Need Assistance-Opportunity

[Project_Willow]

Hi all,
I have an opportunity to educate a group of people (who belong to a high profile voter rights org) about the stolen election of 2004.
I have a general idea of the kind of evidence involved, but I have not been able to keep track of all the investigations and sources.
Which ones are the most reliable and striking?
Is there now a good summary, perhaps an article or a DU thread?
Where should I start?
Thanks for you help in advance!

[applegrove]

1. You would do better to teach them how to grieve and let go. The election

was won by stealing hearts and minds. That is obvious and much proof of it is available.

You do these people no service if you harp on diebold election machines.

[GuvWurld]

2. It is all about the frame

Our elections are held under conditions that ensure an inconclusive outcome. Show your group the Voter Confidence Resolution. Tell them to endorse it and take it to your City Council and ask them to pass it.

[brainshrub]

3. Talk to Andy Stephenson when he gets out of the hospital.

[Project_Willow]

8. Andy...

I hope he is well. I would very much like to speak with him, or have him address the group.

[Wilms]

4. Have a look here.

http://www.solarbus.org/election/links.shtml#bethemedia

[FogerRox]

5. a fews things I have on hand today

The American Ballot Box
Part of the Jeffersonian Commons, or owned by corporations?
by Roger Fox

Over the last ten years the way that Americans vote has undergone a revolution. In 2004 about 85% of Americans voted into a Black Box, a computerized voting machine. If you’ve used a touchscreen ATM to take Twenty bucks out of the bank, then you are familiar with this technology. During this revolution the phrase Black Box voting, or BBV, has come to mean any of the myriad array of computerized voting systems in use today.
This array includes optical scanners that scan paper ballots (that have been marked with a pen by the voter). The optical scanner then feeds the ballot information into a Tabulator, usually a PC. The tabulator keeps a running tally, there is no digital representation of individual votes. Many punch card ballots are machine counted and then the ballot information is fed into a PC based tabulator. Again there is no digital representation of individual votes. Touchscreen computer voting machines also feed ballot information into a PC based tabulator. And again there is no digital representation of individual votes. If you see a pattern developing here, you would be right.
All of the computerized voting systems manufactured for use in the United States use what is called a proprietary source code. This means that the source code is legally considered a corporate trade secret that cannot be accessed, verified or audited by any State or County Election official, because the source code is protected by corporate law.
Since all fifty states have Election recount laws on the books that mandate procedures for conducting recounts, and since there is no record of individual votes, how could one possibly conduct a recount? It would seem that these BBV systems are illegal, since a recount cannot be conducted in a verifiable manner pursuant to any state law.
A touchscreen voting system that issues the voter a paper receipt would be a way of verifying the vote count. Comparing this paper trail to the computerized vote tally is simple and is arguably an effective way of verifying the vote count. Some say the lack of a paper trail is just an oversight, or that what we are seeing is the growing pains of an emerging technology. These points are invalid when you consider that when you took twenty bucks out of the ATM at the bank, you got a receipt. And chances are that the manufacturer of the banks’ ATM, may be the manufacturer that made the touchscreen voting machine you vote with. More to the point is that in 2002 Tom Delay saw to it that the provision mandating a paper trail for all touchsreen DRE’s (Direct reporting electronic) was removed from legislation known as H.A.V.A.. There can be only one purpose in creating an unverifiable vote count. And that is to make sure that the vote count is not verifiable. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 provides money for states that wish to replace their punch card and lever voting systems. Money is also available for voting systems that are accessible to the disabled. States must submit a plan to the Election Assistance Commission by January 1, 2004 to obtain the funds. HAVA does not require states to buy touchscreen DRE’s. The purchase of optical scanners qualifies a state for funds, as long as the plan submitted to the Election Assistance Commission mandates replacement of its lever and punch card machines by the first election for Federal office held after January 1, 2006. Funds authorized for HAVA total 3.8 billion dollars. To read the full text of HAVA go to: http://www.fec.gov/hava/hava.htm .
Studies have indicated that touchscreen voting machines are the most expensive method currently available to process votes. The storage and maintenance requirements of touchscreens make them far and above the most expensive option available to an Elections official.

