from article:
"British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that those who committed the attack on the Golden Mosque “have only one motive: to create a violent sedition between the Sunnis and the Shiites in order to derail the Iraqi rising democracy from its path.”
Well said Mr. Blair, particularly when we keep in mind the fact that less than a year ago in Basra, two undercover British SAS soldiers were detained by Iraqi security forces whilst traveling in a car full of bombs and remote detonators."
And a worthwhile backgrounder:
A Meeting with Hoshyar Zebari
Author:
Hoshyar Zebari
June 8, 2004
Speaker: Hoshyar Zebari, foreign minister of the Interim Government of Iraq
Moderator: Richard N. Haass, president, Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
New York, N.Y.
June 8, 2004
Let me just begin by introducing the minister, someone I’ve known for a long time. He has been a leading figure in Iraqi politics now for decades. He’s one of the principal figures in the Kurdish Democratic Party. He has been a principal figure in the Iraqi National Congress and in Iraqi opposition politics. Most recently, Minister Zebari has, again, been the foreign affairs figure for the IGC, and as of June 30, he not so much changes hats, but we change the sign on the hat, and represents the sovereign government of Iraq in its foreign relations.
He’s with us his morning, and immediately after this he will heading down to join the president of the new interim government and they will be making their way down to a little resort off the coast of Georgia, where the Iraqi delegation will meet with the leaders of the G-8 countries. And hopefully, all of this will happen against the backdrop of the passage of a new Security Council resolution, which the minister has been instrumental in shaping. So again, sir, welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations.
ZEBARI: Thank you very much for your kind words. And I’m also very pleased to be here with you. In fact, the first time I was here was in 1991, immediately after the second Gulf War, the liberation of Kuwait. I’m very pleased to be here this year after the liberation of the Iraqi people from Saddam’s dictatorship.
The significance of this resolution for us, for the Iraqis, is really to take away the concept of occupation, which I would say was the main reason for many of the difficulties that we have been going through since liberation on April the 9th <2003>. So we want this resolution to make a clear departure from previous resolutions— 1483, 1511— that legitimized the occupation of our country, and it has put us in a very difficult position to defend our vision for the future of Iraq, to defend our friends and allies who have sacrificed a great deal to liberate the Iraqi people from these years of darkness. This is one.
ZEBARI: Well, one of the areas that has taken a great deal of discussion in the Security Council is the relation of the new interim government with the multinational forces, which I have said in the chamber of the Security Council and very publicly that we need these forces. It is an Iraqi need more than an American or coalition need. And I warned against any premature withdrawal of these forces because the consequences would be catastrophic. I have said this here in New York in the chamber. I’ve said it in Cairo. I’ve said it in Tunis in front of all the Arab leaders, said it in front of all the Islamic leaders, that any premature withdrawal will create a vacuum. We the Iraqis are not ready to fill it, and the possibilities really would be wide open for the disintegration of Iraq as a state, for the possibility of reigning chaos and even civil war. When we mention that it would not be like Lebanon or Afghanistan, really, it would be far more serious. It would be the possibility of a junior Saddam coming up again in such a situation, on these extremist, nationalist ideas to take control again.
<snip>
ZEBARI: --yes, yes— the federal entity will retain some internal security, like police, mountain rangers, antiterrorist groups, and so on. This would be under the command of the regional government, but all the other militias— I mean, now, I mean, we had, the KDP/PUK had nearly about 100,000 people under arms. The rest actually would be encouraged to join the other Iraqi army units: the police, the new army, the IRDC, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the border guards. Many such entities have been established where they have joined.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7091/meeting_with_hoshyar_zebari.html