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Judi Lynn (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore | Mon Aug-16-10 07:42 AM Response to Original message |
4. Truth Behind Bars: colombian paramilitary leaders in u.s. custody |
Truth Behind Bars
colombian paramilitary leaders in u.s. custody February 2010 International Human Rights Law Clinic University of California, Berkeley, School of Law Introduction: On May 13, 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, William Brownfield, announced the extradition to the United States of fourteen leaders of Colombia’s largest paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self- Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC)31 to face drug charges.32 In total, thirty former paramilitaries (Defendants), including most of the AUC’s top commanders,33 are in U.S. custody in Florida, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Washington D.C.34 The AUC, formed from paramilitary groups created in the 1980s to fight left-wing guerillas, has become a powerful network of Colombian drug traffickers and warlords. Over the last thirty years, AUC members are alleged to have massacred, forcibly disappeared, tortured, and raped thousands of civilians.35 By 2002, at the height of paramilitary violence in Colombia, the United States estimated that the group carried out approximately seventy percent of the killings and forced disappearances in that country.36 At a press conference announcing the May 2008 extraditions, Ambassador Brownfield pledged that the transfer of Defendants to the United States would not interfere with Colombia’s efforts to hold paramilitaries accountable for their crimes in Colombia. The United States will “facilitate all access, all of the information, and all of the opportunities to the representatives and to the prosecutors,”37 stated the ambassador. Three years earlier, in 2005, Colombia’s Congress approved Law 975, also known as the “Justice and Peace Law,” which offered leniency and public benefits to paramilitary members in exchange for an agreement to disarm, forfeit assets, and tell the truth about human rights abuses they committed.38 All of the extradited AUC leaders were participants in the Justice and Peace program, and had begun to disclose details about their crimes and the identities of their accomplices. They gave details about AUC responsibility for crimes against civilians as well as its role in rigging Colombian elections.39 Defendants’ disclosures created an opportunity to dismantle paramilitary networks by prompting domestic investigations into AUC crimes and the criminal investigation of elected officials. However, since their extraditions, the paramilitary leaders’ cooperation with Colombian investigators effectively has ceased. Logistical difficulties have been compounded by the absence of a written agreement between the U.S. and Colombia to coordinate judicial cooperation. Colombian prosecutors and judges face limited access to Defendants in U.S. custody. U.S. prosecutors also have rejected the efforts of Colombian victims to intervene in U.S. prosecutions to compel AUC Defendants to divulge information about their crimes.40 Further, the plea agreements that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has reached with thirteen of the extradited Defendants do not contain incentives for Defendants to cooperate with Colombian law enforcement or to reveal the details of their human rights crimes.41 Eight Defendants have been sentenced to terms ranging from four to thirty-one years for drug-related crimes.42 The potential for AUC Defendants to help obtain convictions of corrupt Colombian politicians, dismantle drug trafficking networks, and reform the Colombian military is diminishing. In light of these developments, the International Human Rights Law Clinic (IHRLC) evaluated the consequences of extradition of the AUC leaders from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy interests. The specific goals of this report are: (1) To identify the impact of extraditions on Colombia’s on-going human rights and corruption investigations; (2) To evaluate U.S. foreign policy interests in promoting the cooperation of extradited Colombian paramilitaries with Colombian law enforcement; and (3) To make policy recommendations to better utilize the U.S. prosecutions of Colombian paramilitary leaders to advance U.S. foreign policy interests in Colombia. In preparation of this report, we consulted primary documents, including U.S. court records regarding the extradited Defendants, Department of State reports on human rights conditions in Colombia, and testimony from current and former U.S. officials regarding Colombia as well as the U.S. interests in promoting the rule of law there. We also reviewed documents released by Colombian government agencies, including the Attorney General’s Office, the High Commissioner for Peace, and the National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation. International legal materials were also consulted. In addition, we reviewed secondary sources including newspaper accounts from U.S. and Colombian outlets, as well as documentation compiled by international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups in Colombia. Our analysis is limited by the availability of U.S. and Colombian court documents. The complete case records of U.S. prosecutions of eighteen extradited AUC leaders are not publicly accessible.43 Thus we were unable to verify the current legal status of each of the cases against AUC leaders including whether a Defendant has reached a plea agreement. Similarly, official transcripts of the statements by Defendants before proceedings conducted under the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia are not publicly available. However, Colombian newspapers published reports of these statements, which we consulted. Finally, the participation of some of the researchers in legal actions related to this report may have influenced the analysis.44 Every effort was made to minimize research bias by training researchers and by consulting multiple sources. The benefit of researcher involvement in some of the court proceedings against Defendants is a deeper understanding of the legal and factual issues involved. Background PARAMILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES The extradited Defendants include most of the former leaders of the AUC.45 In the 1980s, wealthy Colombian landowners created militias to wage a “dirty war” against left-wing guerilla groups and suspected sympathizers.46 Financed by the drug trade, the independent militias formed a national network in 1997, the AUC, to advance their common goals of controlling territory and drug trafficking routes. Often acting with the support or acquiescence of the Colombian military, the AUC used brutal and violent methods to wrest territory from guerilla control. AUC combatants forcibly displaced, disappeared, tortured, and killed thousands of campesinos, Afro-Colombians, indigenous persons, trade unionists, human rights advocates, religious leaders, and other civilians.47 AUC commanders colluded with the political, military, and business sectors to ensure control of their areas of operation. In 2000, Human Rights Watch, a U.S.