History of the Major Players
The top 3 manufacturers of touchscreen voting machines used in the United States are Diebold, ES&S, and Sequoia. Triad GSI makes punchcard ballot mechanical tabulators.
The history of ES&S can be traced back to the 1970’s when 2 brothers, Bob and Todd Urosevich, founded Data Mark Systems. Data Mark became American Information Systems in 1980 (AIS). In 1993 Bob Urosevich left ES&S to form I-Mark Systems. At that point Chuck Hagel was tapped to be Chairman of the Board of AIS. It was under Hagel's chairmanship that AIS sold touchscreen voting machines to the state of Nebraska. Hagel resigned in 1995 as Chairman of the Board of AIS in, and then announced his candidacy for the US Senate, in Nebraska. Chuck won, quite nicely too. In 1997 AIS bought part of the election equipment subsidiary of Business Records Corporation (BRC) and changed their name to ES&S. A 1997 Department of Justice Anti-trust action forced BRC to be split between AIS and Sequoia Voting Systems
Looking for a right wing connection takes us back to the AIS years in Nebraska. AIS received heavy capital infusions from the Ahmanson brothers, William and Robert, cousins to the infamous Howard Ahmanson jr. of H.F. Ahmanson Co. a holding company involved with the Washington Mutual bank. The Ahmanson's financial support of right wing groups parallels that of other well known figures such as Richard Mellon Scaife and John Coors.
"Charles Diebold first organized Diebold Bahmann 1859 as a manufacturer of safes and vaults in Cincinnati, Ohio". "Word spread that all 878 Diebold safes in the area, along with their contents, survived the flames". Jumping ahead, we pick up the story in this century. Global Elections Systems was founded in 1991 and immediately acquired the Accuvote system. In 1997 Global Elections Systems bought Bob Urosevich's I-Mark Systems. In 2002 Diebold acquired Global. Bob Urosevich served as President of Diebold Election services until July, 2004. An opensecrets.org search reveals that in 2004 eleven top officers of Diebold Inc. made contributions to Bush Cheney '04. No officers of Sequoia or ES&S contributed to the Bush Campaign. On November 3rd 2004 Diebold Chairman, Wally Odell received $34 million in Diebold stock options.
Sequoia Voting Systems is owned by De La Rue LLC, UK. De La Rue is in turn controlled by Madison Dearborn, part of the Carlyle Group, who employ's George Herbert Walker Bush. In March of 2005 Sequoia was purchased.

-------------------------------------
Miami-Dade County officials are studying whether to replace an
expensive, controversial touch-screen voting system after a series of
mishaps.

BY NOAKI SCHWARTZ


Three years after spending $24.5 million to install a controversial
touch-screen voting system, Miami-Dade County elections officials
have been asked to study scrapping the system in favor of paper-based
balloting.

The request from County Manager George Burgess follows the recent
resignation of Elections Supervisor Constance Kaplan and the
revelation that hundreds of votes in recent elections hadn't been
counted.

In a memo, Burgess asked new elections chief Lester Sola to assess
whether optical scanners, which count votes marked on ''bubble
sheets,'' would deliver more accurate results. Burgess also wants
information on how much a switch would cost -- and how much it might
save in the long run.

County officials say the machines have more than tripled Election Day
costs.

rest of article

http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/11370895.htm
http://www.votersunite.org/MB2.pdf

Between pages 58 to 60 on the PDF.

DRE's cost $3000.00 to $3500.00 ---w/o printer
ONE DRE can process up to 10 ballots/hr

OPscans cost $5000.00
ONE opscan can process up to 360 ballots/hr

So you would have to spend about 100 grand on DRE's to process 360 ballots/hr

If you dont keep the batteries charged between elections the batteries die--and need to be replaced. Have you ever bought a new battery for a laptop? They start about $100 & go to $200.

When you use DRE's you still have to print paper absentee ballots and spare ballots because DRE's freeze up (MSwindows)or stop working, so election officials still to print a significant number of paper ballots.
Suit filed on county vote machines
A contract between Snohomish County and a private firm is
unconstitutional, two Everett men argue in court action.

By Jerry Cornfield
Herald Writer


SEATTLE - Two Everett men filed suit Thursday to void the contract
between Snohomish County and the maker of its electronic voting
machines, claiming the deal illegally shifts control of vote counting
from the public to a private company.

Paul Lehto and John Wells allege in their suit that the contract
between Snohomish County and Sequoia Voting Systems violates the U.S.
Constitution by altering the right of citizens to an open and
transparent election.

