Why don't Christians trust atheists?

[rug]

Randal Rauser, associate professor of historical theology at Taylor Seminary, Edmonton, Canada, has penned an interesting blog on the foundations of the widespread Christian distrust of atheists. The popular notion that Christians regard atheists as immoral is wrong, he says. Making note of the now familiar study in which atheists were rated by Americans as the least trustworthy group -- below Muslims -- Rauser supposes that it's not morality but the nature of the worldview itself.

Citing a passage from an epistle of Paul, Rauser compares atheists who deny the "obvious" evidence for god's existence to (ironically) a medieval bishop denying the clear telescopic evidence that the earth revolves around the sun. Atheists are viewed by Christians the same way, he proposes. "In short, this means that atheists who deny the knowledge which is generally available to everyone are wickedly suppressing evidence that is available to them."

So it's not really about morality, at least not directly. Instead, Christians distrust anyone who is either so evil or so dumb that they can't see and accept the obvious. How can someone who makes such an elementary error be trusted with more "nuanced" decisions, especially the kind that dominate politics? Or morality?

While it seems a bit naive to suppose that no Christians believe atheists to be inherently immoral (there are certainly enough preachers preaching sermons to that effect...) there is probably merit in this. One of the most common themes coming from both pulpits and personal testimonies is the joy of seeing god in everything from the grandeur of the universe to the smile of a baby. And many Christians seem nonplussed when atheists suggest that nature is not good evidence for the existence of a god.

Examiner.com http://www.examiner.com/atheism-in-atlanta/why-don-t-christians-trust-atheists#ixzz1Ovg1ZQwY

[baldguy]

1. Because atheists have spent the last 2000 yrs slaughtering anyone who didn't share their beliefs?

Oh, right .... It's been the Christians who've been doing that.

[rug]

2. No, I didn't see that in the article.

Maybe I'll read it again.

[msongs]

3. because atheists keep asking why bibles are not in the fiction section at the library lol nt

[Curmudgeoness]

4. Hmmmm, well, I do have something in common with this theory.

"Christians distrust anyone who is either so evil or so dumb that they can't see and accept the obvious"-----And the feeling is mutual.

But the writer already knows this. I don't understand why we care one way or the other if someone is a believer or not. In fact, I have no desire to convince a single believe that there is no god. If they are willing to live by the teachings of the Bible, they will be living a good life and why would I want to take that away from them. (But don't get me started on the people who do not live by the teachings but tell me about how Christian they are---I love to skewer them.)

[darkstar3]

5. "Ah, arrogance and stupidity all in the same package. How efficient..."

[rug]

6. Babylon 5 had pretty shitty dialogue.

[darkstar3]

7. And my opinion of it just went up

[rug]

8. Enjoy.

"I hope in your stumbling around you do not wake the dragon." - Londo Mollari

Truly deathless drama.

[spin]

9. I've found that I have been treated better by atheists than by Christians ...

The only problem with Christianity is Christians.

[Orrex]

10. Because atheists are famously great in the sack is why

Duh.

[laconicsax]

11. The neighbors do wonder what's going on sometimes.

[dimbear]

12. It's shocking that Christians don't keep up with court decisions.

The idea that atheists aren't to be trusted went out in 1961 with the Torcaso v Watkins decision. Since then atheists can be considered reliable witnesses in any court in the United States, regardless of any state laws which formerly classified them with mental defectives and children as prima facie incompetent.

http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=librar...

Of course those laws are still on the books, no need to tinker with them as they may again be useful some sunny day.

[Leontius]

13. What!

[trotsky]

14. K&R for the sheer comedy! n/t

[struggle4progress]

15. I tracked back from the Examiner to Rauser's blog and then to the Maitzen Free Inquiry piece.

I'd have to say I'm really not impressed by any of it

As a general rule, I don't read stuff in the Examiner, and Hamby's bit doesn't do anything to change my mind, partly because he's immediately interested in the question of evidence, which I think has nothing to do with religious belief

I don't find Rauser's bit any more impressive. Rauser suspects American Christians distrust atheists because the Christians think the atheists are dishonest. I consider that naive and ideologically based

Finally, I went back and read Maitzen's "Does God Destroy Our Duty of Compassion?" -- a piece that Rauser linked. Maitzen's piece strikes me as a mishmash of childish theodicy arguments

The progression here is from Maitzen's theodicy arguments to Rauser's naive psychosocial speculations to Hamby's demand for discussion of evidence: there is nothing coherent in the progression

Maitzen's theodicy arguments are a waste of time. "Why is there evil in the world?" is unimportant abstract nonsense: the proper question is "How should I address the evil I encounter?"

