Hey! Bev Harris and anyone else concened about voting machines

[MindPilot]

The California Secretary of State has extended the deadline for public comment on electronic voting machines issues until the end of July. If they do this right, California may be able to set a standard the rest of the country will follow, so even if you are not a California resident, your input will still be important.

http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/taskforce.htm

Submit your comments to:

Write to:
Secretary of State Kevin Shelley
Attn: Touch Screen Report
1500 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Send email to:
[e-mail]

Fax comments to:
[phone]

At the risk of starting another hueueueuge thread on the subjest, please post what you send.

[DUreader]

1. kick it

[donsu]

2. kick

nt

[loudsue]

3. Kicking it!

:kick::kick::kick::kick::kick:


I hope they DO set a precedent and take this situation in hand.

[guajira]

4. My Local Democrats Club (IN FLORIDA!!!) Decided NOT to Support this

issue. AAAAAAAARRRRRRRRRRRRRHHHHHHHH!!!!!!

I'm disgusted with Democrats right now!!!!

To the group's credit - they are good at planning dinners! (sigh)

[Generic Other]

5. I hope you started throwing punches, swinging from chandeliers, etc.

I have had a few public outbursts in my life that embarassed me and those who witnessed my explosion. Twice since Bush has been in office, I have raised my voice in public. I didn't know I was capable of being that loud.

If we can't get Democrats in Florida to care about fair elections...wow, that stuns me.

It is to your credit that you weren't carried out in a straightjacket on a gurney! I probably would have been.

[KeepItReal]

6. Check out their recommendations

http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/taskforce_report_4.pdf

They seem to recognize the need for the elections officials to be able to better audit the machines they are rolling out to the voting public...

Here are some excerpts:

"There are currently too many holes in the federal qualification and testing process that need to be strengthened in order for the Task Force to be confident that software is being developed, checked, tested, loaded, and run with adequate safeguards to prevent tampering or bugs.

After hearing from experts on computer security as well as election experts versed in election administration security procedures, and receiving no response from several inquiries to Wyle Laboratories and Ciber (two of the three federal ITAs that test DRE voting system hardware, software and firmware), the Task Force agrees that each of these areas is not as strong as they can and need to be.

In addition, some members of the Task Force have significant concerns about the security protocols that vendors have in place during the product development phase and throughout the vendor’s participation in the modification and improvement of software and systems through software patches.

...

A system designed to protect the most valuable aspect of our democracy – our voting systems, must be free from any questions over inadequacy, conflicts of interest, or collusion. Transparency is the only method that will ensure that the public does not question the intensity of the certification process. Therefore, the Federal testing process must increase transparency by incorporating citizen observation and participation and increasing public disclosure throughout the entire qualification process.

...

The Task Force acknowledges that its mission is limited by factors of time and knowledge. Therefore, the State should create a Technical Oversight Committee comprised of technical experts who can improve current testing and code-review standards, provide expert guidance throughout the certification process, and serve as a panel to review software and hardware issues that might arise. The panel members should be independent experts in computer science (especially computer security) and other engineering fields as appropriate who have technical expertise related to software development, computer security, user interface design, and other related fields. Panel members must not have financial or other conflicts of interest with voting equipment vendors. The panel should be convened by July 2003 and its meetings must be open to the public. "

I hope the Task Force can succeed in doing what they recommend. I do think they should push harder for a paper trail at the actual time a vote is cast, instead of at the end of voting. They make printing out a vote summary sound like having to re-invent the wheel.

[On the Road]

7. Thanks for Posting

Here's the text of my letter:

Mr. Shelley

Kevin:

Thank you for seeking public comment. I am concerned about the electronic voting machines being deployed in California. I believe electronic systems should improve accuracy and reliability, not decrease them.

At the very least, an individual record should be stored for each voter, including an identification or ballot number. In the event of a recount or contested election, these records would be available, just like a paper ballot, to validate the results.

I think there is a serious question as to whether the existing machines are capable of doing a recount as defined in California election law. I believe the law requires individual votes to be examined. Checking an electionic total is not the same.

I can promise you that in the next contested election, this will be brought before a court. It a very live issue.

Apart from the legal question, an electronic vote provides the least assurance that a voter's choices have been recorded and will be counted. Even with a paper receipt, there is still no record that the machine included the votes in the electronic totals. There must be an individual electronic record to allow verification after the fact. Anything else leaves the door open to fraud and the suspicion of fraud with no way to prove otherwise.

If there is any doubt, it is better to leave the existing systems rather than replace it with a flawed and controversial system.

Jack Neefus