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Judi Lynn

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Number of posts: 147,053

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Bolivia's Madidi National Park is most biodiverse in the world


Researchers hope the publicity earned by Madidi's record-setting biodiversity will encourage a continued commitment to conservation.
By Brooks Hays | May 22, 2018 at 2:27 PM



The forests of Bolivia's Madidi National Park are home to thousands of species,
including Madidi titi monkeys. Photo by Rob Wallace/Wildlife Conservation Society


May 22 (UPI) -- Bolivia's Madidi National Park is the world's most biodiverse protected area, according to a newly completed two-year survey of the park's plant and animal inhabitants dubbed "Identidad Madidi."

While documenting the park's thousands of plant and animal species, researchers identified 120 new candidate species of plants, butterflies and vertebrates.

"We have accomplished everything we hoped for and more on this journey of science and discovery," Robert Wallace, a scientist with the Wildlife Conservation Society who lead the recent survey, said in a news release. "The massive amounts of images and data collected on the expedition will provide us with the baseline information needed to protect this natural wonder for future generations of Bolivians and the world."

The park features dramatic elevation changes as the Amazon transitions to the Andes, and as a result, it hosts a wide range of ecosystems, including grasslands, rivers, streams, wetlands and several types of forests -- Amazonian forests, montane dry forests, treeline elfin forests, Andean foothill forests and cloud forests.

More:
https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2018/05/22/7121527008251/

Guardian: Venezuela shows that protest can be a defence of privilege

Street action is now regularly used with western backing to target elected governments in the interests of elites

Seumas Milne in Caracas

@seumasmilne
Wed 9 Apr 2014 16.30 EDT

If we didn't know it before, the upsurge in global protest in the past couple of years has driven home the lesson that mass demonstrations can have entirely different social and political meanings. Just because they wear bandannas and build barricades – and have genuine grievances – doesn't automatically mean protesters are fighting for democracy or social justice.

From Ukraine to Thailand and Egypt to Venezuela, large-scale protests have aimed at, or succeeded in, ousting elected governments in the past year. In some countries, mass protests have been led by working class organisations, targeting austerity and corporate power. In others, predominantly middle class unrest has been the lever to restore ousted elites.

Sometimes, in the absence of political organisation, they can straddle the two. But whoever they represent, they tend to look similar on TV. And so effective have street demonstrations been in changing governments over the past 25 years that global powers have piled into the protest business in a major way.

From the overthrow of the elected Mossadegh government in Iran in the 1950s, when the CIA and MI6 paid anti-government demonstrators, the US and its allies have led the field: sponsoring "colour revolutions", funding client NGOs and training student activists, fuelling social media protest and denouncing – or ignoring – violent police crackdowns as it suits them.

. . .

What are portrayed as peaceful protests have all the hallmarks of an anti-democratic rebellion, shot through with class privilege and racism. Overwhelmingly middle class and confined to wealthy white areas, the protests have now shrunk to firebombings and ritual fights with the police, while parts of the opposition have agreed to peace talks.

More:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/09/venezuela-protest-defence-privilege-maduro-elites

CIA and FBI Documents Detail Career in International Terrorism; Connection to U.S.

LUIS POSADA CARRILES
THE DECLASSIFIED RECORD
CIA and FBI Documents Detail Career in International Terrorism; Connection to U.S.

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 153

For more information contact
Peter Kornbluh - 202/994-7116

May 10, 2005

Update - May 18, 2005 - Documents featured on May 17, 2005 edition of ABC's Nightline

Washington D.C. May 18, 2005 - The National Security Archive today posted additional documents that show that the CIA had concrete advance intelligence, as early as June 1976, on plans by Cuban exile terrorist groups to bomb a Cubana airliner. The Archive also posted another document that shows that the FBI's attache in Caracas had multiple contacts with one of the Venezuelans who placed the bomb on the plane, and provided him with a visa to the U.S. five days before the bombing, despite suspicions that he was engaged in terrorist activities at the direction of Luis Posada Carriles.

