"Israel: May act to stop Syria arms reaching Hezbollah" By Ori Lewis at Reuters

[applegrove]

Israel: May act to stop Syria arms reaching Hezbollah

By Ori Lewis at Reuters

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/us-syria-crisis-israel-idUSBRE86J1EL20120720

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"I have instructed the military to increase its intelligence preparations and prepare what is needed so that ... (if necessary) ... we will be able to consider carrying out an operation," Defence Minister Ehud Barak said in an interview on Channel 10 television.

"We are following ... the possible transfer of advanced munitions systems, mainly anti-aircraft missiles or heavy ground-to-ground missiles, but there could also be a possibility of the transfer of chemical means (weapons) from Syria to Lebanon," said Barak.

"The moment (Assad) starts to fall we will conduct intelligence monitoring and will liaise with other agencies."

Hezbollah, which in the past has received military and financial support from Syria and Iran, launched thousands of mainly short-range rockets into Israel during the Jewish state's 2006 offensive in southern Lebanon. Some longer-range rockets reached central Israel.

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[Bradlad]

1. The also had many long range grnd to grnd missiles in place.

The also had many long range grnd to grn missiles in place. I'm now reading a pretty good book that discusses Israel vs Hezbollah: "Spies Against Armegeddon". Here's a snippet from the chapter I'm reading now:

The most impressive intelligence was identifying—with great specificity—private houses where Hezbollah hid the long-range missiles that could perhaps reach Tel Aviv. At least a hundred of what were basically domestic launching pads were constructed with the secret help of Iran’s al-Quds Force. Iranian engineers designed extensions to the houses with an innovative feature: sliding roofs like missile silos. The convertible tops could be opened to launch a surprise weapon toward Israel.

As a reward, the homeowners and neighbors would get money from Hezbollah, financed by Iran.

That entire network of houses and missiles was destroyed by precise air strikes in the first 34 minutes of the war—reminiscent of the pivotal first three hours of the Six-Day War in 1967. The exact locations in Lebanon were provided by the Mossad and Aman (another branch of Israel Intelligence). A retired chief of analysis at Aman called that “the result of years of determined, individual, gray, exhausting intelligence work, and one of Israel’s greatest successes in target intelligence.”

The loss of Hassan Nasrallah’s most potent missiles turned his words into hollow threats. The maverick secretary-general of Hezbollah boasted, in the first days of the war, that he would hit “beyond Haifa,” meaning Tel Aviv. He no longer had the capacity to do that.

All he had left were short-range rockets. They certainly were disruptive to normal and even fatal, for residents of northern Israel—about a million forced to sleep in shelters or move to safer parts of the country to the south—but the damage and casualties were far less than Hezbollah had hoped to inflict.

Nasrallah, after the war, admitted that he regretted having provoked Israel. He told Hezbollah’s TV station that had he known “the Zionists” would react so massively, he would not have ordered the operation to kidnap the two soldiers.

His interview was an echo of secret meetings he had with his master, the commander of the al-Quds Force, Iran’s Major-General Qassem Suleimani. Al-Quds was the special unit of the Revolutionary Guards in charge of covert action outside Iran’s borders and maintaining ties with pro-Iran militias and terrorists. The United States publicly blamed the al-Quds Force for a campaign of roadside bombs that caused many American casualties inside Iraq.

Israeli intelligence quickly learned that Suleimani strongly scolded Nasrallah over the results of the war. He accused the Lebanese Shi’ite of not being cautious and of failing to coordinate the kidnapping of the two Israelis with him. The Iranian’s biggest complaint was that the missile launchers with the sliding roofs were no longer a secret—and no longer in existence. Iran had meant to save them for a much bigger showdown, when Iran and Israel might go to war.

Feeling humiliated and penetrated after the war, Hezbollah launched a witch-hunt for Lebanese who had spied for Israel and claimed to have caught a handful. TV stations in Lebanon showed evidence, including camouflaged communications equipment. Some suspects confessed to having been recruited by Israel 20 years earlier. As usual on such matters, Israel maintained its silence. Yet, for Israel, the sum total of the Second Lebanon War was a strategic win.

Melman, Yossi; Raviv, Dan (2012-07-02). Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars (Kindle Locations 7290-7302). Levant Books. Kindle Edition.