Scheuer: CIA Threatened 9/11 Commissioners over Naming of Junior Officer

[KJF]

In his new book Marching Toward Hell, former Alec Station chief Michael Scheuer describes an incident where CIA officers threatened the 9/11 Commission. First, he recounts how former CIA director George Tenet fired a young low level CIA employee for the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Serbia in 1999. Then, he says:

"In the same way, in early 2004, the 9/11 commissioners indicated that they were intending to name an even younger CIA officer as the only individual to be publicly identified for a pre-9/11 failure. A group of senior CIA officers, however, let it be known that if that officer was named, information about the pre-9/11 negligence of several very senior US officials would find its way into the media. The commissioners dropped the issue."

It's in a footnote on page 273.

I wonder who the junior officer is - Clark Shannon? There's really not much criticism of any of the junior officers in the final report.

[wildbilln864]

1. Thank you KJF. nt

:hi:

[JackRiddler]

2. What a hero...

"information about the pre-9/11 negligence of several very senior US officials would find its way into the media."

Like, this wouldn't be the moral imperative to do except as a threat to protect a team member? Great.

[rschop]

3. Junior Officer

It is unlikely that Clark Shannon was the junior officer at the CIA that the 9/11 Commission wanted to publicly identify for the following reasons. Shannon was a subordinate of Tom Wilshire, Deputy Chief of the CIA Bin Laden unit and with Wilshire helped set up the meeting in New York for June 11, 2001 with the FBI Cole investigators, a meeting that later turned out to be nothing but a well crafted CIA sting on the FBI investigators to see if they had uncovered information on Mihdhar and Hazmi in their search for Khallad Bin Attash.

While Shannon knew at the time of this meeting that Hazmi was inside of the US and also knew Mihdhar had a US multi-entry visa, and even knew that Khallad Bin Attash had attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting with both Mihdhar and Hazmi and that this directly connected all three to the planning of the Cole bombing which took place at that meeting, Wilshire also knew all of this information. So if Shannon had been named, Wilshire also would have been named right along with Shannon and he never was. By withholding this information from FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his Cole investigating team at this meeting that Hazmi was inside of the and that he and Mihdhar were involved in the planning of the Cole bombing Shannon, Wilshire and even FBI HQ IOS Agent Dina Corsi, who claimed to have set up this meeting, were all knowingly criminally obstructing the FBI criminal Cole investigation and were committing major felonies. What is worse, there is no way the 9/11 Commission and the FBI IG investigators did not uncover this blatant criminal behavior at the CIA and the FBI! It was simply just way too obvious!

While both Shannon and Wilshire knew about a huge al Qaeda attack that was about to take place at the time of this meeting, in July Wilshire says in emails that he is sure that the people who were at the Kuala Lumpur meeting were connected to the warnings of this huge attack and then a few weeks later says in emails to CTC managers that Mihdhar, and by association, Hazmi, will be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda attack.

But what is the horror story of all horror stories, when Margarete Gillespie finds that Mihdhar and Hazmi are both inside of the US on August 22, 2001, and she takes that information to Dina Corsi and Tom Wilshire, Wilshire knows immediately that they are inside of the US for no other reason than to take part in this huge attack. But not only does Wilshire not raise any alarm with the FBI, he and Corsi conspire to make sure any search for Mihdhar will be kept away from Steve Bongardt and his team of Cole investigators. Since Gillespie had the CIA Bin Laden unit issue a world-wide alert for Mihdhar and Hazmi on August 23, 2001, everyone at the Bin Laden unit and the CIA hierarchy, including Black and Tenet, who also that knew about this huge al Qaeda attack also knew that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in this attack, and none of these people raised any alarm or told the FBI in spite of knowing that thousands of Americans were just about to be killed in this huge attack.


When Corsi's EC comes over to the FBI on August 28, 2001 and accidentally is sent to Bongardt, and he calls Corsi to try take back the investigation of Mihdhar for his team, Corsi tells Steve he must destroy that EC and any other information he has on Mihdhar and that he and his team will not allowed to have any part in the investigation of Mihdhar. Steve is told that if even one single piece of paper is found at the FBI with his name and the name Khalid al-Mihdhar, his career is finished at the FBI. What is so horrific is at the time Corsi is doing this, she knows that the CIA and Wilshire have been hiding the photo of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur. She knows that this directly connects Mihdhar to the Cole bombing. This meant that she clearly knew the search for Mihdhar should have gone to Steve and his team of Cole investigators. If Steve had known about the fact that the CIA had this photo, he would have had enough of an case to insure that the investigation of Mihdhar was not taken away from his team. Had Steve been given the task of finding Mihdhar, it is inconceivable he would not have found him in time and prevented the attacks that took place on 9/11.

While the photo of Mihdhar and Hazmi were sent to the FBI on August 23, the CIA, Wilshire and Corsi kept the photo of Khallad secret from the FBI New York office until August 30, until two days after they had insured Steve would be blocked from taking part in any aspect of of the investigation for Mihdhar. The CIA knew that if the photo of Khallad came over to the FBI at the same time as the photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi, both Bongardt and his boss, Ali Soufan would have immediately known that the CIA and FBI agents at FBI HQ they had been working with, had criminally obstructed the investigation of the Cole bombing on many occasions. The CIA knew that everyone of these people would have ended up in prison for years.

Since the CIA was well aware of the huge attack that was about to take place inside of the US that would kill thousands at the time they worked with Corsi to write up that EC to keep the investigation of Mihdhar away from Bongardt, it is inconceivable that they also were not aware that by keeping this investigation away from the only effective team that could have found Mihdhar quickly, they were insuring that the FBI would be unable to prevent this attack and as a result thousands of Americans would perish.

This information is now found in publicly available documentation from the 9/11 investigations and has been compiled into a book for the first time, the first printing which was released in January 2007, called "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" available now on web site:

www.prior-knowledge-of-9/11.com

[noise]

4. The question is why they did so

There is a repeated pattern of CIA failure to share the Malaysia intel with the FBI going back to January 2000. It seems the orders given at that time (yes I am rejecting the notion of poor watchlisting procedures as IMO it is BS) stood until late August 2001. I come to that conclusion because Gillespie was researching intel already known by Wilshire. Thus it seems the watchlisting had more to do with another (unknown) factor instead of Gillespie's research. One notes that the CIA's conduct spans two Presidential administrations.

Another aspect that isn't widely discussed:

In Unsafe at any Altitude, author Joe Trento reports that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were undercover Saudi GID agents. In the same book, Trento tells the story of Eric Gill (Dulles security worker) who claims he saw Nawaf al-Hazmi and Marwan al-Shehhi on the night of 9/10. Gill said they were wearing dirty United Airline ramp uniforms and evidently had employee ID's. Gill said he got into an argument with al-Hazmi.

Here is an interesting statement from George Tenet:

Tenet also told the panel in written testimony that the CIA believes Almihdhar and Alhazmi were actually in the country not for the Sept. 11 strike but for another al Qaeda operation. The pair operated on a different timetable than the other hijackers and received special training in Afghanistan in 1999 with operatives who planned and executed the Oct. 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole, Tenet noted.