-based NGO, documented that half of Colombia’s eighteen brigade-level army units regularly collaborated in paramilitary activity.48 Military personnel directly participated in several high-profile massacres committed by paramilitary groups.49 In exchange for political protection, Colombian officials used paramilitaries to intimidate citizens and secure votes.50 In the 2000s, several paramilitary leaders boasted that the AUC “controlled” thirty to thirty-five percent of the members of Colombia’s Congress.51 International and domestic businesses operating in Colombia have provided the AUC with financial backing and logistical support.52 After the United States indicted several AUC commanders for drug-related crimes in 2002,53 paramilitary leaders announced a unilateral ceasefire and entered into talks with the Colombian government. These resulted in an agreement to demobilize AUC combatants.54 In 2005, Colombia’s Congress passed the Justice and Peace Law which established a legal framework for the demobilization of paramilitary members who had committed serious human rights abuses. The new law offered legal leniency and public benefits to any paramilitary member—from foot soldiers to the high command—in exchange for an agreement to disarm, forfeit assets, and tell the truth about human rights abuses they committed.55 If paramilitaries fulfilled the requirements of the Justice and Peace Law, they were eligible for sentences of five to eight years regardless of the severity of their crimes, or their rank or role in the AUC.56 JUSTICE AND PEACE PROCESS According to the Colombian government, approximately 31,000 paramilitary fighters had demobilized by 2006.57 Of these, 3,712 applied for benefits under the Justice and Peace Law.58 Applicants were required to provide information about the structure and hierarchy of their former organization, their rank and role, and to confess to their crimes. Victims of paramilitary violence were permitted to attend the hearings and pose questions to the perpetrators.59 The Colombian government reports that as of June 2009, more than 27,000 victims had attended 1,836 hearings.60 At the time of their extraditions, all of the extradited paramilitary commanders were participating in the Justice and Peace process. Most were revealing details about their atrocities and the identity of their accomplices.61 (See text box) Because of their roles and lengthy histories with 5 the organization, Defendants had unparalleled knowledge of AUC’s ties to Colombian officials. The testimony of AUC commanders was particularly important because relatively few paramilitaries had come forward to divulge their crimes, let alone had the ability to reveal involvement of government officials as accomplices.62 The Justice and Peace hearings progressed in two stages. First, the applicant testified without restriction about his experience (referred to in Spanish as version libre). Second, state prosecutors had the opportunity to directly question paramilitary commanders about their crimes and could ask questions supplied by victims.63 Because Defendants’ extraditions came during the first stage of the process, the record of their crimes is partial and incomplete. Some Defendants disclosed information about their crimes, as well as details of military complicity and political corruption. Paramilitary commander Salvatore Mancuso, for example, used an eightyseven- slide PowerPoint presentation to detail his role in killing 336 victims.64 However, most Defendants avoided testifying about certain categories of crimes, such as forced recruitment of child combatants, forced displacement, sexual violence, kidnapping, torture, voter intimidation, and smuggling.65 SUPREME COURT INVESTIGATIONS Alongside the Justice and Peace process, Colombia’s Supreme Court is investigating paramilitaries’ alliances. The Supreme Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate sitting members of Colombia’s Congress,66 has initiated investigations of representatives accused of working with paramilitary groups to commit crimes ranging from electoral fraud to kidnapping and murder.67 The Supreme Court investigations were prompted in 2005, after AUC members made a series of statements to the media about the extent of the group’s influence on Colombia’s Congress.68 The investigations gained speed in 2006, after the discovery of a political pact signed in 2001 by paramilitary commanders and thirty-one politicians. 69 Known as the parapolítica or paragate scandal, one third of Colombia’s congressional representatives have come under investigation for their ties to illegal armed groups.70 Of the 133 current and former members of Congress implicated in the investigations, Colombian authorities have subpoenaed seventy-one to testify and detained fifty.71 Nearly all the legislators under investigation are members of President Uribe’s governing coalition. 72 Allegations of illegal conduct extend to the vice-president73 and even to the president.74 Defendants possess evidence crucial to these investigations. For example, files discovered on a laptop belonging to extradited AUC commander Rodrigo Tovar Pupo were used in the investigations of eighteen politicians.75 Yet the evidentiary value of extradited paramilitary testimony has not been fully exploited. Defendant Salvatore Mancuso is a potential witness in proceedings against twenty-six elected officials, however his extradition has limited his availability as a witness.76 Similarly, Defendant Carlos Jiménez Naranjo is suspected of having conspired with seventeen politicians but has only provided testimony relevant to one investigation.77 OTHER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS The Colombia Attorney General’s Office is prosecuting crimes committed by extradited paramilitaries as well as investigating ties between paramilitary groups and public officials. The Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Unit of the Attorney General’s Office and the criminal courts retain jurisdiction over criminal investigations begun before paramilitary leaders demobilized and entered into the Justice and Peace process. Defendants face multiple indictments and convictions in Colombia for serious human rights abuses including massacres, forced disappearances, and murders.78 Colombia’s Attorney General reports that prosecutors have opened 276 cases against public officials.79 The vast majority of these cases involves allegations of public officials conspiring with paramilitary groups (in a few cases to commit murder) and is in an early phase of investigation.80 The extradited AUC leaders are witnesses and accomplices in many of these cases. More: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/Truthbehindbars.pdf |
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