Are there any Pyrrhonian skeptics in the group?

[delrem]

3. What I figure that I *know* is true is a subset of what I *believe* is true.

That is, if I accept the definition (and I do): "Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true."

After all, the phrase "whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true" indicates the broadest subjective judgement state that the writer can encompass. When I say that I know that something is true, in every case I can explain why I claim to know it. This isn't so regarding my totally wide ranging beliefs. So, to *my* perception and to *my* usage of words, I distinguish between knowing and believing.

Knowing is more complex than believing, believing is more generic in form. There are different kinds of knowing whereas there's no differentiation of kind in the idea "whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true". That definition is an undifferentiated answer to the question: "true or false". The question "how do you know" invites an unbounded infinity of answers.