"We speculate that this difference may be explained by the possibility that the two men originally entered the U.S. to carry out a different terrorist operation prior to being folded into the 9/11 plot," Tenet noted in written testimony submitted to the panel.

CIA officials said after the hearing that they do not know what other plot the men might have been trying to complete. In his written testimony, Tenet said the men may have been inserted as last-minute recruits in the Sept. 11 plot when two other would-be hijackers were unable to obtain visas. They are Ramzi Binalshibh, a Yemeni national who was captured in Pakistan last month, and Moroccan Zakaria Essabar.

Link

[KJF]

7. The problem with the GID theory...

... is that Wilshire and Rich B (note: it is unclear if Rich B received the notification saying Almihdhar was in the US, but it is highly likely; Wilshire certainly did receive it) know that there is going to be an attack and know that Almihdhar may be involved in the attack, and Rich B even thinks that the attack is going to be in the US. Yet they still take no action (except Wilshire and Corsi throw a spanner in Bongardt's works). Given Alec Station's relationship with the GID, why would they continue to protect a known GID agent who was to be involved in an attack? The Trentos say this is because the CIA received assurances that everything was under control. Who gave these assurances and why would anyone believe them?

And this information did not go up the management chain at the CIA. Is that because Rich B and Wilshire were concealing it from their managers, or because their managers told them they didn't want a paper trail?

[noise]

8. CIA conduct is a mystery

Lawrence Wright suggests CIA conduct amounted to obstruction of justice in the Cole bombing investigation. One would think any GID assurances would have gone out the window after CIA learned al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were linked to Cole plotters (by way of the Malaysia summit).

Maybe high ranking CIA officials were convinced of the necessity of 'deep state' policy goals.

[greyl]

5. Very interesting.

Would you mind posting evidence supporting what you've written about the inactions/actions of Wilshire and Corsi?

And, here's a working link:
http://prior-knowledge-of-9-11.com

(The site's coding could stand improvement, btw. The comments on the blog about overlapping text are true when people are using certain browsers.)


-Thanks for the OP, KJF

[Fainter]

10. Yes, I Agree, Do You Have Any Links To This Info? Dude, Who Are You...

your information sounds so authoritative you could be a whistleblower or working from the inside.

[eomer]

11. Who is this dude? I googled until I found the answer.

Here's an article that tells his story:

http://www.losaltosonline.com/2007/08/01/in-new-book-los-altan-claims-he-predicted-911-attacks/

And here's a link to his website:

www.priorknowledgeof911.com

(Apparently there are several URLs pointing to this same website. One other variation was already posted elsewhere in this thread.)

[rschop]

13. Reply to Fainter

Neither, but I have spent over 5 years researching all aspects of why the CIA and FBI had allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place and now feel I have the whole story and have put all of this down on paper for the whole world to see. When you read the book you will see exactly why I was motivated to do this. I have given most of the information in the first part of the book to the FBI, on 8 separate occasions, to the Joint Inquiry Committee investigators, and to the 9/11 Commissioners.

[noise]

18. What was their motive?

What did you conclude as to why the attacks were allowed?

[rschop]

23. Re:noise

Yes, it was completely possible to find the very reasons they had carried out a conspiracy to hide information from the FBI criminal investigators. The reasons depended on the time periods when the deliberate hiding of critical CIA information took place and also depended on the people carrying out this conspiracy.

Going Backwards in time:

August 22-September 11, 2001

Wilshire on August 22, 2001 is told Mihdhar and Hazmi are inside of the US and knows they will take part in a huge al Qaeda attack that will kill thousands of American. Yet he knows if the photo of Khallad comes over to the FBI NY office with the photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi, Bongardt will know for sure that Wilshire and Shannon had known this at the June 11, 2001 meeting in New York and that they had obstructed the Cole bombing investigation, and 50-60 people at the CIA and FBI HQ will go to prison for years for having obstructed Soufan and Bongardt's investigation of the Cole bombing. Corsi also knows this but may not know that Mihdhar and Hazmi will take part in this huge attack, although if she does not know this she is incredibly not with it, but she is clearly under Wilshire's complete control.

The CIA Bin Laden unit and the CIA hierarchy by August 23, also know what Wishire is aware of and yet they do not raise any alarm. They all fear going to prison!

The whole objective during this time is to keep the investigation of Mihdhar way from Steve and his team of Cole investigators under all circumstances.

August 24 Wilshire makes contact with Maltbie and Frasca the two FBI managers sabotaging Harry Samit's investigation of Moussaoui. It is clear in email on August 24, 2001 that Maltbie is unaware that Wishire is the designated CIA spy inside of the FBI, but it is also clear that by this point Maltbie is getting pressure to shut down Samit's investigation of Moussaoui by people perhaps above Frasca, this would most likely have been Rolince who was forcing Maltbie to kill Samit's investigation of Moussaoui. The reason this was done was to insure that the investigation of Moussaoui does not gain momentum, and turn into a raging fire storm at the FBI which would encourage Bongardt to force the investigation of Mihdhar back to his group. By deliberately keeping this investigation under wraps and keeping all information on the Moussaoui investigation away from Steve, the information Wilshire now has at this time, Bongardt will be unable to connect these two al Qaeda terrorists together to this huge attack the CIA is aware of.


April 2001- August 22, 2001

The CIA knows about a huge al Qaeda attack and also know Hazmi is inside of the US and know Mihdhar has a multi-entry visa for the US and that Khallad had been photographed at Kuala Lumpur with Mihdhar and Hazmi. But the CIA knows they have already obstructed the Cole investigation several times and now are determined to keep this information from the Kula Lumpur meeting away from the
FBI criminal investigators for fear of going to prison. This was the one group at the FBI the CIA could never control.

November 2000- April 2001

CIA finds out Khallad bin Attash had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Mihdhar and Hazmi and now know they are culpable in this attack for having photographed all of the people at this meeting, who were all known to be long time al Qaeda terrorists, and then just letting them all walk away to carry of the Cole bombing.

The CIA for first time put a wide ranging criminal conspiracy in place, involving the Yemen CIA station, the CIA Bin Laden unit, the handler for the FBI/CIA Joint source, and even almost the entire CIA management including Black, Tenet and many of the managers at the CIA CTC unit to insure this information is kept away from the FBI criminal investigators.

January 2000 - November 2000

This is a conundrum. It is clear this conspiracy started on January 5, 2000 when Wilshire blocked FBI Agent Doug Miller's cable on Mihdhar from going to the FBI. So why did this conspiracy start at this point. The theory I came up with, and this is just a guess, is that Mihdhar and Ali Mohammed had been involved together in the east Africa bombings, which they had been, and Mohammed, a high level al Qaeda terrorist, had worked at both the CIA and FBI so both groups wanted Mihdhar and his connection to Mohammed kept away from the criminal FBI investigators for fear this information would get out into the public in a court case and embarrass both agencies. This was the ultimate case of CYA! But this is just a theory and has little corroboration other than it makes the most sense.

The book has much much more detail on this!

