From BBC: "Study: US is an oligarchy, not a democracy"

[OnyxCollie]

74. Exposing one's ignorance while expressing outrage is not confined to the the right wing.

Converse: The nature of belief systems in mass publics
http://wikisum.com/w/Converse:_The_nature_of_belief_systems_in_mass_publics

A great majority of people neither adhere to a full, complete set of beliefs which produces a clear ideology nor do they have a clear grasp of what ideology is. This is measured by a lack of coherence in responses to open-ended questions. Ideology of elites is not mirrored by the masses and voter revolt to a political party does not reflect ideological shifts.

Converse analyzes open-ended interview questions to measure conceptualization of ideology. He concludes that the liberal-conservative continuum is a high level abstraction not typically used by the man in the street because of response instability and lack of connections made between answers. There is no underlying belief structure for most people, just a bunch of random opinions. Even on highly controversial, well-publicized issues, large portions of the electorate do not have coherent opinions. In fact, many simply answer survey questions as though they are flipping a coin.

Though some political sophisticates do structure their opinions in a larger ideological framework, such structure is rare. This level of political sophistication (one's "level of conceptualization&quot is correlated positively with the respondent's level of education, degree of political involvement, and amount of political information.

Key points: Most people do not have strong belief systems; that is, they do not think ideologically. A minority of people have fixed preferences and answer survey questions consistently, but most simply give random answers. Most people do not interpret politics through an ideological lens.

Before getting to empirical details, we must consider the roles played by the two sets of actors under investigation here-elites and masses-in this clash of traditions. We have learned over the years that the media, elected officials, and citizens influence each other's beliefs and behaviors in very complicated ways. Scholars studying elite/mass linkages have been driven by the empirical puzzle such relationships present, but they are also driven by normative questions that such paths of influence can raise. These normative concerns involve the nature of representation, accountability, manipulation, and mobilization. In other words, it is important to untangle the specific roles that different political actors play in shaping responses to crises like 9/11 because doing so will further illuminate how political developments unfold under conditions of diversity and threat.

Research on agenda-setting, opinion leadership, nationalism, and symbolic politics is useful in this regard. Several agenda-setting and opinion leadership studies argue that public opinion and elite action on salient issues converge, even though they may differ in their explanations of which actors serve as leaders and which actors serve as followers. Some studies suggest that elite policymaking and rhetoric shapes mass opinion (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Zaller, 1992); other studies maintain that elite movement on salient issues follows rather than precedes changes in public opinion (Monroe, 1979; Page & Shapiro, 1983) or that convergence exists because of electoral accountability (Uslaner & Weber, 1983). Finally, other works argue that the relationship among elite opinion, mass opinion, and policy outputs is reciprocal rather than unidirectional (Hill & Hinton-Andersson, 1995; Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000).

Schildkraut, D. J. (2002, September). The more things change. American identity and mass and elite responses to 9/11. Political Psychology, 23(3), 517-518.

Weber argued that the input of the mass public is limited to electing leaders, and that certain status groups within the mass public had influence in affecting the direction of government:

The demos itself, in the sense of an inarticulate mass, never 'governs' larger associations; rather it is governed, and its existence only changes the way in which the executive leaders are selected and the measure of influence which the demos, or better, which social circles from its midst are able to exert upon the content and the direction of administration activities by supplementing what is called “public opinion” (Gerth & Mills, {Eds.} 1946, p. 224-226, as quoted in Selznick, 1951, p. 326).

Liberalism and World Politics Author(s): Michael W. Doyle Reviewed work(s):Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169

The discrepancy between the warlike history of liberal states and Schumpeter's pacifistic expectations highlights three extreme assumptions. First, his "materialistic monism" leaves little room for noneconomic objectives, whether espoused by states or individuals. Neither glory, nor prestige, nor ideological justification, nor the pure power of ruling shapes policy. These nonmaterial goals leave little room for positive-sum gains, such as the comparative advantages of trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is true for his states. The political life of individuals seems to have been homogenized at the same time as the individuals were "rationalized, individualized, and democratized." Citizens-capitalists and workers, rural and urban-seek material welfare. Schumpeter seems to presume that ruling makes no difference. He also presumes that no one is prepared to take those measures (such as stirring up foreign quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling coalition) that enhance one's political power, despite detrimental effects on mass welfare. Third, like domestic politics, world politics are homogenized. Materially monistic and democratically capitalist, all states evolve toward free trade and liberty together. Countries differently constituted seem to disappear from Schumpeter's analysis. "Civilized" nations govern "culturally backward" regions. These assumptions are not shared by Machiavelli's theory of liberalism

Liberal Imperialism

Machiavelli's republic is a classical mixed republic. It is not a democracy -which he thought would quickly degenerate into a tyranny- but is characterized by social equality, popular liberty, and political participation (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 112; see also Huliung, 1983, chap. 2; Mansfield, 1970; Pocock, 1975, pp. 198-99; Skinner, 1981, chap. 3). The consuls serve as "kings," the senate as an aristocracy managing the state, and the people in the assembly as the source of strength.

Liberty results from "disunion"-the competition and necessity for compromise required by the division of powers among senate, consuls, and tribunes (the last representing the common people). Liberty also results from the popular veto. The powerful few threaten the rest with tyranny, Machiavelli says, because they seek to dominate. The mass demands not to be dominated, and their veto thus preserves the liberties of the state (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 5, p. 122). However, since the people and the rulers have different social characters, the people need to be "managed" by the few to avoid having their recklessness over-turn or their fecklessness undermine the ability of the state to expand (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. 249-50). Thus the senate and the consuls plan expansion, consult oracles, and employ religion to manage the resources that the energy of the people supplies.