Nuclear weapons 2011: Momentum slows, reality returns

[kristopher]

This article is an excellent discussion of the potential nuclear weapons proliferation consequences related to the spread of civilian nuclear energy reactors.
About the author:

Steven E. Miller is director of the International Security Program, editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal International Security, and co-editor of the International Security Program’s book series, Belfer Center Studies in International Security (published by the MIT Press). Previously, he was senior research fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and taught defense and arms control studies in the department of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is co-author of the monograph War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2002). Miller is editor or co-editor of more than two dozen books including, most recently, Going Nuclear (MIT Press, 2010) and Contending with Terrorism (MIT Press, 2010).

Nuclear weapons 2011: Momentum slows, reality returns
Steven E. Miller

Abstract

If 2010 was the year of successes and landmarks for arms control, 2011 was the year that the momentum of the new era slowed, and hard realities were made apparent. By the end of the year, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty had not been ratified or even seriously discussed, and negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty remained stuck in the Conference on Disarmament, with no sign of success in the offing. The author takes a look at five events that unfolded in 2011 and that seem certain to cast a powerful shadow in months and years to come. He writes that both the spread of nuclear technology in the Middle East and Southeast Asia and the revision of the export control regime pose a threat to the long-term structure of the global nuclear order. The crisis with Iran continues to present a serious challenge to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime while raising the risk of a military response. A conference on a Middle East WMD-free zone requires addressing an ambitious objective in the world’s most intractable diplomatic environment. And the impediments to progress in US–Russian relations stifle hopes that further agreements and deeper cuts can be achieved; a deterioration of this relationship could mean serious consequences in the arms control environment. In 2011, no new breakthroughs occurred, the author writes, adding that 2012 could be a much more difficult year...

...

The nuclear order widens

On March 14, 2011, Abu Dhabi broke ground for its first nuclear reactor—one of four it is under contract to purchase from the Korean Electric Power Company and all of which it aims to have connected to the electricity grid by 2020. On May 8, 2011, the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr began operating and has since been connected to the electricity grid, becoming the first nuclear power plant to function in the Middle East. On December 2, 2011, Russia began construction of a nuclear power plant at Ninh Thuan, Vietnam, intended to include two nuclear reactors in excess of 1,000 megawatts each and expected to be completed by 2020. All of these developments took place after the terrible accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in Japan—which might have caused a pause, a rethinking, or even a cancellation of these projects, but did not. Instead, civilian nuclear technology is spreading into two regions—the Middle East and Southeast Asia—where it was previously absent. This is the beginning of a long-term process involving the slow spread of nuclear assets to additional countries; dozens of potential nuclear newcomers have approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to express interest in pursuing nuclear power. This is a portentous development. Across time, it will widen the global distribution of nuclear technology, expand the serious nuclear players, reshape the international nuclear marketplace, add to worries about the safety and security of nuclear facilities, and change the politics of the NPT regime.
The implications in terms of nuclear proliferation are indirect...

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The export control regime tightens

As the spearhead states among the nuclear newcomers have begun to visibly implement their nuclear programs, nuclear suppliers (perhaps not coincidentally) have moved to make the harmonized international export regime more restrictive. The suppliers have organized themselves into a cartel—the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—that now consists of 46 member states that are committed to follow agreed, though informal, rules for regulating international nuclear commerce. At its annual meeting in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, in June, the NSG agreed, after years of deliberation, to strengthen the guidelines governing enrichment and reprocessing transfers.
According to published reports of...

Much more at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/1/20.full#sec-1

Or you can download the entire paper with this link:
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/1/20.full.pdf+html

[bananas]

1. k&r nt

[Nederland]

2. Interesting

All of these developments took place after the terrible accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in Japan—which might have caused a pause, a rethinking, or even a cancellation of these projects, but did not. Instead, civilian nuclear technology is spreading into two regions—the Middle East and Southeast Asia—where it was previously absent.

So much for the "nuclear power is dead" meme...