[noise]

30. Interesting theory

We have three successful attacks (African embassies, Cole and 9/11) that are associated with the Yemen hub. Mihdhar was closely associated with the hub by way of Ahmed al-Hada.

US intelligence conduct is very strange.

[rschop]

12. re: Very interesting

All of the evidence is in the book. Material in the book all comes from mostly three sources. The FBI Inspector General Report, the account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan,lead investigator on the Cole bombing, which is found in the July 17, 2006 issue of the New Yorker, and the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, with some information derived from other sources. Actual sections from these various 9/11 reports were added right into the book. Since the book is 630 pages long it is a little hard to give you specifics but I will list the times Corsi and Wilshire teamed up to block information from going to FBI Agent Bongardt and his team of Cole investigators. The FBI IG report is still the most accurate report of what had happened prior to 9/11, but I have I listed in the book where the FBI IG report is flat wrong, and it was wrong to cover up FBI misdeeds. I had un-redacted this report in 2005, but then I switched and used the new government un-redacted version released in May 2006. Note; is was possible to even find out why the FBI IG report had been redacted and why it was only released after the Moussaoui trial.

Corsi and Wilshire:

Corsi was recruited by Wilshire in May 2001 to set up the meeting with the Cole investigators the New York FBI field office. At this time both Wilshire and Shannon had obtained a copy of FBI Agent Ali Soufan's request that he had sent to the CIA in April 2001, asking for any information that the CIA had on Khallad Bin Attash and if the CIA had any information on a al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000. This fact is one of the most closely guarded secrets at the CIA, and it will be clear why this information was kept secret when you see the whole story. Not only did Shannon and Wilshire not give the information they and the CIA had to Soufan, but instead Wilshire asked Corsi to set up this meeting with Soufan's own people only in order to find out if the FBI criminal investigators had uncovered information on Mihdhar and Hazmi in their search for Khallad. This was the information the CIA had been trying to keep secret from the FBI criminal investigators since January 5, 2000. The CIA thought that these FBI investigators knew about the flight Khallad had taken from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok on January 8, 2000, which in fact they did, and had looked over the manifest for that flight and uncovered the fact that Mihdhar and Hazmi were sitting right next to Khallad on that flight. While the CIA knew how close the FBI had come to uncovering information this Mihdhar and Hamzi, it turns out the FBI Cole investigators had never looked at that manifest for that flight.

At that June 11, 2001 in New York meeting, Corsi presented the three photos of Mihdhar taken at Kuala Lumpur that Wilshire had obtained from the CIA, one photo only had Mihdhar and Hazmi in it. Wilshire had been moved over to the FBI to be liaison to Michael Rolince in mid-May 2001 by Black and Tenet, at the acquiescence of Rolince and Freeh, even though both Rolince and Freeh had to know that he was there only to be the CIA spy inside of the FBI.

(Tenet had Freeh over a barrel since Freeh had deliberately obstructed Soufan's investigation of the Cole bombing, and Tenet was aware of this. Soufan had requested in November 2000 that Freeh ask Tenet for any information the CIA had on Khallad or a meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 and was told by Freeh that the CIA had no information. But in fact Freeh already knew there had been a meeting in Kuala Lumpur and already knew that Khalid al-Mihdhar had been at that meeting and he never gave any of that information to Soufan. Not only had the NSA and CIA given Freeh this information in January 2000 and this same information was again put in one of Freeh's January 2000 daily briefing papers.)*
When the three photos were presented to Bongardt and the other Cole investigators, Shannon asked them if they recognized anyone in these photos. It was then clear that the CIA only wanted to know if the FBI had uncovered the information that the CIA had been keeping secret, that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Khallad Bin Attash planning the bombing of the USS Cole that had killed 17 US sailors. When Bongardt and the other FBI Cole investigators said they could not recognize anyone in these photos CIA office Shannon must have been completely flabbergasted.

* From the FBI IG Report, page 238:

2. NSA provides intelligence regarding planned travel by al Qaeda operatives to Malaysia

In the midst of the Millennium period concerns in late 1999, the NSA analyzed communications associated with a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East linked to Al Qaeda activities directed against U.S. interests. The communications indicated that several members of an "operational cadre" were planning to travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000. Analysis of the communications revealed that persons named Nawaf, Khalid and Salem were involved. In early 2000, the NSA analyzed what appeared to be related communications concerning a "Khalid."171171 The NSA had additional information in its database further identifying "Nawaf as Nawaf al-Hazmi, a friend of Khalid. However, the NSA informed the OIG that it was not (continued) The NSA's reporting about these communications was sent, among other places, to FBI Headquarters, the FBI's Washington and New York Field Offices, and the CIA's CTC. At the FBI, this information appeared in the daily threat update to the Director on January 4, 2000.

On Wilshire and Corsi sabotaging Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar, it is all in the last post with the following additional information:

After Gillespie found out from the INS that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US, Corsi with Gillespie went to Wilshire's FBI office on August 22, 2001, where Wilshire took away any further involvement for the search for Mihdhar from Gillespie and gave this work to Corsi. It was not until the very next day that Corsi even contacted her own boss on this matter and tells him the investigation of Mihdhar has to be an intelligence investigation only, meaning that the Cole investigators and Steve Bongardt will not be allowed to have any role in this investigation. (Wilshire claims he had no official position at the ITOS unit of the FBI, so why is he directing all of the work of FBI IOS Agent Dina Corsi?) Yet she had told the FBI NY office on August 22, 2001 that the photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi will be coming over to the FBI NY office on August 23, and that the CIA also has a photo of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur. She clearly knows that the photo of Khallad at Kuala Lumpur directly connected Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing and that this meant that the investigation of Mihdhar clearly should have gone to Bongardt. She contacts the head if the intelligence unit at the FBI NY office and says that it is urgent that they start an investigation of Mihdhar as soon as possible, and when they do she immediately emails Wilshire and says, "The FBI will open an intelligence investigation of Mihdhar?
It is absolutely clear Wilshire is directing and coordinating Corsi's work to guarantee that the investigation of Mihdhar will be an intelligence investigation only!

Yet when he EC comes over to the NY FBI office it does not say urgent, it only specifies "Routine" which means absolutely or no urgency. So it is clear that Corsi only told the FBI intelligence unit that it was urgent that the FBI Intelligence unit open an investigation of Mihdhar quickly in order to head off any effort by Bongardt and his Cole investigators to have any part in the investigation of Mihdhar. It is all but inconceivable that Wilshire did not know by sabotaging Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar that this would make it all but impossible for the FBI to find Mihdhar in time and as a result thousands of Americans would perish in the huge attack the CIA and even the ITOS unit at the FBI was aware of. When Gillespie issued the world-wide alert for Mihdhar and Hazmi on August 23, 2001, the entire CIA Bin Laden unit and CIA hierarchy was aware of this also, and yet no one raised any alarm to stop Mihdhar and Hazmi and the attack on 9/11. On August 24, Wilshire again made email contact with Maltbie and Frasca, the two RFU managers under the ITOS, that were sabotaging Harry Samit's investigation of Moussaoui, yes the very same unit that Wilshire is liaison to and that Corsi works at, to find out the status of the Moussaoui investigation. So on August 24, Wilshire not only knows Mihdhar and Hazmi are inside of the US in order to take part in a gigantic al Qaeda attack, but also knows Moussaoui has been arrested by the FBI as a possible al Qaeda terrorists while trying to learn how to fly a 747 with no prior flight training. But on August 23, the entire CIA hierarchy and the head of the CIA , George Tenet are also aware of this same information. All of this information is now in the public domain, so why is the main-stream news media still keeping this all secret! GO FIGURE!

