These three excerpts of the DSM

[shraby]

haven't been highlighted much, but in my mind they are extremely important:
(No plan for the aftermath)
The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

Particularly this one! (Seeking to influence the election with the invasion)
No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

(An admission that Saddam had less power than the other three countries)
It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

[Poiuyt]

1. I've always thought that the real reason for the Iraqi war was to

increase political power. (point #2)

[klebean]

2. ditto pt 2 n/t