http://www.okno.com/ewltr/archive/vol3/ru-ruble.html - hard to beleive it was some 11 years ago..
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Typically, one of the central triggers to the crisis emerged from politicking in the bureaucracy. The relatively tight fiscal and monetary policies which had successfully brought inflation down to moderate levels were relaxed over the summer when government ministers caved in to pleas for handouts from agricultural and industrial producers. The Central Bank issued credits amounting to an estimated 7 trillion rubles in July and August alone. This has and will continue to push up inflation, which had fallen to 4% per month in August and has since increased to 10% in October. The inflation sparked by these credits prompted the Central Bank to allow the ruble to adjust by dropping in value from 2,000 to the dollar earlier in the summer to nearly 3,000 to the dollar at the beginning of October. A weaker ruble would mean it would take fewer dollars to pay for the budget deficit caused by the increased credits and to pay delayed salaries. It would also serve to protect domestic industry by making imports more expensive.
In September, the Central Bank announced that it would stay out of the currency market in order to preserve its foreign exchange reserves. The scale of previous intervention was revealed on 27 September, when the Bank announced that reserves had fallen below $5 billion after $2.5 billion had been spent in the preceding two months. The Central Bank's unwillingness to intervene led to widespread doubt of the government's commitment to defend the ruble, boosting demand for dollars even further. On Black Tuesday, the Bank intervened only a little, and rather late, in order to halt the ruble from dropping below 4,000 to the dollar. The recovery two days later was partially due to renewed Central Bank intervention. The Bank also raised short-term interest rates to 170% from 130% to help curb currency market speculation.
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The government is trying to negotiate with the IMF for $8 billion in stand-by and other credits for this year and a further $6 billion to help stabilize the ruble in 1995. The IMF will most likely not deliver the credits until the government shows that it can cut spending to hold the budget deficit to 5% of GNP next year (compared to 11% at present) and reduce inflation to about 3% per month or less. The government is determined to follow through on its promises to the IMF but is feeling pressure from a wide range of groups, including labor (over unpaid wages), industrial managers, pensioners, etc. The situation intensifies the budgetary struggle with parliament, which will heat up after Mr. Chernomyrdin presents the government's budget to parliament at the end of October. The proposed budget is extremely tight, requiring cuts in almost every sector of the economy.
Western governments will have to agree to support a social safety net if they want to convince Russian politicians to cut subsidies to failing industries. Meanwhile, the politicians are going to be under even more pressure to issue credits in the face of price increases instituted during and after Black Tuesday. These increases in regulated prices are likely to survive challenge, resulting in higher prices across the board. This "cost-push" inflation will further jack up the costs of industry and lower the buying power of employees' wages. Many people with fixed pensions and low wages already cannot afford basic foodstuffs. These people comprise a large fraction of the electorate, and they are ultimately the ones who choose to vote for a reformer like Grigoriy Yavlinskiy or a neo-fascist like Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
Russia appears to have its fingers on the control switch for oil flow which does not sit well with Europe or the US which has major plans to build pipelines guarded by military bases all over the eastern bloc.