[noise]

19. These dates may have been significant

Don (Dave Frasca) was the unit chief of the RFU at this time. He joined the FBI in 1987 and was assigned to the RFU in May 2001.

He (Rod Middleton) was the Acting Unit Chief of the UBLU from June 28, 2001, until September 10, 2001.

Link

[rschop]

24. These dates may be significant

See the post reply to: What was their motivation!

[KJF]

6. Hi rschop

It's me, Kevin.

I am generally in agreement with you that Wilshire is protecting Alhazmi and Almihdhar from the FBI on purpose. One alternative explanation, as advanced by Joe and Susan Trento, for example, is that the CIA (including Wilshire) thought Alhazmi and Almihdhar were working for the Saudi Arabian GID.

The officer is said to be junior, that's why I thought of Shannon. Wilshire is not that junior - he is a manager. Rich B (Wilshire's boss) is also not that junior. Therefore, I figured Shannon was more likely.

[rschop]

16. Reply to Kevein

Kevin, like I said before if it was Shannon, then Wilshire would have been in the same boat. It is impossible to believe that the 9/11 Commission did not have the information on Wilshire when they knew he had been Shannon's boss at the CIA Bin Laden unit. On the other hand the 9/11 Commission says they could never figure out why the CIA never connected Mihdhar and Hazmi to the warnings of the huge attack they were aware of particularly when the CIA knew about this attack since April 2001, knew it was going to take place inside of the US since July 2001, and then knew Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US from August 22, 2001. That does not even pass the smell test. The 9/11 Commission has subpoena power and could have gotten all of Wilshire's emails particularly Wilshire's emails in July when he said on multiple occasions that the people at Kuala Lumpur were connected to the warning of a huge al Qaeda attack and in later that Mihdhar and by association Hazmi were going to be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda operation. Some how the 9/11 Commission just could never find these emails. GO FIGURE!

[Bryan Sacks]

9. a question concerning FBI, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi

rschop,

thank you for this contribution. Very interesting.

You seem to share the view of Paul Thompson (and perhaps Kevin, though I'm not sure) that FBI was in fact completely in the dark about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi's presence in the US before 9/11. Yet as I am sure you are aware, both lived in San Diego in an apartment rented to them by a known FBI informant, Abdusattar Sheikh, in early Feb 2000. Sheikh had contact with his FBI agent handler after al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had moved in, and reported mentioned them to the agent by first name (no last names, of course, or so the story goes).

That al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi landed with him could be a coincidence. But one of the two , along with a third hijacker, were reportedly spotted in Louisiana by Dr. David Graham a few months later in the fall of 2000. They appear to be staying with Mohammed Jamal Khan, himself suspected to be an FBI asset. Graham also claims he saw large boxes with the names of all three of them in Khan's apartment.

Graham very clearly claimed to have reported their names to the Shreveport FBI office - all of them - several months before 9/11. After 9/11, when Graham frantically got in touch with the FBI once again after seeing a picture of the hijackers he had met before 9/11, Graham was told (at first) that no record of his prior report existed. Khan was eventually indicted, but he's now free and has reportedly left the country, I believe.

In 2004, Graham was poisoned and died in 2006 of his injuries. It's a long story, and I'm not implying anything with regard to the cause of his poisoning. My question is: what makes you so sure that the FBI was in fact in the dark about al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar? Do you believe Graham's story? Isn't it at least very possible that Khan was an FBI asset, making the fact that three of the hijackers land in his care quite troublesome for the FBI-had-no-knowledge claim? Or have I missed something here?

thanks in advance.

[rschop]

15. Reply to Byran Sacks

I gave Paul a copy of my book in January 2007 so he would focus his time on Mihdhar and Hazmi. So I had an ulterior motive. All of our work at this point has been independently done by Paul, Kevin and myself, other than giving him my book we have not actually coordinated our work. But I have used the almost exclusively official 9/11 investigation reports of 9/11 and Paul and Kevin have used main-stream news media for information. I used as little as possible main stream news media sources because I had already found almost all of the information I needed to write my book by just using official government documents. It is amazing that the entire story is actually located in these documents but in fact it is all there, although it took years to extract this information and finally put this entire story down in a book. I don't know why other people have not done the work I have. Paul is getting close to doing what I have done, the difference between what I did and what he did is I draw what are obvious conclusions from the information. These conclusions and very obvious when you have the whole story in one place and you can connect all of the dots together quickly, Paul does not as he feels it is not his place to do this.

[JackRiddler]

20. Mr. Schopmeyer, two questions, if I may...

Last night I read the first 100 pages (12 chapters) of "Prior Knowledge of 9/11."

These chapters tell the following story (please correct any misrepresentations or mistakes on my part) :

On Feb. 11, 2008, while on a United Airlines flight in a 757 from San Francisco to Newark, you read a magazine devoted largely to Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda. This included a translation of the well-known February 23, 1998 Fatwa by Bin Laden, Zawahiri et al. (writing as "World Islamic Front"). The Fatwa ordered a "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" and specifically called for the killing of "Americans and their Allies, both civil and military" as the imperative duty of every Muslim who had the possibility and means to do so, in any country and at any time without warning.

Question 1: What magazine? Which articles? Author and date? Unless I missed it, you only specify that the magazine cost $10, which may be an approximate figure, so can you give us the pub info? Is it online?

As you tell the story, reading the Fatwa prompted you to ask why this group, by issuing it, would in effect invite their own obliteration and the destruction of their camps and organization by a preemptive US strike. You concluded they were issuing a declaration of war in anticipation of a major attack, which would already be in the planning stages, and which they would now have to execute if they didn't want to lose all credibility with their own people.

This set off a long but as you relate it straightforward chain of thought, based only on the information available to you, logic, inspiration, and an emotional modeling of Bin Laden and his followers. You present a very extensive review of your thinking.

While still on the flight, you say you concluded with almost absolute certainty that:

- al-Qaeda must be in the later stages of preparing a large spectacular attack in the United States;

- this attack would necessarily target the World Trade Center towers;

- the means would be to have teams of four to five men armed with short knives hijack four commercial flights of 757s or 767s taking off from airports on the eastern seaboard;

- the hijackers would pilot the planes themselves and crash two into each building.

You say you later visited the WTC, considered its structure and the manner of the attack, and concluded the crashes would cause the Towers to collapse, so that about 30,000 people might die.