For the rest of the article--go here:
http://www.heraldnet.com/stories/05/04/08/100loc_voting001.cfm

Additional coverage @ MSNBC:

http://famulus.msnbc.com/famulusgen/reuters04-12-165037.asp?t=renew&vts=41220051 903
NJ suit-
this is the complaint--in PDF

http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/20041021_NJ_complaint.pdf

This is the Memorandum,
http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/20041021_NJ_memorandum.pdf

here is a compilation of problems with Seqioua

http://www.votersunite.org/info/Sequoiainthenews.pdf

From the web page of Assemblywoman Sandy Galef. Check this out!:
http://assembly.state.ny.us/member_files/090/20050318 /

“SCAN AND BE SURE”
A Voting Machine Campaign for New York State

My colleague Assemblywoman Barbara Lifton and I are launching the “SCAN AND BE SURE” campaign that proposes paper ballots and optical scanning machines along with a marking system for the disabled. We want this to be the voting system chosen by New York as we implement the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). We believe that having voters fill out paper ballots and scanning them through an electronic optical system is secure, simple, accessible, transparent, and economical. It does not have the heavy price tag and security problems seen in electronic voting systems.

The concern about New York’s possible adoption of an electronic voting system was brought to me by my constituents who had volunteered in other states during the last presidential election and saw the flaws in electronic voting. While researching new voting procedures, I was very impressed with a model demonstration in Albany that had paper ballots that were optically scanned. I favor this approach as the best one for our state.

http://www.blackboxvoting.com/index.php
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/

http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-TechnicalIssues&Standards.htm
http://www.electiondataservices.com/content/datafiles.htm

On Wednesday, April 13th, Bo Lipari of the New Yorkers for Verified Voting had a press conference announcing county by county cost comparisons with the electronic touch screen, or DREs, aka Direct Recording Electronic, versus our preferred, paper ballot with precinct-based optical scanners.
http://nyvv.org/doc/AcquisitionCostDREvOptScanNYS.pdf

Total acquisition costs for New York State:


DRE system: $230,473,000

Optical Scan: $114,423,640

Cost Savings of Precinct Based Optical Scan Voting System: $116,049,360
New Yorkers for Verified Voting, NYVV, is releasing an analysis of the cost differences for New York State of two different types of voting equipment currently being considered for adoption to replace the state's lever machines. The estimate compares the county by county cost of touch screen voting machines (DREs) versus a system comprised of hand marked paper ballots and precinct based optical scanners, augmented by ballot marking devices to provide accessible, private and independent voting for voters with disabilities.

Touch screen and pushbutton style DREs have been found to be error prone, impossible to recount, and extraordinarily expensive. The NYVV cost estimate shows that the purchase cost of DREs exceeds the equivalent cost of precinct based optical scan systems by over 100 million dollars.

Optical scan systems have been used successfully in elections around the United States for over 20 years. Currently used in nearly 30% of all the precincts in the US, the states of Arizona, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island and West Virginia have decided to use optical scanners to comply with the Help America Vote Act, which mandates new voting machines for New York.

o Optical scan voting systems are a reliable, mature, auditable and cost effective technology." said Bo Lipari, Director of New Yorkers for Verified Voting. "It's a mistake for NY to spend over 200 million dollars on untested, unauditable, problem prone DREs, when a proven system like optical scanners can be adopted for a fraction of the purchase and maintenance costs." said Lipari.

o "Precinct-based optical scan voting machines with the addition of accessible ballot marking devices will satisfy Help America Vote Act requirements to replace lever voting machines in New York State," said Aimee Allaud, Elections Specialist, New York State League of Women Voters. "The League supports optical scan systems because they meet our criteria of secure, accurate, recountable and accessible," said Ms. Allaud.

o "The Sierra Club members who vote for environmentally minded political candidates want to make sure that every vote is counted. That's why the Sierra Club supports paper ballot based optical scan voting systems - they're the most transparent, reliable, practical way to ensure that every vote counts." Said Sarah Kogel-Smucker, Legislative Associate from the Sierra Club Atlantic Chapter. See their explanation of voting systems:
http://newyork.sierraclub.org/Sierra%20Atlantic/SierraA ...

o The New York Times in an editorial said, "Albany should ignore lobbyists for high-priced voting machines and come out strongly for optical-scan machines".
http://www.wheresthepaper.org/NYT03_09VirtuesOfOpticalS ...