Both documents were featured last night on ABC Nightline's program on Luis Posada Carriles, who was detained in Miami yesterday by Homeland Security.

In addition, the Archive posted the first report to Secretary of State Kissinger from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the bombing of Cubana flight 455. The report noted that a CIA source had overheard Posada prior to the bombing in late September 1976 stating that, "We are going to hit a Cuban airliner." This information was apparently not passed to the CIA until after the plane went down.

There is no indication in the declassified files that indicates that the CIA alerted Cuban government authorities to the terrorist threat against Cubana planes. Still classified CIA records indicate that the informant might actually have been Posada himself who at that time was in periodic contact with both CIA and FBI agents in Venezuela.

More:
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB153/

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The Terrorist List, and Terrorism as Practiced Against Cuba
April 22, 2013 COHA



Of all the components to the United States hostile strategy against Cuba, nothing raises the ire of the Castro government more than its inclusion on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. The designation is seen by Havana as an impediment towards improving relations and as a cruel hypocrisy that provides political cover for Washington to justify the imposition of economic penalties along with the perpetuation of anti-revolutionary propaganda.

There is an opportunity to eliminate that stumbling block in the next few weeks, if newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry decides to recommend Cuba’s deletion from the list to President Obama. Kerry has until the release of the State Department’s annual terror report on April 30 to make the determination of whether Cuba will remain on the terrorist list. High ranking Cuban officials are closely watching this development, indicating the removal could offer an opportunity to re-engage with the United States. [1]

The history of Cuba’s controversial inclusion goes back to 1982, the same year Iraq was taken off the list by the Reagan administration. Besides Cuba, only Sudan, Iran, and Syria continue to be labeled as state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea was dropped in 2008, while Pakistan, long the home of Osama Bin Laden and recognized as a haven for Islamic terrorists, has never been considered. Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the 9/11 terrorists came from, is looked upon as a staunch ally of the United States.

There are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used. Furthermore, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use, including hospital equipment. For example, the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions. [2] For Cuba, these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.

More:
http://www.coha.org/22355/

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The Coddled ‘Terrorists’ of South Florida
Anti-Castro Cuban exiles linked to bombings and assassinations are living free – and conducting drills – in Miami. Does the U.S. have a double standard on terrorism?
JANUARY 14, 2008 By TRISTRAM KORTEN & KIRK NIELSEN

. . .

Plans to attack Cuba are constantly being hatched in South Florida. Over the years militant exiles have been linked to everything from downing airliners to hit-and-run commando raids on the Cuban coast to hotel bombings in Havana. They've killed Cuban diplomats and made numerous attempts on Castro's life.

But, other than an occasional federal gun charge, nothing much seems to happen to most of these would-be revolutionaries. They are allowed to train nearly unimpeded despite making explicit plans to violate the 70-year-old U.S. Neutrality Act and overthrow a sovereign country's government. Though separate anti-terror laws passed in 1994 and 1996 would seem to apply directly to their activities, no one has ever been charged for anti-Cuban terrorism under those laws. And 9/11 seems to have changed nothing. In the past few years in South Florida, a newly created local terrorism task force has investigated Jose Padilla and the hapless Seas of David cult, and juries have delivered mixed reviews, but no terrorism charges have been brought against anti-Castro militants. The federal government has even failed to extradite to other countries militants who are credibly accused of acts of murder. Among the most notorious is Luis Posada Carriles, wanted for bombing a Cuban jet in 1976 and Havana hotels in 1997. It is, perhaps, a testament to the power of South Florida's crucial Cuban-American voting bloc — and the political allegiances of the current president.

In Greater Miami, home to the majority of the nation's 1.5 million Cuban-Americans, the presence of what could credibly be described as a terrorist training camp has become an accepted norm during the half-century of the anti-Castro Cuban diaspora. Alpha 66 and numerous other paramilitary groups — Comandos F4, Brigade 2506, Accion Cubana — are so common they've taken on the benign patina of Rotary Clubs with weapons.