Again working from logical supposition, you say that while still on the Feb. 11 flight, you guessed with astonishing accuracy the approximate ages and backgrounds of the hijackers; that those among them who would pilot the planes would enter the United States about 18 months in advance and train at American flight schools; that their fellow (muscle) hijackers would later follow; and that one of them would be what you call the "ramrod," the one who keeps the cells coordinated, motivated and on-task. You worked out the preparation time, phases and resources the operation would require; and concluded with near-certainty that the CIA, FBI and FAA would fail to stop it.

Finally, based on prep time and timing of prior al-Qaeda attacks, you derived the likeliest date: within a two-week period from Sept. 1-15, 2001.

You say in the months that followed, you chose not to tell the authorities about your conclusions, for reasons I find obvious and understandable. But you say you told a number of people at your company about your suppositions in detail, and name at least one such person by first name.

Question 2: Are any of the people you told about all this on record in confirmation of your claim that you did indeed tell them this story well in advance of Sept. 11, 2001? Where might one find their accounts?

I found this in an article in your local paper:

http://www.losaltosonline.com/2007/08/01/in-new-book-los-altan-claims-he-predicted-911-attacks

Schopmeyer said one of his Los Altos employees signed an affidavit with the FBI attesting that Schopmeyer had told 15 employees at the company his predictions of Sept. 11 in February 2001. A senior account manager at the company confirmed the story on the phone but asked to remain anonymous for fear of a backlash, she said.

Is this affidavit available? Is either person mentioned in the article (or it could be one, that's not clear) willing to step forward or be identified?

These questions are asked in the straightforward journalistic mode of confirming your story. Thank you.

[rschop]

21. Re:Jack Riddler

The magazine was the Japan version of Time sold in the Japan Narita airport, but in English for English readers. The magazine was almost entirely devoted to articles on the al Qaeda terrorists. The affidavit from one of my employees, Alina, was given to the FBI San Jose office at the same time I gave them a 45 minute sit down interview, to FBI Special Agent Vince Taglieri. I no longer have this affidavit. You can contact the FBI to get a copy of this affidavit.

At the time I was interviewed by the FBI I asked them straight out if they thought I was to be blamed for the disaster on 9/11. They said if I had come into the FBI in February with my information would they have done nothing with it. He stated that I did not have the flight numbers, the names of the terrorists or other information the FBI needed to stop these attacks. A summary of this interview in at the back of the book. The head of the staff for the Joint Inquiry Committee investigation, also said in email that he agreed with the FBI that I should not be blamed for the attacks on 9/11. This email is added to the back of the book. Reporters from the Los Altos Town Crier confirmed this story and affidavit by directly contacting this person who still lives in in this area. This information was also confirmed by a reporter from the Wall Street Journal who talked by phone to several of these employees in late September 2001, Rick Wartzman. I had even given Rick the full name of the FBI Agent I had interviewed on September 19, 2001 at the FBI San Jose office, Vince Taglieri. They did nothing with this story at that time.

These employees have been almost horrified beyond belief, traumatized is a better word, at this whole story from the very first time I told them on February 19, 2001 just after returning back to the bay area from New York, that the World Trade Center Towers were going to be completely obliterated before the middle of September 2001 probably killing everyone in these buildings. I told them I had gone over this information in my mind hundreds and hundreds of times with every single argument I could think of in a frantic attempt to try to disprove this and had only reconfirmed that this attack was going to happen. I had in fact come to the conclusion that there was no possible way this attack would not take place. I had concluded that the al Qaeda terrorists and Ussama Bin Laden in particular had become completely focused on destroying these buildings, this was simply just way too obvious, and these buildings were doomed. If I had done anything wrong in my analysis it was only the timing of the attack which could have been off.

I was so sure this attack would take place that on September 8, 2001 when I flew out to Boston, and went through Logan Airport , I went through the airport checking the security points to see if I could spot the terrorists at these points trying to figure out how to get their 4-inch knives through security with the least disruption. I figure I missed them by about 2-4 hours. I knew I needed this corroboration to be able to go to the FBI, since my story was all based on speculation at this point in time and I knew the FBI would never pursue a story based on nothing but speculation. .

Information in the book has been given to the FBI on at least eight separate occasions, in writing an in sit down and phone interviews, to the investigators on the Joint Inquiry Committee of the House and the Senate and to several of 9/11 Commissioners, to Robert Kerrey, Tim Roemer, and Richard Bin-Vinesta.

When I first approached Al Felzenberg , who works for Philip Zelicow, in late March 2004, about giving this information to the 9/11 Commission, he told me he would talk to the 9/11 Commissioners, but after a week when he had not called back I called him back. He said that he had talked to the Commissioners and there was not one Commissioner who wanted to know how anyone could have predicted these attacks prior to them taking place. It was that comment that motivated me to fly out to the 9/11 Commission hearings of April 13 - 14 2001 and give the Commissioners copies of the FBI reports personally. After I heard Tenet lie several times to the 9/11 Commissioners, and every person in the room who had lost a relative on 9/11 knew Tenet was lying, I decided to put my story on paper and find out the real reasons that the CIA and FBI had not anticipated and stopped these attacks. The message in this book was to be that these attacks were predictable and these agencies could have used publicly available information to predicted almost every aspect of these attacks, even to with a few weeks when they were going to take place.

In the end it was almost too easy to figure out and anticipate in advance what these terrorists were going to do. All you had to do is read the publicly available information, in many cases information and statements that the terrorists had written down themselves, spelling out in very clear detail their intentions, believe that meant what they said, and then follow this to its logical concussions. It turned out it was much harder and took much longer to finally figure out what the CIA and FBI had been up to prior to 9/11 since the four government investigations of 9/11 had deliberately obfuscated much the information in an attempt to cover up and hide the culpability of the CIA in the Cole bombing and the culpability of the CIA and FBI headquaters in allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place. But even this was finally possible and this information is now all detailed in this book. Expect to be completely stunned by the information in this book.

[JackRiddler]

25. Follow-up question.

So you told 15 people at your company about this starting in February, as is also clear from your book, and according to your account, many people were taking it seriously and even worried about flying. One gave an affidavit attesting to this after 9/11, which may be available from the FBI.

Did you create any confirmable documents of your story before 9/11, such as a notarized or sealed statement or a video that can be confirmed to have been created before 9/11 and that details how you came up with the plot? If not, why not? Thanks.

