WP, Dionne: A Vote We Can Believe In

[DeepModem Mom]

A Vote We Can Believe In
By E. J. Dionne Jr.
Tuesday, October 10, 2006; Page A21

....I do not pretend to know how large a threat this is. I do know that it's a threat to democracy when so many Americans doubt that their votes will be recorded accurately. And I also know that smart, computer-savvy people are concerned about these machines.

The perfectly obvious thing is for the entire country to do what a number of states have already done: require paper trails so that if we have a close election or suspect something went wrong, we have the option to go back and check the results.

So it is heartening that a diverse group -- Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives -- in Congress has proposed legislation to give everyone, even the supposedly paranoid, confidence that our elections are on the level.

The bill has been pushed by Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.), with strong support from Reps. Tom Davis (R-Va.) and Tom Cole (R-Okla.). It has 219 co-sponsors, which happens to be a majority of House members.

The bill requires that voting machines produce a permanent paper record that voters themselves can verify. It requires random, unannounced hand-count audits in 2 percent of all precincts to make sure the machines recorded votes properly....

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/09/AR2006100901034.html

[kster]

1. Tell em to stick that bill up their ass

CAUSE WE ARE GOING FOR THE GOLD!!

[nolabels]

4. I think they are going to try to cheat, no matter what the cost

Since corporate media has almost always been less than truthful when reporting anything about voting count issues trusting them or the republicans they have supported for so many years would just plain stupid. In other words they always lie, cheat and or spin for more lies deceptions when someone shows the truth.

What reason do any of them have for being truthful now :shrug:

[kster]

2. A full hand count, in the precinct that was hacked, what are the chances?

How Triad hacked
SUMMARY

This paper presents a simple formula that vote tabulation software can employ to steal an election undetected.

I will show that this algorithm is guaranteed to be immune from detection under all conceivable circumstances except one: a full hand recount in a precinct that was hacked. I will also show how the formula can be designed to significantly reduce this risk using publicly-available information. I will highlight some political and procedural ways that this risk factor can be further reduced.

This document is based on information regarding the tabulation software called ElecTab produced by Triad Government Systems, Incorporated. Triad software was used in many counties in Ohio that voted using punch card and optical scan ballots. This algorithm could be adapted to work with many others systems’ tabulation software.

REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCEALMENT

The software used to tabulate ballot counts from punch card readers or optical scan readers have two essential functions:

a) interpret the results from the card reader, e.g. to match up the hole punched on the card with a candidate’s name.
b) total the votes

A third function could be introduced to contain the logic that will alter the outcome based on a simple formula designed to reduce the risk of detection. This formula depends on the inclusion of the following pieces of information within the program code:

1) precinct number
2) expected turnout
3) Yes/No flag indicating whether the precinct is safe to hack

The precinct number is required information that must be present in order to interpret results from the card reader. Expected turnout is used to distinguish whether the current tabulation is a test run or an official vote count. Expected turnout could be predicted ahead of time based on information about past turnouts and current voter registration information.

Defining certain precincts as unsafe to hack will protect against the risk of a full hand recount exposing the discrepancy between the true ballot count and the results generated by the software. It can be shown that the lax enforcement of Ohio recount procedures in combination with an intelligent assessment of precincts likely to be chosen for a hand recount can eliminate the risks of detection.

This information can be inside the compiled code of the tabulation software which is unreadable to the human eye. Only a court can order the software vendor to de-compile the code so others can inspect the source code. Otherwise there will be no other physical evidence on the computer that fraud occurred.

The software must be able to protect itself against detection during an audit. Therefore it must be able to determine whether the current tabulation is a test or the real thing. The test hand counts must always match the machine count. Ohio recount provisions state that actual ballots can not be used to perform the test. Because of this provision, the software will never hack a test count because the precinct information used to interpret the results will never match a precinct on the previously defined “safe” precinct list.

To guard against the possibility that Board of Elections workers will use the ballots from a real precinct in the test, the software can reference the computer’s system date and/or an audit file containing the results of previous tabulations. By incorporating conditions based on previous counts and the system clock the program will succeed in detecting test counts even in the cases where a) the battery-powered system clock is inaccurate; and b) the file containing past tabulations is missing.

Please note that it would not be unexpected for the tabulating computer to have the results of previous tabulations written to a file on the computer’s hard disk. In fact, it may even be required in some places as an auditing mechanism.


THE ALGORITHM

Designing software is a simple logical process. The program receives input and processes it based on clearly defined conditions. The designer must identify which conditions to test and process the input based on the answers. The decision charts shown below can be used to meet all the requirements mentioned above.

The first test shown below can be used if it is found that the system clock is unreliable. The system clock on personal computers is powered by a small battery that lasts up to ten years. Since one of the two algorithms shown below relies on the current date, it is necessary to code for the contingency that the system clock is not set correctly.