For detailed information on Paper Ballot/Optical Scan voting systems please visit: www.nyvv.org, www.wheresthepaper.org

Touch screen machines have an estimated life of 3-5 years, and have a recent history of problems and breakdowns. Last Nov 2, there were tens of thousands of reports of them breaking down, losing votes, causing undervotes, or overvotes, that threw elections into question, assigning votes to the wrong candidate, and causing a loss of voter confidence in the election.

Summary: the touch screen machines are more expensive, less reliable and more prone to errors than Paper Ballot/Optical Scan voting. This is the message we need to send to our state legislators. We DON'T WANT our votes left up to unreliable touch-screen machines that will cost our states more money but are less reliable. We WANT Paper Ballots that are reliable, verifiable and cheaper. The League of Women Voters of New York State, the statewide Sierra Club, New Yorkers for Verified Voting, and many other organizations have endorsed a paper ballot/optical scan system. It is much less vulnerable to software error and fraud than touch-screen voting machines and is much less expensive.

[emlev]

6. a few more resources and a comment

www.freepress.org/department
http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19
Many major election articles are listed in reverse chronological order down the right-hand side

See also this article:
http://bellaciao.org/en/article.php3?id_article=5955
It looks like a good overview, though I've only scanned it.

Remember that there are many parts to this story:

voter disenfranchisement
purging voter rolls
trashing new democratic registrations
disinformation campaign about voting date, sites, etc.
discriminatory distribution of voting machines resulting in lines so long that thousands were unable to vote
etc.

insecure voting technology
e-voting machines
e-tabulation machines
millions of ballots not locked down
etc.

questionable vote-counting processes
Triad GSI supplying vote totals to at least 3 Ohio counties
lockdown during vote count in Warren Co., Ohio
etc.

cover-up
what happened in the White House election night?
exit polls being changed
media black-out
etc.

There were all sorts of other problems as well. The reason there is no concise, clear explanation of what happened is that many, many different things were done to steal the election.

[Project_Willow]

7. Thank you all!

It would have taken me a long time to search for all the info. DU is irreplaceable! Now to read and compile...

[GuvWurld]

9. Good outline and conclusion. Distill to a guarantee of uncertainty.

In my work with the countless iterations of the Voter Confidence Resolution over the past 13 months, I have wrestled with exactly this. How to make the case as overwhelmingly as it actually is, without overwhelming listeners/readers with too much info? The outline above is a good way to dissect everything. The section headings alone can be used to make the most direct and simple case - we can't know what to believe. There is no *basis* for confidence.

One corollary: people tend to be much more receptive to hearing about the system as a whole being incapable of producing legitimate future elections than they are about learning of past fraud. It is not quite a fine line. You can really talk about both but it becomes a matter of orientation, or really, framing.

[emlev]

10. What framing have you found most useful? n/t

[GuvWurld]

11. see above - no basis for confidence

No basis for confidence has been the key frame though with the latest version an integral new word has emerged: inconclusive. People understand that we settle for varying degrees of certainty about all sorts of things, all the time. It is rare, but actually obvious, when something guarantees uncertainty. That is the net sum of all the points in the outline above.

To go a step further, it is really the same argument to say we have no basis for confidence in the media. This is why the Voter Confidence Resolution has always been worded to say "no basis for confidence in the results reported from U.S. federal elections." Even if the machines were made trustworthy (see: Open Voting Consortium), we've seen time and again how the media overtly and covertly manipulate what is accepted as reality. Media reform must be a part of election reform, and has always been called for as an element of the resolution.

The bottom line is that we as a people have become so accustomed to believing lies that we now routinely deceive ourselves. Our job is not really to convince people of new information but to help them recognize that they've had the truth all along and they've been in denial. We have to expose their cognitive dissonance to them, showing them where they hold two contradictory thoughts as both being true. It helps when you can also give them something to do about it, such as taking the resolution to your City Council and pushing them through the same experience. You come out on the other side thinking it should have been obvious all along.

[Project_Willow]

12. Cognitive Dissonance

I would like the group to adopt the voter confidence resolution on a national level. It seems unlikely at this point, but that would be powerful.

How to deal with cognitive d., I am involved with subjects that are much more difficult to present and I haven't been able to come up with an effective strategy yet. This should be a good exercise.

[GuvWurld]

13. I'm no expert on cog. d., these are just my theories and experiences

...but I think we have powerful material with which to show people that they are in internal conflict they must resolve. I believe that if you can show people where they say they believe one thing, but then act as if they believe another, you are hovering around a switch you can flip like a light.