Reply #136: I'm not sure if you are quoting Vietnam syndrome exactly correct

[theboss]

The issue in Vietnam was that a fast US victory over any kind of large, dug-in army in a defensive war was going to be exceedingly difficult. Occupation in Vietnam was never really the issue since we never controlled half the the country.

The Gulf War seemed to create the belief that we could win any ground war against any army in a short period of time.
Kosovo extended that belief in that we could win any ground war simply by air power.

In neither instance did we engage in a full-scale occupation of a hostile nation. That had not been done since the 40s.

Irag and Afghanistan once again proved that we could "win" a war in a hurry. Where Bush crossed the Rubicon was in occupation and nation-building against in the face of modern insurgencies. He turned us into Israel in Gaza or Great Britian in Northern Ireland, but on a much larger scale.

Even during the hot wars in the Cold War era, the idea was to get in and get out of the country as soon as possible and live only enough force to scare the Commies behind. I assume the plan for Vietnam was always to turn it over to a Pro-Western, quasi-military dictator in something resembling the Phillipines or South Korea. We just couldn't get to that point.