The first algorithm therefore depends on the existence of a file containing the results from a previous tabulation. That information can then be combined with the expected turnout number and safe-to-hack precinct flag to determine the results.

Below are the decision charts designed for arriving at the decision to hack or not hack the count in the current run of ballots. The software program will test for the conditions shown in the first three columns. The decision whether to hack the precinct during this tabulation is shown in the fourth column.


PREVIOUS TABULATION
SAVED TO FILE

Is PREVIOUS count close to expected turnout? Is the CURRENT count close to expected turnout? Is this precinct hackable? Hack Decision
N N Y N
N N N N
N Y Y Y
N Y N N
Y N Y N
Y N N N
Y Y Y Y
Y Y N N


If the file containing the previous tabulation numbers is not present OR the hack decision is YES, the program would then proceed to check against the system date to make the final decision whether to alter the results in this tabulation.

CURRENT SYSTEM DATE

Current Date Is THIS count close to expected turnout? Is this precinct hackable? Hack Decision
< Nov 2 N/A N/A N
>= Nov 2 Y Y Y
>= Nov 2 Y N N
>= Nov 2 N Y N
>= Nov 2 N N N


These tests will determine conclusively whether the current tabulation is for a test or for an official count. It will alter the outcome of the individual precinct only if it is an official ballot count and the precinct was pre-identified as one that is “safe” to hack. Additional logic can be included in the program to scientifically determine how many votes to flip in a way that will also help it avoid detection.


CONCLUSION

The programming design illustrated in this document guarantees against detection except in the situation where a full hand recount occurs in one of the precincts that was expected to be “safe” to hack. This design produces tabulation software that a) leaves no physical evidence of fraud; b) can differentiate between test runs and official counts; c) always returns the same results; and d) never needs modifying after the candidate rotation is entered. It can also run on any MS-DOS or Windows operating system released in the past 15 years.

Thus the key to avoiding exposure is to ensure that none of the hacked precincts are chosen for a full hand recount. Lax enforcement of recount guidelines greatly reduces this risk. Risk is reduced even further because many precincts will be not be hacked.

To swing the election in favor of a candidate by 2% percent only requires changing the votes on 1% of the ballots. Due to the small number of voters per precinct, the change would be quite small even in a hacked precinct. The discrepancy can even be small enough to be explained away by under votes or by chads falling off after the first tabulation.

According to published reports, random selection of the precincts for the full hand recount occurred in only one county. Many other irregularities surrounding the recount process have also been reported. Many of the hand counts that were conducted produced results that were slightly different from the machine count.

The design presented here offers a fool-proof method for avoiding detection when the risk of hand counting a known hacked precinct is managed.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=337686&mesg_id=339752

[OnTheOtherHand]

3. actually, it depends on the audit algorithm

Given a random audit, there is no precinct that is "safe" to hack. (EDIT TO ADD: Of course, that only works if there is something to audit, and if the ballots are secure.)

[kster]

7. Gore wanted a full hand count, is

this why the SCOTUS had to shut the hand count down?

"To swing the election in favor of a candidate by 2% percent only requires changing the votes on 1% of the ballots. Due to the small number of voters per precinct, the change would be quite small even in a hacked precinct. The discrepancy can even be small enough to be explained away by under votes or by chads falling off after the first tabulation".

[OnTheOtherHand]

8. as long as we are wandering

As far as I know, Gore's lawyers never called for a statewide hand count. If I remember rightly, Gore's team said there was no provision in Florida law to do so -- they were required to focus on particular jurisdictions where there was particular reason to believe votes had been miscounted. So, that isn't necessarily why SCOTUS had to shut the hand count down. (Some people think that if SCOTUS had given Florida another week, the Florida Supreme Court would have ordered a full hand recount with a uniform standard. Seems reasonable to me, but I don't know.)

I do not at all agree with the OP that a 2% swing could easily be attributed to fallen chads. It sounds nice, but chad controversies didn't account for very many votes in 2000 (although the election was so close that they received a lot of attention anyway). Ironically, that claim resembles a Republican talking point about why a recount should not have been allowed in Florida 2000 -- because it would supposedly be too easy for Democrats to alter the outcome.

[galloglas]

10. How the hell would we know ??

You said:

"As far as I know, Gore's lawyers never called for a statewide hand count.'

How could we ever know??

"Jury-rigging" James Baker was dispatched to Florida, together with his coiffed, and coutured, GOP Mafia of legal hatchet men in three piece suits, rather than black SS unforms and hobnailed boots, which would have been more appropriate to the purpose.

These legal pirates were led by the abominable John Bolton (screaming "We're here to stop the recount!!") and the inestimable, and illusive (no, I mean "illusive", though he is also "elusive"), Mark S. "Thor" Hearne, and they were numbered in the hundreds.

How do we know what would have become of the "recount", what Gore's lawyers would ultimately have asked for?

