Interesting and well-researched diary over at Kos from last month that details the history of superdelegates.
A Brief History of Superdelegates
by poblano
Fri Feb 15, 2008 at 02:33:07 AM PDT
To understand the origin of superdelegates, you have to understand one thing: George McGovern and the 1972 election. But let's first step back and frame things a little bit.
~snip~
There were a number of rationales given at the time for the implementation of superdelegates, none of which are necessarily mutually exclusive. The primary purpose of this diary will be to explore those rationales, based on a survey of contemporaneous newspaper accounts from the New York Times. However, it is also important to understand the underlying context: as of 1982, the Democrats had had two absolutely disastrous results out of the last three Presidential election cycles.
~snip~
In 1984, superdelegates proved to be helpful in getting Walter Mondale past the threshold he needed to achieve an outright majority of delegates, thereby avoiding a brokered convention. However, in all probability the superdelegates did not alter the outcome of the election; Mondale had a clear plurality of pledged delegates at the time. There is an outside chance that Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson could have teamed together to defeat him, but it would have required near-perfect coordination, and would arguably have usurped the public will ... And that's basically the last we heard of superdelegates until this election cycle.
Now that we've examined the broad history of superdelegates, let's go back and scrutinize the "framer's intent" behind their invention. There were three or four justifications advanced for the implementation of superdelegates at the time, all of which echo the historical narrative to some extent or another:
1. To increase the sense of order and avert a crisis at the Convention.In this formulation, superdelegates basically exist as a mechanism to "break glass in case of emergency". Thus could run the gamut from providing some experienced, stabilizing voices in the event of a procedural fight on the convention floor, to potentially picking a different nominee in the event of an Eagleton-type crisis. ...
~snip~
2. To get party officials more involved with the eventual nominee.Probably the most widespread rationale cited at the time, perhaps because it's the most benign. ...
~snip~
3. To nominate a candidate who can win. While the first two rationales are more procedural, the latter two have a somewhat more specific outcome in mind. For one thing, in light of what had happened in 1972 and 1980, there was some surprisingly frank discussion about the electability of the eventual nominee ...
~snip~
4. To check against a plurality, factional candidate who does not reflect the prevailing sentiment of the electorate.At this point, we need to bring up another critical point of context regarding George McGovern. McGoven was really not the consensus choice of the electorate. Although he had earned 57% of the delegates, he had only 25% of the popular vote, in what was essentially a three-way tie with Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace (Humphrey, in fact, had a bare plurality of the popular vote) ...
~snip~
How could this have happened? Recall that the primary system was something relatively new in 1972, and the rules were highly irregular from state to state. Some states, like California, were winner-take-all (and McGovern won California by a few percentage points), and some allocated delegates proportionally. Some states had primaries, and others had caucuses (as they still do). Some states received a lot of attention, and others received but a little. McGovern, by virute of his support in the grassroots, could compete everywhere. Undoubtedly, he also had some advantages because he understood the delegate selection rules, as he had helped to draft them...
~snip~
So,
rather than to override the will of the electorate, superdelegates were created in some sense to enforce it in elections whose results were skewed by odd delegate allocations or weak multi-way fields that would allow a fringe candidate to win a plurality. Both of these conditions prevailed in 1972; neither of them do in 2008...
~snip~
One last point that needs to be addressed. To our contemporary eyes, there might seem to be some tension between #3 (selecting the electable candidate), and #4 (selecting a candidate that represents some broad consensus of the voters). What if the Democratic voters had a slight preference for a candidate who was liable to perform slightly worse in the general election (in a pool that included independents and Republicans?). In 2008, with its climate of polarization and relatively unpopular party institutions, this tension seems quite palpable: the establishment candidate may not be the most electable one...
~snip~
Finally, it's worth reflecting on what's absent from the contemporaneous rationales behind superdelegates. There is not any sense that superdelegates have a mandate to express what is essentially their own personal preference for President; rather their duty is to look out for the best interests of the Party. Of course, the phrase "best interests of the Party" can mean different things to different people. ...
~snip~
As
Chris Bowers writes, it is disingenuous to argue that the debates about superdelegates are debates about rules. There really aren't any rules about superdelegates ... let me just clip from Mr. Bowers, because he makes the case as succinctly as it can be made:
During the numerous discussions that have taken place on the subject of super delegates, the notion that super delegates can vote for whoever they wish is continually raised. Let me make the best counter-point to this argument as simple as possible:
DNC rules do not obligate super delegates to thwart the popular will of Democratic primary voters and caucus goers. Just as DNC rules allow for super delegates to thwart the popular will of Democratic primary voters and caucus goers, those same rules allow for super delegates to ratify the popular will of Democratic primary voters and caucus goers. Both are well within the rules. The decision is up to the super delegates.
The difference is that if super delegates decide to ratify the popular will of Democratic primary voters and caucus goers, then super delegates are upholding both the rules of the DNC and the principle of democracy. In other words, voting to thwart the popular will upholds our rules, but not our values, while voting to ratify the popular will upholds both our rules and our values.
Super delegates should uphold both our rules and our values by ratifying the popular will. That is as simple as I can make it.
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