March 21, 2009, 12:30 pm
Why was I so quick to condemn the Geithner plan? Because it’s not new; it’s just another version of an idea that keeps coming up and keeps being refuted. It’s basically a thinly disguised version of the same plan Henry Paulson announced way back in September. To understand the issue, let me offer some background.
Start with the question: how do banks fail? A bank, broadly defined, is any institution that borrows short and lends long. Like any leveraged investor, a bank can fail if it has made bad investments — if the value of its assets falls below the value of its liabilities, bye bye bank.
But banks can also fail even if they haven’t been bad investors: if, for some reason, many of those they’ve borrowed from (e.g., but not only, depositors) demand their money back at once, the bank can be forced to sell assets at fire sale prices, so that assets that would have been worth more than liabilities in normal conditions end up not being enough to cover the bank’s debts. And this opens up the possibility of a self-fulfilling panic: people may demand their money back, not because they think the bank has made bad investments, but simply because they think
other people will demand their money back.
Bank runs can be contagious; partly that’s for psychological reasons, partly because banks tend to invest in similar assets, so one bank’s fire sale depresses another bank’s net worth.
So now we have a bank crisis. Is it the result of fundamentally bad investment, or is it because of a self-fulfilling panic?
If you think it’s just a panic, then the government can pull a magic trick: by stepping in to buy the assets banks are selling, it can make banks look solvent again, and end the run. Yippee!
And sometimes that really does work.But if you think that the banks really, really have made lousy investments, this won’t work at all; it will simply be a waste of taxpayer money.
To keep the banks operating, you need to provide a real backstop — you need to guarantee their debts, and seize ownership of those banks that don’t have enough assets to cover their debts; that’s the Swedish solution, it’s what we eventually did with our own S&Ls.
Now, early on in this crisis, it was possible to argue that it was mainly a panic. But at this point, that’s an indefensible position. Banks and other highly leveraged institutions collectively made a huge bet that the normal rules for house prices and sustainable levels of consumer debt no longer applied; they were wrong. Time for a Swedish solution.
more(emphasis added)
Krugman and others are pushing nationalization. The Swedish solution nationalized about five banks. Their system was not as complex, and even Krugman hasn't dealt with all the
ramifications of translating the Swedish model to the U.S. banking system.
Also at the previous link is this excerpt from John Hempton, who challenged Krugman's assumptions:
Sweden could guarantee all banking liabilities because – frankly – their banks were not that deeply insolvent.
We know they were not that deeply insolvent for a few reasons – the best of which is that ex-post the Swedish bailout cost very little (and the Norwegian bailouts were actually profitable for the government).
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But the second part of Krugman’s paragraph contains a deeply troubling false logical step. He says: “but of course we can’t do that unless we’re prepared to put all troubled banks in receivership”.
Here are the details on a successful U.S. nationalization and re-privatization (completed this week):
Yesterday, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC)
successfully completed the sale of IndyMac bank,
eight months after it was nationalized following
catastrophic losses due to subprime mortgages. The bank’s 33 branches will
reopen today as branches of OneWest, a Pasadena-based bank.
Even though it
cost more than
originally estimated, the successful nationalization and re-privatization of IndyMac — the fourth largest bank ever seized by federal regulators — shows that taking over troubled financial institutions, clearing them of their troubled assets, and selling them back to the private sector can be done. As Stephen Gandel
wrote in Time:
For the government, the IndyMac sale provides a shining example of how takeovers can work, at a time when the Obama Administration may soon begin pushing for more nationalizations…The government is in the process of stress-testing the nation’s largest banks as part of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s plan to fix the ailing banking sector. And many think the outcome of those tests could lead to more takeovers.
We’ve been arguing that nationalization is the best way to handle zombie financial institutions. However, in order for leviathans like AIG and Citigroup to be nationalized and wound down, some mechanism — different from that employed by the FDIC — needs to be created. As FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair
explained to the Senate Banking committee yesterday:
The problems of supervising large, complex financial institutions are compounded by the absence of procedures and structures to effectively resolve them in an orderly fashion when they end up in severe financial trouble. Unlike the clearly defined and proven statutory powers that exist for resolving insured depository institutions, the current bankruptcy framework available to resolve large complex non-bank financial entities and financial holding companies was not designed to protect the stability of the financial system.
moreAs Bair points out, more complex institutions will require a different mechanism for reorganization. Here is another piece that describes what
South Korea and Thailand did (I'm sure with smaller banking systems) during the Asian financial crisis.
Maybe Krugman can wait and comment on the actual plan.
Edited typos.