But Alpha 66 members are eager to remind you that even if they are graying and prosperous they are not toothless old tigers. Their Web site boasts that “in recent years” they've sabotaged Cuba's tourist economy by attacking hotels in the beach resort of Caya Coco. At the group's headquarters in the Little Havana neighborhood of Miami, the walls are hung with the portraits of dozens of men who have died on Alpha 66 missions.

More:
https://www.theinvestigativefund.org/investigation/2008/01/14/coddled-terrorists-south-florida/

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Why the FBI Is Coming After Me
By Ann Louise Bardach
Sunday, November 12, 2006

As a rule, I don't believe in conspiracy theories. They tend to be tidy and selective, whereas life seems so random and messy. But the case of Cuban militant and would-be Fidel Castro assassin Luis Posada Carriles has sorely tested my convictions.

I've been writing about Posada for nearly a decade. I interviewed him in Aruba for a series of articles in the New York Times in 1998. He was a fugitive who had escaped from Venezuela in 1985 while awaiting trial in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban passenger plane that killed all 73 people aboard-- the first deadly act of airline terrorism in the Americas. Posada has maintained his innocence, but in a rare instance of unanimity, the CIA and the FBI, as well as Venezuelan, Trinidadian and Cuban intelligence, concluded that he and fellow militant Orlando Bosch had masterminded the bombing.

Last year, I wrote an Outlook article about Posada's surprise arrival in Miami, where he filed a claim for political asylum. Not only did this move strike many as brazen, but it also seemed incomprehensible that the Bush administration, so committed to what it calls the War on Terror, could have allowed someone of Posada's notoriety to slip into the country.

Soon after, Homeland Security Department officials got around to arresting Posada and charging him with illegal entry. I assumed that the Justice Department would act on his self-admitted history of paramilitary attacks and extradite him somewhere, and that I'd just continue to cover his case. Instead, the government has dithered for a year and a half while Posada languishes in an immigration jail in Texas.

More:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/10/AR2006111001384.html

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Castro Enemy Said to Have Recounted Role in Attacks
By DAN FROSCH MARCH 16, 2011

EL PASO — A journalist called as a key prosecution witness in the perjury trial of an elderly anti-Castro militant testified on Wednesday that the defendant had described in detailed interviews his role in a wave of bombings that tore through Havana in 1997.

The witness, Ann Louise Bardach, was a contract writer for The New York Times when she interviewed the man, Luis Posada Carriles, in 1998. The interviews were the foundation for articles she wrote that year with Larry Rohter, a reporter for The Times, in which Mr. Posada spoke about coordinating the bombs at hotels and restaurants to frighten tourists.

Mr. Posada, 83, has been on trial in federal court here for two months, but not for the attacks in Havana that killed an Italian tourist, or in connection with the downing of a Cuban jet in 1976 that killed 73 people — both of which have made him a wanted man in Cuba and Venezuela.

. . .

Federal prosecutors say Mr. Posada, who was on the C.I.A.’s payroll during the 1960s and ’70s, lied during immigration hearings more than five years ago about how he had gotten into the United States and about his involvement in the Havana bombings.

More:
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/us/17posada.html

The US Blockade of Cuba: Its Effects and Global Consequences

Nicholas Partyka I Geopolitics I Analysis I May 2nd, 2014

It is not possible to discuss almost any aspect of life in Cuba without talking about the US blockade of the island. That the US has an 'embargo' against the island is one of the few things that Americans might know about Cuba. This policy of economic warfare against our hemispheric neighbor has been in place for more than five decades now. In this dispatch, I want to focus on the US blockade policy. We will look briefly at why it exists, its aims, its status under international law, and what its main effects are. Though many Americans may know that there is an "embargo" (though "blockade" is more accurate), few likely know how it works and what its costs are. Attempting to remedy this situation will be the point of this part of the series.

On New Year's Eve 1958, Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba. The next day, the revolutionary government took control of the country. For the better part of a year, the US foreign policy establishment did not know what to make of Fidel Castro and his revolution. Relations remained cordial until Fidel announced the implementation of a set of Agrarian Reform laws. These laws aimed to put land in the hands of poor farmers who had been largely excluded from land ownership under the old regime. Many of the lands nationalized under Fidel's measures belonged to US citizens or companies; e.g. King Ranch. Other nations also had property nationalized in Cuba in the wake of the revolution, but only the US refused compensation, which the Cubans offered.

