Asode from general interest I post this to show shine light on another false claim that nuclear supporters are fond of - that the Price Anderson Act isn't a form of subsidy. India has elected to hold the businesses involved in nuclear power to a *somewhat* stricter set of standards, not, in other words, giving them the protections afforded by the PAA. The concern of the Japanese reflect a universal attitude among the entire nuclear industry. THEY WANT THE BOTTOM LINE ECONOMIC VALUE that being exempt from the harm they might wreak brings to them. That is called an indirect subsidy and it's value is discussed in the piece after the article.
India-Japan N-deal likely to be delayed
Indrani Bagchi, TNN, Oct 5, 2010, 01.37am IST
NEW DELHI: A crucial civil nuclear agreement between India and Japan will not be ready by the time Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrives in Tokyo later this month.
The two countries will be sitting down for the second round of nuclear negotiations starting at the end of this week in Delhi. Japan is likely to grill Indian officials on the new Indian nuclear liability law and whether it would deter Japanese nuclear suppliers. US companies are already raising concerns about a provision in the law that makes suppliers liable in case of a nuclear accident. A second clause in the law that leaves companies open to be prosecuted under other Indian laws is also giving them the jitters.
But this will be small change compared to the Japanese demand that the agreement should have a provision for cessation of nuclear cooperation if India tests another nuclear device. Indian officials will be looking for "creative" word-play which will address concerns on both sides.
The bottomline though is that both sides want to get an agreement because the relationship, as envisaged by Tokyo and Delhi, is situated on a bigger canvas.
But the PM's visit will be a lot ...
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Japan-N-deal-likely-to-be-delayed-/articleshow/6685241.cmsI've removed the references from the first iteration to make it more readable.
Taxpayer Subsidies for Nuclear Costs
Consider first the way that most nuclear-cost studies ignore taxpayer subsidies that cover many nuclear costs. The largest of the ignored subsidies is for nuclear insurance. The European Commission (consistent with the WNA and Cato-Institute figures) recently showed that, if commercial reactors had to purchase full-insurance-liability coverage on the market, this would triple nuclear-generated-electricity prices. Yet a majority of the nuclear-cost studies exclude full-insurance costs, presumably because they are not market costs but mainly government/taxpayer subsidies. Without these subsidies (and liability protection), however, utilities agree they would never use risky atomic energy, e.g..
Why not? Insurance rates reflect this high risk, given that the government-calculated, lifetime-core-melt probability for all US-commercial reactors is 1 in 5. Reflecting various responses to this core-melt risk, commercial reactors fall into three camps regarding liability coverage. The vast majority of reactors are in the first camp (e.g., in China, India, Iran, Pakistan), where operator nuclear liability is 0.
One-third of reactors (many in western Europe and the US) are in the second camp, where operator liability is minimal. US reactors have the highest (minimal) liability, $10.8 billion—roughly 1.5% of government-calculated, worst-case-accident damages of $660 billion. The third camp includes 13% of reactors (in Germany, Japan, Switzerland), all having government- guaranteed, unlimited liability. All countries thus reduce nuclear-industry risks/costs by transferring them to the people, either directly, to those who live nearby, or indirectly, through taxpayer/ government subsidies.
K. Shrader-Frechette
Taxpayer Subsidies for Nuclear Costs
Consider first the way that most nuclear-cost studies ignore taxpayer subsidies that cover many nuclear costs. The largest of the ignored subsidies is for nuclear insurance. The European Commission (consistent with the WNA and Cato-Institute figures) recently showed that, if commercial reactors had to purchase full-insurance-liability coverage on the market, this would triple nuclear-generated-electricity prices (European Commission (EC) 2003; World Nuclear Association (WNA) 2008; Heyes 2002). Yet a majority of the nuclear-cost studies exclude full-insurance costs, presumably because they are not market costs but mainly government/taxpayer subsidies. Without these subsidies (and liability protection), however, utilities agree they would never use risky atomic energy, e.g. (Scully Capital Services Inc. 2002; Heyes 2002; Spurgeon 2008; Slocum 2008; American Nuclear Society (ANS) 2005; Rothwell 2002; Energy Information Administration (EIA) 1999; Brownstein 1994).
Why not? Insurance rates reflect this high risk, given that the government-calculated, lifetime-core-melt probability for all US-commercial reactors is 1 in 5 (Makhijani 2007; Smith 2006; Shrader-Frechette 2007).
Reflecting various responses to this core-melt risk, commercial reactors fall into three camps regarding liability coverage. The vast majority of reactors are in the first camp (e.g., in China, India, Iran, Pakistan), where operator nuclear liability is 0.
One-third of reactors (many in western Europe and the US) are in the second camp, where operator liability is minimal. US reactors have the highest (minimal) liability, $10.8 billion—roughly 1.5% of government-calculated, worst-case-accident damages of $660 billion (Smith 2006; Shrader-Frechette 2007). The third camp includes 13% of reactors (in Germany, Japan, Switzerland), all having government- guaranteed, unlimited liability (World Nuclear Association (WNA) 2008; Schwartz 2006). All countries thus reduce nuclear-industry risks/costs by transferring them to the people, either directly, to those who live nearby, or indirectly, through taxpayer/ government subsidies (Energy Information Administration (EIA) 1999).
K. Shrader-Frechette
Climate Change, Nuclear Economics, and Conflicts of Interest
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
19 October 2009
Sci Eng Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s11948-009-9181-y
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