If you googled the phrase ‘failed state’ this past week, the search result would toss up links to several online definitions of the same as well as news stories and blog posts about two countries: Pakistan and Mexico. Separated by oceans, continents and socio-political contexts, the two countries find themselves facing similar crises. While one tackles militants and the other fights drug cartels — vastly different organisations — the fallout has been similar: destabilisation, compromised governance and deteriorating security.
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From the US perspective, the destabilisation of either Pakistan or Mexico would be catastrophic. Indeed, both countries have been described as ‘a threat to US national security’. A collapse in Pakistan would create a nationwide haven for militants and expose the country’s nuclear weapons to misuse. A Mexican implosion, meanwhile, would spill thousands of migrants and a robust drug trafficking infrastructure across US borders. With the nature of US involvement in both countries, however, the similarities end.
In Mexico, the army is a cohesive entity, loyal to the civilian government. Mexican President Felipe Calderon has so far deployed 25,000 troops, but to little avail. For that reason, the US army is now stepping in to train Mexican troops to take on drug gangs. Moreover, the US government is helping Mexico to crack down on gun trafficking (the parallel smuggling enterprise that keeps drug cartels well-armed).
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In Pakistan, meanwhile, longstanding tensions between the army and civilian government make coherent action against the militants impossible. The army’s scattered loyalties and propensity for double games have also been the subject of much local consternation. Troop deployment in the northern areas and tribal belt has thus proved largely unsuccessful, failing to stem militancy and instead causing collateral damage and earning civilian ire.
It doesn’t help that the Pakistani government is not consistent in its strategy against the militants, switching constantly between confrontation and negotiation. (In Mexico, negotiating with a drug cartel would be totally out of the question; given the similar methodologies of the militants, however, you’d think the same logic would apply here.)
The government’s pandering to cultural quirks is also problematic. In any situation where militias threaten the state, de-weaponisation seems like a good idea. In Swat, however, militants recently engaged in a semantic tango, insisting that they would ‘lay down’ — rather than surrender — their arms, since a Pakhtun could not be expected to live without his gun.
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More importantly, Pakistan should heed the warning of the Mexican example, where the rewards of drug trafficking are enabling cartels to out-arm the state. Recently, growing evidence of the link between the Taliban and Afghanistan’s drug trade has been emerging. In February, it was reported that the Taliban generate between $300m and $400m a year from drug trafficking, a figure that was widely understood to be a gross under-estimate. If drug-related financing were to increasingly spill over to militants in Pakistan, they would have access to unlimited financing for state-of-the-art weapons and communications technology. In that case, Pakistan will be saddled with its own — and Mexico’s — problems.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/Dawn%20Content%20Library/dawn/news/pakistan/a-tale-of-two-countries-szh