In a somewhat ironic twist, the Cubans offered compensation for nationalized property on the basis of the property's value as determined by the most recent pre-revolutionary Cuban tax assessments. Now, this would only be a problem for US owners of Cuban property to be nationalized if those owners felt that there was too large a discrepancy between the value of the compensation offered and the market value of that property. This kind of situation would be likely to come about if US owners had massively underreported the value of their Cuban property to Cuban tax officials (perhaps with official blessing of the regime at the time). The response of the US to these compensation matters also has nothing to do with the fact that the then-sitting CIA Director, Allen Dulles, sat on the Board of Directors for at least one large US firm to have property nationalized in Cuba, namely the infamous United Fruit Company.

Before the revolution, underreporting taxable value saved money in taxes and thus put more of it back in the owner's pocket. After the revolution however, this meant that those owners would lose out in a compensation package offered by the new Cuban government as the value of the compensation offered would be substantially less than what the property would be worth on the market. US owners of Cuban property wanted to both receive the real value of their property, but also not thereby tacitly admit what Castro and the Cuban revolution had accused them of, namely taking advantage of Cuba and Cubans for their own private gain. This is a classic example of one not being able to have one's cake and eat it too. The refusal of the US to acknowledge this had lead to the lion's share of the trials and tribulations that have arisen as the US and Cuba attempt to normalize relations.

More:
http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/cuba-project-part-two.html#.WwDL4kgvzIV

Plane crashes in Havana, Cuba, with 104 passengers on board

CBS/AP May 18, 2018, 2:37 PM

HAVANA -- A Cuban airliner with 104 passengers on board plummeted into a yuca field just after takeoff from Havana's international airport on Friday. There was no immediate word on casualties.

Officials said the plane was headed to the eastern city of Holguin when it crashed a short distance from the end of the runway on the southern outskirts of Havana. Witnesses said they saw a thick column of smoke near the airport.

. . .

The plane lay in a field of yuca-root plants and appeared heavily damaged and burnt. Firefighters were trying to extinguish its smoldering remains. Government officials including President Miguel Diaz-Canel rushed to the site, along with a large number of emergency medical workers. Residents of the rural area said they had seen some survivors being taken away in ambulances.

. . .

"Among the difficulties created by the U.S. trade embargo is our inability to acquire latest-generation aircraft with technology capable of guaranteeing the stability of aerial operations," Hernandez said. "Another factor is obtaining part for Cubana's aircraft."

More:
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/plane-crash-havana-cuba-today-2018-05-18/

Is Colombia's justice system too weak to try the powerful Uribe?


by Adriaan Alsema May 17, 2018

Colombia’s Supreme Court has “abundant” evidence to jail ex-president Alvaro Uribe on witness tampering charges, but the country’s justice system may be too weak to stand up to the powerful politician.

The court has been gathering evidence to support witness tampering charges since February. Since then, one witness against Uribe has been assassinated and two others survived assassination attempts.

The former president is being investigated for “conspiracy, homicide and other” crimes, according to a court order urging increased protection of witnesses against the far-right politician.

Uribe, who rose to prominence in the shadow of Pablo Escobar‘s Medellin Cartel, has been accused of forming death squads as well as dozens of other crimes.

More:
https://colombiareports.com/is-colombias-justice-system-too-weak-to-try-the-powerful-uribe/

Making Development Anthropology More Public: A Study of Displacement and Resettlement by the World B

MAY 16, 2018
by KATALINA KHOURY

Development anthropologists embody a niche existence that is not always easy to navigate. There are naysayers and antagonists to the discipline on all sides of the political field; the hegemonic scientific and economic communities overwhelmingly discount the value of social science and the knowledge it generates; and policymakers often do not prioritize development issues. Development anthropologists have not only had to learn and adopt much of the language, presumptions, and social constructs of its audiences and interlocutors, but have also had to make problematic compromises working with a broken system in order to make small advancements in society. In other words, challenging the prevailing paradigm of development work is an “up-hill battle.” This struggle to impart positive social change from the unique perspective of and position as a development anthropologist is heightened by the fact that institutions and people with socio-economic power (in academia, within development agencies, Governments, etc.) disagree about what actions and policies are ethical, would enable human progress, and are practical. In addition, those with socio-economic power advance their own ideologies of what these three conditions entail and mean, so that they continue to profit economically, or to maintain a position of dominance.

