncounted Votes – The software used in Georgia has no way to distinguish the votes of separate write in candidates. In the March 2003, Macon mayor race, ballot images had to be printed and manually counted to determine the results of the race where two write-in candidates garnered over 30% of the total vote.



* Unlawful Operations Secrecy – Although Title 21 Chapter 2-Subchapter 2-406, 408 of the state elections code requires state election workers to conduct the business of elections in public, at least one voter choice coalition member has been refused admission to observe election proceedings at a tabulation center.



These examples and the other problems stated in this overview clearly show that Georgia electronic voting has experienced serious problems that need to be corrected. Nevertheless, the office of the Secretary of State has led most people to believe that elections in Georgia have been smooth and relatively trouble free. In reality, no one in Georgia, including every election official, knows whether or not elections have been smooth because none of the election results can be verified.



7. HOW WILL THE VOTE COUNT PROTECTION ACT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS?

The Vote Count Protection Act will restore the protections that Georgia voters had prior to statewide implementation of electronic machines in 2002 and offer several new protections. For example, this Act will:

* Provide a permanent, tangible, paper record as the official ballot of votes recorded for each voter;
* Specify that the tangible paper records are the official ballots to be used for counting, auditing, recounting the vote and for election challenge proceedings;
* Offer each voter the opportunity to verify and affirm that the official ballot has accurately recorded his or her intent before casting the ballot for counting;
* Restore public ballot counting procedures at the precinct on election night for all voting systems in Georgia;
* Protect against any type of election fraud by allowing manual results to be compared against electronic results at the precinct on election night;
* Ensure that all tabulation center operations are conducted publicly and that precinct results are made public immediately;
* Include a provision for voice prompts to assist visually impaired voters with ballot verification;



All of these features are non-partisan provisions that almost every citizen in Georgia would expect and many may even believe are already in place. However, these provisions do not exist, are currently ignored or have been removed from previous Georgia election law.


8. WHY CAN’T WE RELY ON STATE ELECTION OFFICIALS TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS?

Election officials serve under the direction of the Georgia Secretary of State who has actually created most of the problems detailed in this overview. Specifically, the office of the Secretary of State has:

* Failed to evaluate electronic voting machines from vendors who provide verifiable, auditable ballots
* Participated in a secret contract to acquire the electronic voting machines and software that have been ruled inadequate to conduct elections in four states
* Did not properly certify the electronic voting machines that were installed in 2002
* Replaced verifiable, auditable ballots that existed in most Georgia precincts with electronic records that cannot be verified or externally audited
* Consistently and adamantly opposed efforts to restore verifiable or auditable elections in Georgia
* Opposed the 2004 Senate Bill, SB500, that attempted to provide voter verified paper ballots
* Ignored certain rulings and regulations from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Help America Vote Act and Georgia state codes
* Incorrectly stated to Senate committees in 2004 that there were no federally certified electronic voting machines that produced a voter verified paper ballot.
* Failed to respond to 15 items of a March 4, 2003 Open Records Act request

· Retained an expert who personally and publicly attacked a Georgia citizen in electronic print when he pointed out that the electronic voting machines under consideration had no external audit trails

This track record of working in a manner that is contrary to the best interests of voters in Georgia has proven that the office of the Secretary of State does not have credibility or desire to solve these problems.


9. WHAT ARE THE NEXT STEPS FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS?

The Georgia Vote Count Protection Act must be passed into law. It is a completely nonpartisan piece of legislation that was drafted by Georgia citizens for Georgia citizens and has already gained wide support. It is also clearly written and easily understood by legislators and citizens alike. If you are a legislator we ask that you refer to the special legislator page on our web site, contact us for more information and please sponsor or support this bill. If you are citizen we ask that you use this overview to contact your Ga. State Senator and House Representative to request their sponsorship or support. For more information please contact us at 404 806 0035. Thank you for your concern regarding this critical Georgia issue.



10. BIBLIOGRAPHY

State of Georgia DRE Timeline: http://www.sos.state.ga.us/pressrel/dretimeline.htm

Free Congress Foundation Report: http://countthevote.org/fminus.htm

California De-Certification: http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ks_dre_papers/decert.pdf

Ohio Halt of DREs: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/news/release/07-16-04.htm

Nevada Statement: http://sos.state.nv.us/press/121003.htm

TrueVoteMD Lawsuit: http://truevotemdorg/litigation_complaint.asp

2001 CalTech/MIT Report: http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/2001report.html

Johns Hopkins/Rice Report: http://avirubin.com/vote/analysis/index.html

SAIC Report: http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/dbm_publishing/public_content/dbm_search/technology/toc_voting_system_report/votingsystemreportfinal.pdf

RABA Technologies Report: http://www.rabacom/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf

Compuware Report: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/files/compuware.pdf

Diebold Employee Rob Behler's statement: http://countthevoteorg/behler_interview.htm

Cliff Tatum denial of certification letter: http://countthevote.org/nocert.htm

Real Time Monitoring allowed: http://countthevote.org/monitor.htm

Walker County Inaccurate Results: http://countthevote.org/walker_county.htm

Undervotes reprogrammed to Blank Voted Ballots: