pbmus

pbmus's Journal

September 11, 2022

Rashists fleeing in panic...

https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1569039671618936834

https://twitter.com/chuckpfarrer/status/1569096659778375683

https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1569107840047931392

September 11, 2022

The joy of liberation....

https://twitter.com/marqs__/status/1568965535026528257

https://twitter.com/ua_industrial/status/1569036945975541762

https://twitter.com/kateryna_kruk/status/1568938225787363330

https://twitter.com/gerashchenko_en/status/1568876674544173057

https://twitter.com/gerashchenko_en/status/1568936084930981890

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And to think all we have to do is vote._….

September 10, 2022

Latest Ukraine battlefront analysis...

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1568438928516022279.html

here is what im seeing.

this is basic math and open source reporting so im keeping opsec.
UKR army has built at least 3 battle groups. each about the size of a US division (3-4 brigades with attached elements working together).

the VAST majority of the vehicles are wheeled vehicles. this seems to be built like the US 9th infantry div (1985-91) truly motorized divisions. the makeup is infantry transports (HMMWVs, pick ups), scout. dune buggies FASTVs, and backed up by MRAPS, BTRs... with tanks attached
this allows the ukr forces to move fast hit hard and hold with dismounted ATGMs. the russian army with "death before dismount mentality has no way to counter this. as they are sending reinforcements into the battle they are hitting ambushes and counter attacks prior to deploying

im betting that the ukr army has made 3 battle groups. one that hit kherson, one that hit the north, and one that has not been played yet.

if you are battletracker (i am) you count vehicles by TO&E (donated, sold vehicles) and look for them in combat as BDA. sofar many of some types of vehicles donated HAVE NOT shown up on the battlefield, yet.

if my numbers are right only about 1/2 of the new "secret" army has been used. this means another strike is coming....soon... and just like the north strike this will be too fast for the ru forces to counter.

in addition MANY more vehicles are being given to the ukr forces right now. and the troops that were holding the line are being recovered, rested, and rearmed... in 14-30 days the ukr army will have 2-3 more battle groups (divisions) that can be thrown into the fight

im really not tracking any unengaged fresh troops of anything over a brigade that ru still has that could counter any attack of that size... but time will tell

keep in mind that both sides are showing old video of units that were in training... many of the vid of some vehicles are not in combat.. they are old training vid and the vehicles are NOT yet in combat.. they will be when the time is right

i will say this. the ukr army has 4 options to strike the next blow, any of the 4 could spell the end of the russian army in that FRONT. this would enable the ukr army to swing its remaining army to the opposite front crushing the surviving ru forces

September 10, 2022

Russian troops fleeing and surrendered tons of supplies...

https://twitter.com/shymanskyi/status/1568165706717450242

https://twitter.com/saintjavelin/status/1568369329170968577

https://twitter.com/saintjavelin/status/1568431059288707072

https://twitter.com/itsborys/status/1568291736576737286

September 10, 2022

Ukraine is giving the world and especially Russia a hell of a show....

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1568319528232181761.html

Achtung Panzer!, Kharkiv Front 🧵
This is what successful armored warfare looks like. There are many aspects to what appears to have made this operation work & I'd like to briefly go over a few of them. We'll start from the top & work our way down.
1/
The UAF have pulled off a remarkable strategic deception. By initiating, even telegraphing, an offensive in OpComSouth as their main effort they have successfully induced the Russian command to transfer a considerable number of troops south. Including some higher quality
2/
formations. This seems to have denuded the Russians opposite OpComEast of ready reserves & robust combat units in general. Furthermore the UAF was able to mass combat power in excess of what many analysts (including myself, I must admit) thought was possible.
3/

The UAF have now effectively launched two assaults in two seperate operational areas. A fixing attack at Kherson that the Russians cannot ignore, & an armored/mech deep penetration strike into the rear of Russian forces in the east. This will force Russian commanders to make
4/
hard choices with scarce reserves of combat formations capable of standing up to heavy UAF formations, many of whom are currently out of position to immediately engage thanks to the aforementioned deception in the South. Any redeployment will take time Russia doesn't have.
5/
This appears to have been a coordinated plan. Now to the tactical/operational side. UAF assault units, composed primarily of armored & mechanized formations acting in concert (quantity unknown), overran and shattered Russian front line units - reportedly composed heavily of
6/
DPR/LPR units. UAF formations then maintained the momentum of their advance, continuing deep into the Russian rear areas & preventing Russian lines from reforming & solidifying. The breach was then widened & exploited by follow on units, to a point that it appears to be
7/
destabilizing the entire front north & west of Izium. Russian units in the area of advance have not yet been able to reform coherently enough to mount an effective defense. Those areas (primarily urban) where Russian troops have held together have, correctly, been bypassed
8/

by UAF spearhead units. Pocketed &isolated, these Russians are/will likely be surrounded & compelled to surrender in short order. The UAF has placed primacy on speed & violence of action so as not to slow down their assault units & allow the Russians time to recover.
9/
Currently the Russians are scrambling to reinforce their lines. Lead UAF elements appear to be driving on Kupyansk as their primary objective - a major railway nexus supplying Russian formations. Taking it would have strategic implications for the entire eastern front.
10/
There are already reports of UAF units in or near the outskirts of the city, given the condition of Russian resistance - they are highly plausible IMO. Further information indicates UAF units are expanding their breach south, with an eastern boundary along the Oskol river.
11/
If the Russians cannot swiftly bring additional forces to bear, this could conceivably put the city of Izium into play from the north. Even if they can, this assault has effectively reordered the situation in OpComEast already.
12/
Going forward: the butchers bill for Russian forces from this operation is unlikely to be low in either man or materiel, neither of which they can afford. UAF losses are likely to be substantial, but less than would be expected given the swift collapse of RU forward units.
13/

If the UAF can keep them on their heels until their own planned halt points are reached, it will climb higher. The danger for the UAF will be overextension. They will be tempted to continue on once reaching their own pre-planned stop lines, given RU performance.
14/
This must be resisted. The UAF will need time to reorganize, refit, consolidate its lines of supply & communication, deal with rear-area holdouts, & then ready itself for a fresh offensive. Given its performance to date, I am optimistic this concern will be heeded.
15/
In the back of every good analyst's mind for 7 months has been at least one question: "What will Ukraine look like on offense?"

We're finding out. They're giving us all a hell of a show on their 1st time out.
16/16
Addition: This is almost moving faster than I can write it. There are now (thank you to those who directed me to them) reports that UAF units are hitting Izium from the south with heavy fighting within the city limits. The entire tenor of the war in the east has changed.

September 10, 2022