But, what are these elusive institutions and who are these people with socio-economic power? In 1972, anthropologist, Laura Nader, popularized the term “studying up,” which pushed the discipline to reinvent itself. No longer ought the subject(s) of anthropological inquiry and study be the exotic, the paternalistically called “primitives,” and the powerless; instead, anthropologists were to study the familiar and the powerful. Institutions, people, and structuresof power became the subject(s) of a newly developing form of cultural anthropology: applied, or public, anthropology. This sub-discipline rejects anthropology’s apolitical history and futile attempt at objectivity, for a militantly political praxis. The point of anthropological work is no longer merely to study culture and human development, but to change it…for the sake of equity, human rights, and informed human progress. Ethnography, as an empirical science, is therefore used to investigate nodes and structures of power and what can be done to improve equity between individuals in terms of livelihood standards (e.g., health, access to healthcare, food security, housing, income, etc.).

Development anthropology can be a taboo subject, because outsiders to the discipline are not aware of this turn in the discipline’s history and its newfound objective and purpose. Even some anthropologists are weary of development anthropology, because they do not understand and trust its strategies and tactics. They accuse its affiliates of “selling out,” if you will, of engaging with a broken system that continues to serve those already with socio-economic power and of reestablishing the exploitative anthropological practices of the not-so-distant past. Theoretically, the existing literature on development-caused forced displacement and resettlement(DFDR), for example, has extensively posited the question, “Development for Whom?” (see Mahapatra 1991), which reevaluates who actually profits, and who disproportionally suffers, from development projects; however, in practice, development scholars have only their intellectual weapons with which they can arm themselves to convince those with socio-economic power to relinquish it for the sake of equity and human rights.

Development scholars have indeed had to make complex choices, with dire implications, for the limited societal advancements that they have achieved. This is because despite the “lessons learned” and advocated by development scholars, which emphasize risk assessment and prevention (see Cernea 1997), many development projects cause the involuntary displacement and resettlement of indigenous people. Development projects furthermore cause “new poverty,” primarily by externalizing the costs of DFDR on those uprooted (see Chen 2018). For example, development practitioners widely assert that restoring people to pre-displacement livelihood levels via compensation is a sufficient goal. However, if a development project in question had not existed, the displaced and resettled population would have developed itself to a level much significantly higher on its own during the 8-9 years of average project preparation and implementation.

More:
https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/05/16/making-development-anthropology-more-public-a-study-of-displacement-and-resettlement-by-the-world-bank/

"The Making of a Massacre" Explores the D.E.A.'s Role in a Mexican Tragedy

By Sarah LarsonMay 15, 2018

The Making of a Massacre,” a new investigative podcast from Audible and ProPublica, is a two-hour dramatic exploration of a 2011 massacre in Allende, Mexico, reported and narrated by Ginger Thompson. “There’s no missing the signs that something unspeakable happened in Allende,” she says in the first episode. “People were murdered here. Gunmen from one of the most violent drug-trafficking organizations in the world swept through this little town like a flash flood.” We hear a translated account: “They broke into houses. They looted them and burned them. Afterward, they kidnapped the people who lived in those houses and took them to a ranch just outside of Allende.” Dozens were killed and their bodies were burned. Thompson, a Pulitzer Prize winner, is an investigative reporter at ProPublica and a former Mexico City bureau chief for the Times; she grew up on the border and has been writing about Mexico for decades. Cartel-related massacres are “mind-numbingly common,” she says. But this story is different: this massacre, she learns, had been set off by the United States. “It’s a story that’s never been told before,” Thompson tells us. “And it starts here.”

