9/11 Report: Discrepancies between the Report and reality?

[gandalf]

In the following text, one (of many noticeable) discrepancies concerning the 9/11 attacks is described, the behavior of the terrorists, and what one would expect after reading the Report.

The REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 describes that al-Qa’ida attached importance to operational security, as the following quotes from the report illustrate:

"Discovering and disrupting al-Qa’ida’s plans proved exceptionally difficult, however. Details of major terrorist plots were not widely shared within the al-Qa’ida organization, making it hard to develop the intelligence necessary to preempt or disrupt attacks. Senior al-Qa’ida officials were sensitive to operational security." (p. 6)

"As the 1990s progressed, it became clear that Bin Ladin’s terrorist network was unusual, although not unique, in its skill, dedication, and ability to evolve." (p. 196)

"Operational security. Terrorist manuals and training emphasize that operations should be kept secret and details compartmented. Communications security is also stressed." (p. 197)

That seems to be a reasonable behavior for terrorists, since they know that they have resourceful and able opponents, among them CIA, FBI, NSA. As the preparation of a large terrorist attack is probably not quite simple and requires a lot of coordination, one can assume that it involves, for example, a lot of communication (which can be intercepted).

According to the FBI, “much of what took place on September 11, 2001 originated during the mid-1990s when Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah moved to Germany, eventually settling in Hamburg, and began to associate with Islamic extremists.” (p. 183)

In Germany, Mounir el Motassadeq got the highest possible sentence, because the judges argued that he must have known what his fellows in Hamburg were planning. That is another indication that Atta and Co. in Hamburg WERE indeed PLANNING, so that one must assume that they, or at least some of them, belonged to the upper echelons of al-Qa’ida (since "Details of major terrorist plots were not widely shared within the al-Qa’ida organization", cf. above, so if they know details, they must be senior).

However, the terrorists were not careful at all: They checked in using their real names, they used the phone openly, used their own credit cards (Washington Post 10/04/01), four of them got speeding tickets (9/11 Report, “Additional view of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski”, without page). As Atta, the alleged leader, failed to show up for a May 28 court appearance to resolve the citation, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest (The Wall Street Journal, 10/16/01).

That is an obvious contradiction: The report claims that the hijackers would use operational security, and according to newspaper reports that is exactly what they did not. If the report is wrong in this respect, and the newspaper reports are true, if the hijackers did not adhere to the basic rules of operational security: Why were then the Intel agencies unable to disrupt the plot? Or are perhaps the persons that the newspapers connect with the known hijacker names not the real al-Qa'ida members, or not the persons that realized the attacks?