And Rauser is completely blind to the actual dynamics of American culture. Almost everyone here is impressed by their own opinions and rudely contemptuous of folk who disagree -- on almost every topic

[rug]

16. Thanks for the trackback.

Good summary.

[Silent3]

17. How lucky for you that you can so handily dismiss theodicy.

The existence of evil might not totally eliminate the possibility of the existence of a deity or deities, but it certainly doesn't sit very well with many people's inconsistently-described versions of God.

Then again, since you so easily hand-wave away the importance of evidence, I don't suppose "abstract nonsense" like consistency matters much to you either. You are soooooo beyond all that! :eyes:

[struggle4progress]

18. Is the problem of evil really a problem of the consistency of our notions?

[Sal316]

19. No, the problem of evil...

...is people looking for a convenient excuse to blame the actions of other people on.

Those that look to Epicurious' Argument forget one thing.

Free will.

They're simply looking to exonerate humanity for the evil humanity brings by blaming God for not stopping it.

It's really a weak argument.

[darkstar3]

20. Actually, free will is a weak argument for the problem of evil.

Because it inevitably leads to a circle sooner or later.

[laconicsax]

21. Ooh! The free will card!

Tell me, Mr. Enlightened Theologian, does free will explain away natural disasters, incurable disease, drought, or pestilence?

All of those things are incompatible with the notion of a benevolent god. Is free will somehow responsible for these things too?

[rug]

25. How is a natural disaster evil?

[laconicsax]

28. Did I say they were?

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?”

Replacing "evil" with natural disasters, disease, etc. doesn't change the argument, but it does eliminate the "free will" dodge.

[rug]

29. If Epicurus wanted to write the Riddle of Natural Disasters, he was quite capable of doing so.

The problem of evil is a different thing entirely.

[laconicsax]

31. Different only because apologists are able to weasel out of it.

You can swap out "evil" with plenty of things and the problem is the same.

Evil:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

Natural disasters:

Is God willing to prevent natural disasters, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh natural disasters?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

Disease:

Is God willing to prevent disease, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh disease?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

Suffering:

Is God willing to prevent suffering, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh suffering?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

[rug]

32. Oh, now you claim disease is synonymous with evil?

Pray tell, what do you think is not synonymous with evil?

[laconicsax]

34. Nice try.

Natural disasters, disease, and suffering in general are valid substitutes for evil in Epicurus' 'riddle' because they all illustrate the same problem with the description of the Abrahamic god as omnipotent and benevolent.

But you knew this already.

[rug]

35. No, they are different things.

[laconicsax]

36. They are different things with the same implication, making them valid substitutes.

If you disagree, why don't you offer an explanation?

[LeftishBrit]

22. Free will could only explain *some* of the world's problems

War; poverty caused by powerful people's greed; oppression of some groups by others.

But it cannot explain earthquakes, tsunamis, disease, all the suffering that is due to non-human factors.

And for that matter all the physical factors that lead to some people being 'in the wrong place at the wrong time' when there is a war or massacre, while others escape.

[rug]

24. You assume earthquakes are evil.

[LeftishBrit]

39. Clearly, as earthquakes, etc are involve inanimate objecs, they are not 'evil' in the intentional

sense.

However, they are AN evil. They cause disaster and suffering to others; and if one assumes a God who is both omnipotent and benevolent, then surely such a God should be able to prevent such disasters. It is even more difficult to understand how a good and powerful God could allow these disasters than wars and tyranny, since the former do *not* involve the free will of humans.