[rschop]

26. re:follow-up question

No I did not, it was my goal to try to figure out how I could stop this attack on the World Trade Center Towers not document this disaster before the fact.The complete details of how I figured out this attack take up about 120 pages in the first part of this 630 page book. (The bulk of the time doing this analysis was trying to understand the motivation of the al Qaeada terrorists in publishing their Fatwa world-wide and then holding a press conference to announce this again. I found a speech by Tenet in 1998 that says the al Qaeda terrorists had declared war on the US in that year, in 1998. So the CIA knew this. CNN also broadcast the press conference where this Fatwa was presented by Bin Laden and one Pakistani reporter in perfect English says right after Bin Laden had issued this Fatwa; "You have just declared war on the US, how can you do this when you are so small and they are so big." What took me 2 hours took this journalist just a few seconds. However the conclusion I came to was that because this Fatwa had been issued 10 years after they started al Qaeda and was going to put them a huge risk, and this had to mean that they were now going to massively ratchet up the level of their attacks and this had to mean an attack inside of the US. It took me just a short time after this point to figure out the target had to be the World Trade Center Towers. No other target even came close to the magnitude and symbolic importance of the WTC Towers and after I knew that the Cole had been attacked after the al Qaeda terrorists had missed the USS Sullians in the exact same location it was obvious they never give up if they miss their target the first time. I concluded they had no other option other than to use hijacked aircraft and made a time line of their flight training time and other preparations to put this plan together.) I did not want to be the person who went to the FBI told them this story and then after it was over said I told you so. After I talked to my people and they universally said I should not go to the FBI I decided that the best approach was to read the papers every day and find corroborating information that would confirm my speculation and when I had that take that to the FBI with my story so I could get them to believe me. I recently called FBI Agent Taglieri and asked him what he thought I might have done prior to 9/11 to have been believed at the FBI and he said I might have told them that my story was more than speculation. But when look at this the sad thing i in fact I actually did not have anything that was more than speculation. In fact it was all speculation and I was convinced the FBI would do nothing with pure speculation. they needed hard evidence prior to assigning agents to a serious investigation on this.

Two notes that are worth mentioning. I gave the FBI signed statements after each FBI interview saying that I would be more than willing to submit to any number of polygraph tests on any number of question what so ever that the FBI wanted to put to me to verify my belief in truth of this account. I gave these same interview summaries to both Joint Inquiry Committee investigators and to the 9/11 Commissioners and even offered to testify under oath. These FBI interview summaries are included in the book. On the flight to New York, after I had put all of the pieces in place of the attack on the WTC Towers that was to occur in the first two weeks of September, I asked what will the next attack be and came to the conclusion that the al Qaeda terrorists were always one step ahead of the FBI. So they would change the plans for their next attack and instead of using 4-inch knives they would use a shoe bomb with Islamic terrorists who did not have middle eastern names but English sounding names. I was so sure that the next attack would be a shoe bomb when I interviewed Vince Taglieri in September 2001, that when I sent him email (around the 19 or 20th of September 2001) summarizing the interview, the email had to be sent to the San Jose office attention FBI agent since he said the individual agents did not have email, I stated that the security point at airports had to check for shoe bombs and had to have explosive detectors at every security point, and even put this in capital letters so they would not miss it. The fact that Richard Reid got on a US airliner in December 2001 with a shoe bomb shows my email probably ended up in the circular file.

Second, and this account is in the book, in June 2001 when we were getting ready to fly over to Las Vegas for the DAC conference, one of the sales persons came to me and said what would she do if the al Qaeda terrorists who were going to attack the World Trade Center Towers were on our flights to Las Vegas. I said in the first place that these people were devote Muslims and it was highly unlikely that they would be on out flights to Las Vegas since Las Vegas was sin city and devote Muslims just would not be caught dead in sin city. But I said just in case of the very slim chance they might be on our flights, she should look for them and if she spotted them on her flight she should immediately get right off of the aircraft. I said they would be very easy to spot, 4 or 5 young middle eastern people all sitting in first class and business class in groups of two and threes. They did not like Americans so they would be huddled down whispering to each other and not be talking to the other American passengers. I went on to say if she looked them in the face they would never return eye contact and that would be the dead give way that were in deed the terrorists who were going to carry out the attacks on the World Trade Center Towers. I further went on to say I would her one better and give this same information to the whole company. So I had a meeting with the 15 people who worked for me that were going to DAC in Las Vegas the next week. I started off by saying every one knew I had been talking about the huge attack on the World Trade Center Towers since February, and one of the sales persons was very concerned that these terrorists might be on our flights to Las Vegas. While I personally thought it was very unlikely I did not want anyone killed while they traveled for the company. So I said just in case they might be on our flights, look for these terrorists on your flight. They will be very easy to spot 4 or 5 young middle eastern males sitting together in twos and threes in business and first class. They dead give away is that they will never give you eye contact. I went on to say if anyone spots them on their flight, they should get right off of their flight throw their ticket away and buy a new ticket. I further went on to say, "Do not say anything to anyone. Everyone is worth far more than the price of a ticket to Las Vegas." I went on to say "if you tell security these people were terrorists you will be immediately arrested not the terrorists. The security people will never arrest the terrorists but will for sure arrest them." I went on to say: "THE LAWS OF THIS COUNTRY ARE DESIGNED TO ALLOW THESE TERRORISTS TO GET ON THESE AIRPLANES UNMOLESTED AND THERE IS NOTHING YOU CAN DO ABOUT THIS!" (The terrorists flew to California and then took National Airlines from Califronia to Las Vegas, the same airline on the same week end we did and were in Las Vegas the second week in June, the exact same week we were in Las Vegas for DAC. GO FIGURE) I had known about the FAA ruling that allowed passengers to board with 4-inch knives and had been worried about that since the middle 1990s, but was unaware that if two middles eastern people were questioned who were on the same flight because it was thought they might be terrorists, it was an immediate fine of $1.500,000.00. It looks like the FAA and Norman Mineta basically did everything they could to ensure the terrorists would not be stopped while getting on board an aircraft. I did not know this until after the attacks on 9/11.

[JackRiddler]

27. Thanks.

I gathered all of this already, having read the first 120-plus pages of your book so far. Thanks for the review.

The question again is: As you tell it, you were clearly preoccupied with what you say you had discovered through logical supposition. You say you devoted a great deal of time to developing and also disseminating the idea. You say you were telling people the whole story. Naturally, you understood them when they explained why you couldn't go to the FBI with it yet (I would have agreed with them). But if you were doing all this, scanning the newspapers and so forth looking for more concrete indicators of what you believed was inevitable, why didn't you also, during these months, take a couple of hours to create at a document or video that could be notarized, summing up the ideas which you started developing in such detail starting on Feb. 11, 2001? This would serve to confirm the story if your efforts to stop what became known as 9/11 failed, and obviously would have also been very important in gaining a platform for your advocacy work in the years since. Did the idea not occur to you at all to document what you were doing in a confirmable fashion?

[rschop]

28. re:thanks Posted by JackRiddler

I was running a company, seven days a week 24 hours a day job, and was absolutely horrified over this information and how I was going to be able to stop these attacks on the WTC Towers. The last thing, and I mean the very last thing on my mind was to document this so I could explain how I had failed after it was all over.

If you really want some "What if's"

Why did I not ask the pilots on the United flight I took to Boston on September 8, 2001 to get off of the plane so I could explain that I was going to go through Logan airport looking for the al Qaeda terrorists that I was sure were going to highjack aircraft in the coming week? I knew if I told this story on the aircraft I would have been arrested by security on the spot, several air line pilots have told me this long after the attacks on 9/11.

Why did I not go to the FBI in Boston on September 10, 2001, I had thought about this almost all day and tell them what I knew in the hope they would believe me and would stop this attack?

Why did I not go to the FBI office in Manhattan in February 15, 16, 2001. or why did I not go to the FBI in San Jose in the two weeks prior to September 2001. I had planned to do both of these and then decided that I had nothing at each point that would allow them to think my story was anything more than pure speculation. If I had gone to them and then been some how put in contact with FBI Agent Steve Bongardt, we might have had enough information to put this whole thing together:

Bongardt knew Mihdhar and Hazmi were both inside of the US on August 28, 2001 and knew they had been at an important al Qaeda planning meeting in January 2000.

