snip
in a hospital, human error seems all but inevitable. How can any one individual, or even any one team of individuals, keep all the tasks straight and anticipate all eventualities 100 percent of the time?
But Dr. Peter Pronovost, a critical care specialist at the Johns Hopkins medical center in Baltimore, thought he knew how to minimize human error. It was, as Dr. Atul Gawande describes it in his provocative new book, “The Checklist Manifesto,” an idea so simple that it seemed downright loopy.
In 2001 Dr. Pronovost borrowed a concept from the aviation industry: a checklist, the kind that pilots use to clear their planes for takeoff.
In an experiment Dr. Pronovost used the checklist strategy to attack just one common problem in the I.C.U., infections in patients with central intravenous lines (catheters that deliver medications or fluids directly into a major vein).
Central lines can be breeding grounds for pathogens; in the Hopkins I.C.U. at the time, about one line in nine became infected, increasing the likelihood of prolonged illness, further surgery or death.
Dr. Pronovost wrote down the five things that doctors needed to do when inserting central lines to avoid subsequent infection:
wash hands with soap; clean the patient’s skin with chlorhexidine antiseptic; cover the patient’s entire body with sterile drapes; wear a mask, hat, sterile gown and gloves; and put a sterile dressing over the insertion site after the line was in.
“These steps are no-brainers; they have been known and taught for years,” writes Dr. Gawande, a surgeon at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston and a staff writer at The New Yorker, where a version of “The Checklist Manifesto” first appeared in late 2007. “So it seemed silly to make a checklist for something so obvious.”
But Dr. Pronovost knew that about one-third of the time doctors were skipping at least one of these critical steps. What would happen if they never skipped any? He gave the five-point checklist to the nurses in the I.C.U. and, with the encouragement of hospital administrators, told them to check off each item when a doctor inserted a central line — and to call out any doctor who was cutting corners. As Dr. Gawande relates it, “The new rule made it clear: if doctors didn’t follow every step, the nurses would have backup from the administration to intervene.”
The nurses were strict, the doctors toed the line, and within one year the central line infection rate in the Hopkins I.C.U. had dropped from 11 percent to zero. Two years after the checklist was introduced, Dr. Pronovost calculated, it had prevented 43 infections, avoided 8 I.C.U. deaths and saved the hospital approximately $2 million.
Based on this success, Dr. Pronovost and his colleagues wrote up checklists for other situations in the I.C.U., like mechanical ventilation. (Were antacids prescribed to prevent stomach ulcers? Was the bed propped up 30 degrees to keep the windpipe clear of saliva?) The average length of stay in the I.C.U. dropped by half, and 21 fewer I.C.U. patients died than had died the previous year.
The story of the Hopkins I.C.U., and many other stories from “The Checklist Manifesto,” will be familiar to loyal fans of Dr. Gawande’s amazing New Yorker article
snip
..... the complexities of technology in the 21st century may be best handled by the simplest solution. “We may admit that errors and oversights occur — even devastating ones,” he writes, referring here primarily to his fellow surgeons, a group not known for modesty. “But we believe our jobs are too complicated to reduce to a checklist.”
snip
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/books/24book.html?em