Are Conservatives More Likely Than Liberals to Avoid Cognitive Dissonance?

[Judi Lynn]

Are Conservatives More Likely Than Liberals to Avoid Cognitive Dissonance?
—By Chris Mooney
| Mon Jun. 17, 2013 3:20 AM PDT

Ever since Stanford psychologist Leon Festinger's pioneering work on doomsday cults in the 1950s, the concept of cognitive dissonance has been well established in psychology and even, to some extent, embedded in public consciousness. Basically, when the mind is faced with an idea that is threatening to one's identity or sense of self—an idea that induces unpleasant dissonance—one tends to try to either avoid the thought or, perhaps, reinterpret it into something unthreatening or positive. Thus, in Festinger's landmark work, a doomsday cult interpreted the failure of the world to end on the precise day they had predicted as evidence that their beliefs were right in the first place!

But do liberals and conservatives differ in their tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance? Suggestive evidence from past research suggests they might. For instance, a study of voters in the 2000 election by Stanford public opinion specialist Shanto Iyengar and his colleagues found that although Republicans and conservatives were more interested in learning information about George W. Bush than about Al Gore, Democratic and liberal voters had no such political preference.

In a recent study in PLOS One, an online academic journal, the psychologist Jay Van Bavel and his colleagues at New York University set out to explicitly test whether conservatives are more likely than liberals to avoid the unsettling sensation of cognitive dissonance. For the experiment, they asked George W. Bush and Barack Obama supporters to write an essay supporting the president whom they had already said they opposed. It was a test, as the study's instructions instructions put it, of "the ability to craft logical arguments arguing positions you may not personally endorse."

Importantly, the study sometimes presented writing the essay as a choice—which is more likely to arouse dissonance—and other times presented it as an assignment. As a control, the participants were put through the same routine by being asked to write essays on a non-political issue: How they felt about Macs vs. PCs.

More:
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/06/study-conservatives-more-likely-liberals-avoid-cognitive-dissonance

[Doctor_J]

1. Cons avoid cognitive dissonance by avoiding reality

"Fox News says climate change doesn't exist. Therefore no amount of evidence will convince me that it's true, or even intrude on the Fox Bubble"

[JayhawkSD]

2. Yes, Liberals are superior to Conservatives in every way

We obviously are smarter, by a couple of dozen IQ points or more. We are much better educated. We are far better in our ability to think, and substantially more rational. We have better morals and go to church on a much more regular basis. We give far more to charity. We treat our parents better and, if parents, raise our children better. We are better looking, have better singing voices and we dress far more tastefully.

[Doc_Technical]

4. My dear JayhawkSD,

Methinks you snark greatly.

[kristopher]

7. Jayhawk's way of dealing with the cognitive dissonance created by the OP. nt

[raccoon]

6. self delete

[Dark n Stormy Knight]

8. We??? Hilarious!!!!!

[OnyxCollie]

3. There's a lot of cognitive dissonance in the fan base

regarding the domestic spying.

“There Must Be a Reason”: Osama, Saddam, and Inferred Justification
http://sociology.buffalo.edu/documents/hoffmansocinquiryarticle_000.pdf

One of the most curious aspects of the 2004 presidential election was the strength
and resilience of the belief among many Americans that Saddam Hussein was linked to
the terrorist attacks of September 11. Scholars have suggested that this belief was the
result of a campaign of false information and innuendo from the Bush administration.
We call this the information environment explanation. Using a technique of “challenge
interviews” on a sample of voters who reported believing in a link between Saddam and
9/11, we propose instead a social psychological explanation for the belief in this link.
We identify a number of social psychological mechanisms voters use to maintain false
beliefs in the face of disconfirming information, and we show that for a subset of voters
the main reason to believe in the link was that it made sense of the administration’s decision
to go to war against Iraq. We call this inferred justification: for these voters, the fact of the
war led to a search for a justification for it, which led them to infer the existence of ties
between Iraq and 9/11.

~snip~

In this article we present data that contest this explanation, and we develop
a social psychological explanation for the belief in the link between Saddam
and Al Qaeda. We argue that the primary causal agent for misperception is not
the presence or absence of correct information but a respondent’s willingness to
believe particular kinds of information. Our explanation draws on a psychological
model of information processing that scholars have labeled motivated reasoning.
This model envisions respondents as processing and responding to information
defensively, accepting and seeking out confirming information, while ignoring,
discrediting the source of, or arguing against the substance of contrary information
(DiMaggio 1997; Kunda 1990; Lodge and Tabor 2000). Motivated reasoning is
a descendant of the social psychological theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger
and Carlsmith 1959; Kunda 1990), which posits an unconscious impulse to
relieve cognitive tension when a respondent is presented with information that
contradicts preexisting beliefs or preferences. Recent literature on motivated
reasoning builds on cognitive dissonance theory to explain how citizens relieve
cognitive dissonance: they avoid inconsistency, ignore challenging information
altogether, discredit the information source, or argue substantively against the
challenge (Jobe, Tourangeau, and Smith 1993; Lodge and Taber 2000; Westen
et al. 2006). The process of substantive counterarguing is especially consequential,
as the cognitive exercise of generating counterarguments often has the ironic
effect of solidifying and strengthening the original opinion leading to entrenched,
polarized attitudes (Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2000; Sunstein 2000; Lodge and
Taber 2000). This confirmation bias means that people value evidence that confirms
their previously held beliefs more highly than evidence that contradicts them,
regardless of the source (DiMaggio 1997; Nickerson 1998, Wason 1968).

~snip~

We chose to focus on Republican partisans because of the well-documented
partisan difference in the perception of the validity of this link. We assumed
that Democratic partisans would not have a strong desire to defend the Bush
administration on this issue, thus severely reducing the variation we would
capture in responses. Our choice of subjects means that we are investigating how
partisanship produces and reinforces political (mis)information. Our choice of
subjects should not be taken to imply that the processes we are examining here
are particular to conservatives: we expect that, had we conducted this study in
the late 1990s, we would have found a high degree of motivated reasoning
regarding the behavior of President Clinton during the Lewinsky scandal.
Previous research on motivated reasoning has found it among respondents of all
classes, ages, races, genders, and affiliations (see Lodge and Tabor 2000).

[toby jo]

5. Absolutely - you have to pick up everything and look at it from all angles to really get the why

of letting it go.

They just look. One-diminesional minds.