I had come to the conclusion that the terrorists had started planning the attack on the World Trade Center Towers in February 1999, and had sent the first pilots into the US in February 2000. I had come to the conclusion that the first pilots had started taking flying lessons by May 2000, three months after they first came into the US.

Steve knew that Mihdhar and Hazmi had entered the US in January 15, 2000, not in February, but close enough for government work. If I or he had called the FAA we would have found that Mihdhar and Hazmi had both started taking flying lesson in May 2000, and this information was registered with the FAA. His knowledge of the meeting in Kuala Lumpur would have meshed with my conclusion that terrorists were transitioning from the planning to the execution phase of this operation in January 2000, and it have been logical for them to have had a planning meeting in January just before sending off the first pilots to the US to start their flight training.

I had come to the conclusion that they were going to hijack 767 and 757 type aircraft from eastern airports in the first two weeks of September. If either one of us had called the two airlines with the most 767 and 757 type airplanes, United and American, we would have found both Mihdhar and Hazmi on American 77 on September 11, 2001. But unfortunately Bongardt was already forbidden from even having the slightest role in the search for Mihdhar by August 28, 2001 and he was told his career was finished at the FBI if even one piece of paper was found at the FBI with his name and the name Mihdhar on it. With that restriction it is entirely possible we would have had all of this information and still been unable to do anything about it.

NOW FOR THE HORROR STORY OF ALL HORROR STORIES!

Why did I not think this through when I first put this analysis together on that flight out to Newark, NJ on February 11, 2001, to the point where I could identify the exact airports where the hijacked planes would be departing from, the exact flight numbers and the exact seats the terrorists were going to be sitting in? After the attacks on 9/11 I realized that I had all of the information I needed to have put this information together in just a few minutes. In a few minutes worth of analysis I could have told you the following information:

The exact airports the terrorists were going to use in this hijacking and why they were using these airports.

The exact flights they were going to hijack and why.

The exact seats the terrorists were sitting on and why they were sitting in these exact seats, their ages with 2-3 years, their nationalities, the time window each one had entered the US and even the role each was going to play in the hijacking. How and why each one had been recruited in this plan.

The routes the planes they were going to hijack were going to take to the World Trade Center Towers.

The exact point where each plane would contact each towers and why, the exact floor, and even the damage these planes were going to inflict.

What the terrorists had done wrong in their analysis prior to this attack, and what was the one big mistake they had made in their planning, and how did that mistake blunt and significantly reduce the damage in their attack. Why had made this mistake when they had made so few mistakes in this plan?

On the flight as I was going over these very issues I came to the conclusion that there must have been over 200,00 flights during the first two weeks in September 2001, I would have to sort through to find the flights that were going to be used in this attack and thought this was just way too daunting. I did not even want to try to figure this out, just thinking about solving this problem was giving me a head ache. After 9/11 I realized that I had been just minutes away from answering all of these questions had I not given up so soon. What is the real horror story to solve this problem all you had to do is use the exact same techniques that terrorists had used when the first put their plans together, this technique is listed right in the book.


I am now making a challenge to anyone who reads this post!

I am not trying to put anyone on the spot just trying to demonstrate how easy this problem actually was to solve. Answer the questions above but for each answer justify why this is in deed the correct answer. and why no other answer would be correct! It turns out this problem is much easier than it looks at first and you can use my book and the time line and the techniques the terrorists used to put these attacks together described in the book as a guide. It should take you no more than 5-10 minutes, but if you are good you can solve this problem it in 3-4 minutes. The important thing and the big hint is do not over think the problem, it should in fact be very very easy to solve as long as you do not put too much thinking into this. You are not trying to out think Einstein, just some very simple people who lived in mud huts and caves in a very primitive country and in general had not even gone beyond high school.

Post here your answer here. If no one does I will post the answer here next week. GOOK LUCK!

[noise]

29. There are confusing aspects of the attacks

1. Moussaoui could easily have blown the plot. How could hijackers have known that US intel would obstruct FBI criminal side agents from thwarting the attacks?

2. No way hijackers could know that FAA/NORAD would fail to intercept the planes.

2. Mystery of cockpit intrusion.

3. Possible smuggling of weapons (mace, bombs, guns(?)) on the planes. How would hijackers know that air marshals wouldn't be on the planes (after all hijack warnings were in the August 6 PDB) or that the FAA would have failed to pass on more alerts to pilots and flight crew?

4. Atta and al-Omari's strange flight from Portland.

5. Why was there confusion in identifying al-Mihdhar and Salem al-Hazmi when CIA had photos from Malaysia?

The real Salem Al-Hazmi, however, is alive and indignant in Saudi Arabia, and not one of the people who perished in the American Airlines flight that crashed on the Pentagon. He works at a government-owned petroleum and chemical plant in the city of Yanbu.

Link

For example, Badr Mohammed H. Hazmi, a San Antonio radiologist under arrest as a material witness, has used the alias of Khalid Almihdhar.” A terrorism expert told Newsday, “These people are clever. This is another world of changing identities and false identities. We may not ever know who some of these people were after all the name changes, the transliterations, the spelling differences.” Little more is known a year later.

Link

[rschop]

31. re:There are confusing aspects of the attacks

1. Moussaoui could easily have blown the plot. How could hijackers have known that US intel would obstruct FBI criminal side agents from thwarting the attacks?

They did not know US intel would give them a pass, but the had absolutely no respect for US intel and because of this operated out in the open using their own names.


2. No way hijackers could know that FAA/NORAD would fail to intercept the planes.

They did not know this but had picked planes departing from eastern airports to give them the shortest time fight time in the air

2. Mystery of cockpit intrusion.

The sat in front of each airplane at the very front of first class, next to the front cabin curtains. They knew the only way to get into the cockpits was to wait until each aircraft reached cruising altitude, slightly open the first call cabin curtain and find out when the cockpit door was opened and then all rush the cockpit and over power the pilots.

3. Possible smuggling of weapons (mace, bombs, guns(?)) on the planes. How would hijackers know that air marshals wouldn't be on the planes (after all hijack warnings were in the August 6 PDB) or that the FAA would have failed to pass on more alerts to pilots and flight crew?

They did not know any of this. But they had practiced with large key rings to see if they could get these through security with no problems and found out these set off the door alarms but would not set off the wand alarms. So they were as confident as they could be that they could get small knives through security.

4. Atta and al-Omari's strange flight from Portland.

They went to Portland for two reasons, First Atta was trying for the first time to get actual 4-inch knives through the security check points. If this had failed it is possible the entire attack would have been called off. Second Atta did not want all ten hijackers at Logan going through security at the same time for fear it would trigger more rigorous security checks. So he thought he could pass through Portland security with one of the other terrorists and not have to pass through Logan security again. He became very angry when he was told he had to go back through Logan security.


