The decision’s reasoning can also be applied neatly to Trump’s practice of blocking Twitter users with whom he disagrees. When Trump blocks Twitter users, they can still see his tweets—by, for instance, viewing them in an incognito window. But they cannot engage directly with his tweets, at least not without resorting to an intricate and unreliable workaround. (Knight mentions “a third-party application” that can “mitigate the implications of the block,” but it is “burdensome” and seems to rely “on a temporary glitch in Twitter’s interface.”) This inability to respond to Trump may seem to present only a minor burden on speech. But it poses a real First Amendment problem nonetheless, inflicting a potentially unconstitutional burden on protected political speech.
There’s just one lingering issue with this comparison: It isn’t clear whether Trump intends his personal Twitter page to function as a public forum the way Randall did. (Trump has a presidential account, @POTUS, from which he does not block users—but he doesn’t use it for interesting communications.) Public officials have more latitude to censor expression in personal, private forums than they do in forums that they use to speak in their official capacity. Trump’s lawyers will almost certainly argue that his personal Twitter feed is a private forum, not a government project.
But that argument will likely fail. As Trump’s recent tweets banning transgender military service demonstrate, the president uses Twitter not just to convey official policy but also for lawmaking. This habit would seem to turn his feed into a quintessential public forum. And so, under the First Amendment, he lacks the power to block those users who tweet their discontent at @realDonaldTrump.
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/07/28/federal_court_rules_public_officials_cannot_block_social_media_users.html
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