[Silent3]

23. There are multiple problems of evil.

What is evil? For me, it's not a thing in-and-of-itself, it's just a category, a descriptive term for behavior. Many religious believers, however, cause themselves unnecessary logical complications by speaking of evil as if it were some kind of mysterious dark force or spiritual contagion.

Why is there evil? That's not a difficult problem for me as an atheist. Much of what we call "evil" isn't all that mysterious in light of our evolutionary past, knowing, for instance, that even in a social species that benefits from cooperation, pure cooperation and selflessness would not be an ideal gene-perpetuation strategy. The existence of evil is more difficult to explain for someone who not only claims there is a God, but who describes that God as infinitely loving, merciful, and just.

What can we do about evil? Plenty of things: relieve the suffering of victims of evil, try to prevent the conditions that lead to evil behavior, without going so far as to sacrifice too much of our freedom (which is itself a form of evil) try to limit the ability of people to act on evil impulses, etc. Not wasting time praying for evil to go away also sounds like a good idea to me.

Why does God permit evil? Not really my problem, since I don't believe in God, yet I can still contemplate the possibility that there might be some sort of entity powerful and fundamental enough to be worthy of the label "God" who nevertheless simply might not have great concern for the suffering of humanity. I don't have to try to reconcile, as many religious people try (and fail) to do, my own self-inflicted belief in an all-powerful, all-knowing God who, for some reason I can't explain very well, sits back letting terrible things happen.

The problems of evil are problems for the consistency of some of our notions about God.

[muriel_volestrangler]

26. But Maizen doesn't talk about 'evil'; he just talks about suffering

And I think your use of the word 'evil' has rather sidetracked the discussion - hence the arguments above about whether earthquakes etc. are 'evil'. No-one had actually claimed they are; but they do cause suffering, and, if we are considering an extremely powerful god, they are a valid part of the discussion of that god's attitude to humans and humans' obligations to that god (eg few Greeks would have said we have a duty of compassion because of Poseidon, who was blamed for quakes).

[skepticscott]

27. Exactly

the issue is not whether natural disasters are "evil", since clearly they aren't, but why a supposedly benevolent and powerful god would fail to prevent them (or create a world where they could happen in the first place). This is where the apologists usually employ the convenient but dishonest dodge of disavowing any ability by humans to know the mind, purposes or intentions of god (even though their whole system of belief is founded on being able to know exactly those things).

[struggle4progress]

30. That seems a silly quibble to me: if you replace "evil" by "suffering" in what I wrote,

my point remains entirely unchanged: "Why is there suffering in the world?" is unimportant abstract nonsense: the proper question is "How should I address the suffering I encounter?"

[laconicsax]

33. "Why is there suffering in the world?" is easily answered.

Why is there suffering? Simply because the universe is indifferent to humanity.

[LAGC]

38. Yep.

If God really exists, he obviously doesn't give a damn what happens to us.

Therefore, why should we give a damn about him?

[muriel_volestrangler]

37. You asked "is the problem of evil really a problem of the consistency of our notions?"

If you asked "is the problem of suffering really a problem of the consistency of our notions?" then the obvious answer would be 'no'. But we now have a large sub-thread about evil because of your question.

If you think "why is there suffering in the world?" is unimportant abstract nonsense, then I'm surprised you have anything to do with religion at all. I think nearly all priests, pastors, imams and so on would say it's not just 'unimportant nonsense'.

[Lydia Leftcoast]

40. I don't trust or mistrust any CATEGORY of people

That's bigotry.

[LeftishBrit]

41. I think it is partly indeed an inability to understand how any sensible person could believe

differently from themselves. It is not confined to religion. I have come across people -usually young - who can't trust anyone who has a different taste in clothes or in music or who supports a different football team. I have come across people of all ages who can't trust anyone who disagrees with them on any of a number of issues.

With religion, there are the additional issues that (a) religion is often *very* stronly identified with culture and even nationality; (b) some people are indoctrinated with the idea that non-believers are generally selfish and untrustworthy as they are seen as having no incentive to be moral, or more specifically that both religion and morality require particular hardline views on gays, abortion and other issues related to the important topic of SEX.

All that being said, I've met plenty of religious people who *don't* have a problem with atheists.