5. Why was there confusion in identifying al-Mihdhar and Salem al-Hazmi when CIA had photos from Malaysia?

There was never any confusion in identifying either al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, or Salem al-Hazmi. Where there was confusion was in the 9/11 Commission staff statement #10 that said the Bin Laden unit at the CIA speculated that Mihdhar and Khallad were one and the same. But at the time the 9/11 Commission is saying the CIA was speculation on this, the CIA Bin Laden unit already had a photo of Mihdhar from Kuala Lumpur, had a photo of Khallad from Kuala Lumpur and even had a passport photo of Khallad from FBI Agent Ali Soufan. But the fact that two photos from Kuala Lumpur had been shown to the Joint source in January 2001 had already become public knowledge.

So the 9/11 Commission was obligated to explain why just these two photos from Kuala Lumpur were shown to the Joint CIA/FBI source. It turns out that FBI Agent Ali Soufan had given the Yemen station the passport photo of Khallad and then this CIA Station sent this photo back to the CIA Bin Laden unit and then asked for the Kuala Lumpur photos of Khallad and Mihdhar so these photos could also be shown to the Joint CIA/FBI Joint source. The passport photo of Khallad been already shown to the Joint source and Khallad identified as a high level al Qaeda terrorist.

After Khallad was identified in the Kuala Lumpur photo the Yemen station, the CIA Bin Laden unit and the CIA handler for the Joint source were all aware of this identification and that Khallad had been now identified at Kuala Lumpur with Mihdhar and all knew this identification had been precipitated by Soufan's request to the Yemen station asking for any CIA information this station and the CIA had on Khallad and any meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

They then all proceeded to hide this identification from the FBI in a wide ranging criminal conspiracy, a conspiracy the 9/11 Commission wanted to cover up. This information was kept secret and left out of the 9/11 Commission report for fear of exposing this conspiracy at the CIA to hide the fact that this identification had been precipitated by Soufan, in fact Soufan is left out of all of the investigations on 9/11 since once you know about his account it is fairly easy to unravel this conspiracy.

It is impossible to believe at this point that the 9/11 Commission did not know a huge criminal conspiracy had taken place at the CIA to deliberately obstruct the FBI investigators on the Cole bombing and the murderer of 17 US sailors.

The CIA was obstructing this investigation because they knew once Khallad was identified at Kuala Lumpur they were culpable in the Cole bombing and wanted to keep this fact secret from the FBI criminal investigators. They also knew if this information got out and it was also known Mihdhar had been at Kuala Lumpur the FBI criminal investigators would be all over this and this was exactly what the CIA did not want to happen. They had been keeping the name Khalid al-Mihdhar absolutely secret from the FBI criminal investigators since January 5, 2000.

[Bolo Boffin]

14. My Firefox NoScript keeps getting triggered when I try to find out how much the book costs.

Very strange.

ETA: More curious. Googling "Robert Schopmeyer" took me here.

http://www.veritools.com/industry_solutions/success_stories.html

Is this the same guy as the author? If not, it's a wild coincidence that he works for a company that sells debugging software, and the other Schopmeyer has such a buggy site.

[noise]

17. More info

Nearly six years after the Sept. 11 attacks, Los Altos resident Robert Schopmeyer believes his predictions of what was to come are the authoritative account. In a hefty, self-published book, “Prior Knowledge of 9/11,” he lays out his case, adding to a growing repository of alternative storylines on the events.

Through sheer logic and some imagination, Schopmeyer said he was able to foretell the terrorist plot - including the targets, the date, the flight numbers and later, the ages and nationalities of the al-Qaida members who crashed the planes into the World Trade Center towers - seven months before the event.

Schopmeyer, the president of Veritools, a software company in Los Altos, claims he unraveled the entire sequence of terrorist planning on a business flight from San Francisco to the East Coast in February 2001, but he didn’t come forward until after the attacks, fearful of the reprisal and disbelief that might bar him from telling his story in the future.

Link

I came across Mr. Schopmeyer's posts by way of researching Dina Corsi. I was impressed by his research and almost ordered the book but his claims of predicting the attacks in such a specific manner threw me for a loss. I don't get it.

[rschop]

22. re: More infor

Prior post: "I don't get it"

See the post RE: Jack Riddler, this should clear it all up.

The book also has over 100 pages explaining in minute detail how it was possible to anticipate and then predict what the al Qaeda terrorists were up to using nothing but publicly available information, including statements that they themselves had published world-wide stating in detail their full intentions!

rschop

[Diane_nyc]

32. Thanks for the very interesting quote from "Marching Toward Hell"

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=125&topic_id=200795&mesg_id=200795">KJF wrote:

In his new book Marching Toward Hell, former Alec Station chief Michael Scheuer describes an incident where CIA officers threatened the 9/11 Commission.

...

"In the same way, in early 2004, the 9/11 commissioners indicated that they were intending to name an even younger CIA officer as the only individual to be publicly identified for a pre-9/11 failure. A group of senior CIA officers, however, let it be known that if that officer was named, information about the pre-9/11 negligence of several very senior US officials would find its way into the media. The commissioners dropped the issue."

It's in a footnote on page 273.

Thanks very much for the information.

[rschop]

33. RE: Thanks for the very interesting quote from "Marching Toward Hell"

We now know why all of the criminal activity at the CIA and at FBI HQ by agents the CIA had enlisted in their criminal activities to obstruct FBI criminal investigations has been covered up.

If you fry the little fish they will then name the bigger fish in this huge and massive criminal conspiracy to hide information that resulted in their out right criminal obstruction of the FBI Cole investigation.

It was clearly a horrific coincidence that because the planning for the Cole bombing and the planning for the attacks on 9/11 came together at the al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

Because the CIA wanted to hide the name Khalid al-Mihdhar from the FBI criminal investigators, and then went on to hide this meeting in Kuala Lumpur attended by Mihdhar and Hazmi, they ended up hiding the very information that could have pretended the attacks on 9/11.

After April 2001, when the CIA was warned that a huge al Qaeda attack was in the works, they had to know by continuing to hide this information, the result could be the deaths of many Americans.

But we now know from Tom Wilshire's emails in July 2001, that the CIA management was told that the people at the Kuala Lumpur meeting were likely connected to this warning of a huge al Qaeda attack. On July 23, 2001 Wilshire emailed his CTC managers and stated that Mihdhar and by association, Hazmi, were going to be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda operation. Yet even after being told this information, the CIA management forbid Wilshire from giving the FBI criminal investigators the information that came out of the Kuala Lumpur meeting.

But what is even worse, after Wilshire had been forbidden from giving this information to the FBI, he continued to work with FBI HQ IOS Agent Dina Corsi to effectively sabotage any chance FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team of Cole investigators would have to be part of the investigation and search for Mihdhar and Hazmi.

It is impossible to believe that Wilshire and his CIA CTC managers did not know by blocking Bongardt from this investigation, the result would be thousands of Americans were going to perish in these attacks, particularly when they all found out on August 22/23, 2001 that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in this huge al Qaeda attack.

Since all of this information now comes from publicly available sources, the big question is why has the main stream media not reported this and has instead cover up all of this information.


GO FIGURE!