This is a classic podcast beginning—surprising, vivid, urgent, portending lessons about human folly and government error. We’re eager to hear the rest. Then the podcast proceeds in a way that alternately fulfills our expectations and unsettles them, because of the ways in which it dramatizes the content. In the course of its five ambitious episodes, “Making a Massacre” employs both NPR-type narrative audio and a dramatic style that evokes Hollywood: the investigative reporting is dramatized not just with music and sound design but with performances by the film and TV actors Cheech Marin, Danny Trejo, Alana de la Garza, Clifton Collins, Jr., and Snow Tha Product, who deliver interviewees’ words, translated from the Spanish. Trejo also narrates the episodes’ titles—“Chapter 1: The Takeover”—with a husky-voiced gravitas that suggests a horror-movie trailer. Then we hear friendly ranchera music, horses’ hooves, and an introduction to Allende before the massacre, and we’re back in the familiar genre of narrative nonfiction, getting to know our setting. Throughout, the tone switches back and forth, sometimes easily, sometimes less so.

Allende is a ranching town of twenty-three thousand people in the state of Coahuila, a forty-minute drive from Eagle Pass, Texas; it’s home to farmers, teachers, professionals with large houses. It has an annual equestrian parade and rodeo. Thompson narrates in a kindly tone that sounds a bit slowed down for our benefit, and she takes a tour of Allende with the town’s former property assessor, a beekeeper who rents his bees out to melon farmers. He takes her on what he calls, with a nervous laugh, a “narco tour.” They pass dozens of ruined houses, some mini-mansions. “Whatever walls were left standing had holes big enough to shoot basketballs through them,” Thompson says. The beekeeper is willing to drive by but not to stop. “It was as if he was afraid the people who had knocked the houses down seven years ago were still watching,” she says.

The people responsible are the Zetas, a powerful drug-smuggling cartel. Before the Zetas, there was smuggling in Allende—but the local kingpin respected society and society respected him, and life proceeded mostly peacefully. Then he was murdered. The Zetas, led by two brothers, Miguel and Omar Treviño, known as Forty and Forty-two, both moved to Allende and quickly established dominance. The Zetas were known for their flouting of norms and for their spectacular violence—beheadings, dissolving bodies in acid—and ambition: they wanted to rule not just the drug trade but the country. (Both brothers are now in prison.) “The Making of a Massacre” deftly illustrates how the Zetas took power: through violence; by bribing and intimidating government agencies; and, insidiously, by establishing personal ties. An Allende veterinarian memorably describes agreeing to provide veterinary care to a dog belonging to the young son of a cartel member. Soon, locals and cartel are intertwined. When the D.E.A. gets coveted intelligence on the Zetas through cartel operatives and makes a “deadly miscalculation”—sharing the information with Mexican authorities—shocking cruelty ensues. Allende’s townspeople, many unrelated to the drug trade, are its victims. The massacre, its aftermath, and its implications are examined in the second half of the series.

More:
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/podcast-dept/the-making-of-a-massacre-explores-the-deas-role-in-a-mexican-tragedy

Commentary: 'Mexico First' frontrunner uses Trump playbook in crunch election

MAY 16, 2018 / 12:34 PM / UPDATED 3 HOURS AGO

Andres Martinez.
8 MIN READ

It’s crunch time for Mexico, where the course of the next two months will determine whether the country turns its back on a generation-long project of opening its economy to the world and its political system to the winds of democratic change. The decision ultimately rests with Mexican voters — and, to some extent, with U.S. President Donald Trump.

On July 1, Mexicans will elect a new president. Much like American voters in 2016, they are eager to “drain the swamp.” And Mexico indeed may end up electing a rather swampy candidate who promises to do so.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist former mayor of Mexico City and twice-defeated presidential candidate, has a comfortable lead in the polls. The prospect of his victory has rattled financial markets, as well as those in Mexico concerned about democratic niceties and the rule of law.

