Extensive Interview w/ Key Fukushima Nuclear Official Dr. Madarame

[kristopher]

This is a translation from the Japanese of an article that recently appeared in the Japanese equivalent of the Wall Street Journal.
The translation was done by a bilingual blogger in Japan that since the beginning of the disaster has provided some of the best English language coverage available, bar none.

Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame
Fukushima I NPP Wasn't Much of a Topic in March 11, 2011 Meeting Despite Station Blackout and Emergency Core Cooling Failure"

Dr. Haruki Madarame was the chairman of the now-defunct Nuclear Safety Commission at the time of the start of the Fukushima nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. He became instantly infamous and reviled in Japan when it was reported that he had reassured then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan on their way to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in the morning of March 12, 2011 that there would be no explosion. A few hours later, the Reactor 1 building blew up in a hydrogen explosion.

Nikkei Shinbun interviewed Dr. Madarame recently, who was as candid as he had been in the past few times he had spoken about his role in the early days of the nuclear accident, readily admitting his errors. (In his testimony to the Diet Commission that investigated the Fukushima I NPP accident in February 2012, Dr. Madarame said he didn't remember the 1st week of the accident, as he was so tired from lack of sleep.)

Nikkei's article from the interview is very informative but also quite long, so it will be in 7 installments.

In the first installment below, Dr. Madarame paints a picture of the Kan administration and himself not knowing what was going on and not knowing what to do....

Part 1 continues here:
http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2014/01/nikkei-shinbuns-interview-of-haruki.html

Part 2 snip:

"In retrospect, I didn't know what was going on in the room. In a nuclear accident, NISA's Emergency Response Center (ERC, in the Ministry of Economy Annex building) was to be the command center. I assumed the ERC was doing the job, and I was there at the Prime Minister's Official Residence to explain things to the politicians. But I was answering a barrage of questions from my memory, without any reference material, not even a blueprint of the plant [reactors]. Commissioners [of Nuclear Safety Commission] started to gather in the office in the evening of March 11, but I couldn't make a call on my cellphone from the Crisis Management Center in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence to get their help."

http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2014/01/nikkei-shinbuns-interview-of-haruki_12.html

Part 3 snip:

"The purpose of the vent had vastly changed from the previous night. By that time [morning of March 12, 2011], it could be assumed (I assumed) that the reactor core melted, and the pressure inside the Containment Vessel was rising (because of water vapor and gas). The vent was necessary in order to protect the Containment Vessel (from damage)."

http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2014/01/nikkei-shinbuns-interview-of-haruki_15.html

Part 4 snip:

"I hardly slept. But on March 13, I began to have more time [or "peace of mind"] to listen to other experts. Discussion with Dr. Kukita was particularly valuable, and we both agreed that the most frightening possibility at that time was the phenomenon called "High-pressure Melt Through" (HMT). HMT happens when the melted fuel melts the Pressure Vessel wall thin, and the melted fuel gets ejected through the Pressure Vessel due to the difference in pressure between the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. It is possible that the melted fuel could pierce through the wall of the Containment Vessel."

http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2014/01/nikkei-shinbuns-interview-of-haruki_16.html

Parts 5, 6, and 7 not yet available.