Though many people both inside and outside Mexico passionately argue about whether or not AMLO, as he is known, is the Mexican incarnation of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, the debate seems a bit off-point. AMLO might well be no Chávez, and still be a dreadful prospect. AMLO would almost certainly represent a return to the country’s more authoritarian, statist past. With an inward- and backward-looking view of the world, his slogan may not be “Make Mexico Great Again,” but it might as well be “Make Mexico Mexico Again.”

More:
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-martinez-mexico-commentary/commentary-mexico-first-frontrunner-uses-trump-playbook-in-crunch-election-idUKKCN1IH260?rpc=401&

The 7 Viking Ring Forts - Trelleborg

A trelleborg or ring fort was a circular fortification built across Denmark and Sweden during the Viking age. Similar structures have been found throughout Northern Europe, particularly in Ireland, but none have the same strict and precise geometrical design of the Scandinavian ring fortresses.


A TRELLEBORG OR RING FORT WAS A CIRCULAR FORTIFICATION BUILT ACROSS DENMARK AND SWEDEN DURING THE VIKING AGE.
Similar structures have been found throughout Northern Europe, particularly in Ireland, but none have the same strict and precise geometrical design of the Scandinavian ring fortresses.

Around 974 the Danish Viking king Harald Bluetooth lost control of the Danevirke and parts of Southern Jutland to the Saxons. The entire complex of fortifications, bridges and roads which were built around 980 are presumed by some to be Harald’s work, and part of a larger defensive system.

A TRELLEBORG OR RING FORT WAS A CIRCULAR FORTIFICATION BUILT ACROSS DENMARK AND SWEDEN DURING THE VIKING AGE.
Similar structures have been found throughout Northern Europe, particularly in Ireland, but none have the same strict and precise geometrical design of the Scandinavian ring fortresses.

Around 974 the Danish Viking king Harald Bluetooth lost control of the Danevirke and parts of Southern Jutland to the Saxons. The entire complex of fortifications, bridges and roads which were built around 980 are presumed by some to be Harald’s work, and part of a larger defensive system.

Another theory suggests that the forts were built as boot camps for Sweyn Forkbeard’s troops prior to his invasion of England.

To date, archaeologists have uncovered 7 ring forts, with some possible sites currently under investigation that includes Rygge in Norway.

More:
https://www.heritagedaily.com/2018/05/the-7-viking-ring-forts-trelleborg/119665








More ring fort images:

https://images.search.yahoo.com/search/images;_ylt=AwrEwNXGo_ta.nkAp62LuLkF;_ylc=X1MDOTYwNTc0ODMEX3IDMgRiY2sDZWFlcjdmOWNnbDI5ZyUyNmIlM0Q0JTI2ZCUzRGZFVE9PSzFyWUgzS3VfNWJGaWk4THF3a19jX3JYc19ya1E2azM1dGQ0N2NwM1EtLSUyNnMlM0RkayUyNmklM0RhUld1NUEwY3cxX0t4T1NsM1EyTQRmcgMEZ3ByaWQDWFQzeTNBMU1UYWlGbVRCRnEyTzE1QQRtdGVzdGlkA251bGwEbl9zdWdnAzAEb3JpZ2luA2ltYWdlcy5zZWFyY2gueWFob28uY29tBHBvcwMwBHBxc3RyAwRwcXN0cmwDBHFzdHJsAzMwBHF1ZXJ5A1Zpa2luZyBSaW5nIEZvcnRzIMgVHJlbGxlYm9yZwR0X3N0bXADMTUyNjQ0MDkwOQR2dGVzdGlkA251bGw-?gprid=XT3y3A1MTaiFmTBFq2O15A&pvid=qF0jFTEwLjHlO2d6WQqJMAlzMjYwMAAAAAA3wxgF&fr2=sb-top-images.search.yahoo.com&p=Viking+Ring+Forts+–+Trelleborg&ei=UTF-8&iscqry=&fr=sfp#id=124&iurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwings1320.files.wordpress.com%2F2013%2F11%2Ftrelleborg_319165c.jpg&action=close
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