This invasion of the GOP legal corps could have easily been termed "The Barristers storm The Bastille", for they put a swift end to the fullness of time which might have laid bare the legals mechanics which stole the Florida election, as the storming of the Bastille freed both the innocent and the guilty.

Moreover, IMHO, it might have opened the heart of the matter to inspection by the SCOTUS: that being the disenfranchisement of all Floridians, and hence, most all American voters via the illegal "outsourcing" of elections to private corporate "persons". Something our Founding Fathers neither forsaw, nor prevented.

But the Founding Fathers failure to forsee such an illegal appropriation of Americans franchise to vote does not, consequently, mean that such "outsourcing" is not, indeed, unconstitutional.

I think that was the ultimate, and most important, purpose of the GOP "Depositional Desperadoes" who invade Florida. The cementing of the stolen election is a given.

But, having forced the issue of "who won" in Florida, it evaded the issue of the privatization of the vote to partisan corporate parties.

Consequently, it still lies before us.

[OnTheOtherHand]

11. we would read the court filings and transcripts

As to what would have become of the recount, I didn't claim to know.

Mechanical voting machines have been around for over 100 years, so it is hard for me to conclude that the use of corporate-built voting machines is obviously unconstitutional. Certainly the question still lies before us.

[Awsi Dooger]

14. David Boies mentioned a statewide recount to the Florida Supreme Court

I believe this was before their first ruling, a unanimous one later vacated and sent back by SCOTUS: http://graphics.boston.com/news/politics/campaign2000/news/Asking_the_hard_questions+.shtml

"Gore's attorneys, led by David Boies, who won the US government's antitrust case against Microsoft, pointed time and again to their view that the law has conflicting wording about recounts and deadlines, and must therefore be read generously. Boies also alluded to the court's broad power to mediate the dispute, up to and including an order for statewide manual recount.

''Your Honor,'' Boies said, addressing Wells, ''if you concluded that it was essential to avoid unfairness or some kind of overweighting of one county's vote over another county's vote, this court has within its equitable power, to have a statewide recount.''

That assertion drew skeptical questioning from Justice Peggy Quince, who wondered if a remedy as sweeping as a statewide recount could jeopardize completion of the count by Dec. 12.

''How do you think a statewide recount would impact on the whole idea of getting these things done before Dec. 12, is it? And aren't we just adding another layer if we order a statewide recount?'' the justice asked.

''You could be, Your Honor,'' Boies conceded.

[OnTheOtherHand]

16. thanks, I couldn't remember who raised this issue

I remembered Boies talking about it, but couldn't think of the context. I would like to know what Wells said right before Boies said that.

Consistent with what I said before -- Boies didn't ask for it, but pointed out that it was possible. A tough situation for the Gore lawyers.

[OnTheOtherHand]

18. I guess it should be mentioned

The Florida Supreme Court's last ruling (12/8) before SCOTUS shut everything down called for (among other things) a statewide manual recount of undervotes. As I understand it, it was the Bush lawyers' position that if undervotes were to be recounted, they should be recounted everywhere and not just in a few counties. That isn't to say that the Gore lawyers opposed counting all the votes, although of course the Republicans did say that. It's easy to second-guess the Gore lawyers, but the table was tilted against them.

A manual recount limited to undervotes is a lot less ambitious than a full manual recount. No reason it couldn't have happened.

[Awsi Dooger]

23. It looks like Boies turned to address Chief Justice Wells

after the conclusion of a discussion with Justice Pariente, regarding recount standards in different counties. The transcript is a bit difficult to follow but I think Boies thought the issue was particularly significant so he specifically addressed it to the chief justice.

Actually, I have the damn thing on VHS tape somewhere but I'm too lazy to search for it. I made 12 tapes in hope of a better outcome but considering the result it's too depressing to watch them.

http://archives.cnn.com/2000/LAW/11/21/court.transcript.pol/index.html

PARIENTE: Well, for example, if right now in Palm Beach County chads that are not detached at all, but I guess are these dimpled chads, are being counted, but in Broward County they're not counted, then does that say that one vote is being counted in one county and not in the other?

If that's an argument, then what do you say to Governor Bush's argument and secretary of state's argument that for those counties that did not have manual recounts but also have punch cards, because I guess not all counties have the punch cards, that if those votes did not get manually recounted that that is unfairly giving certain counties a greater voice in this election than other counties?

BOIES: The first thing, Your Honor, is that any candidate could have requested a manual recount in any county, so that the manual recount provision is something that by statute is given to the candidates. And wherever there has been a manual recount requested, the counties have gone forward, and indeed some of the results that have already been certified have been results that included manual recounts.

PARIENTE: Do we know in Volusia County whether they used -- what standard they used? Is that in the record?

BOIES: I do not believe that is in the record, Your Honor.

I would say that I think that it -- for the reason that you point out, it is quite important that this court be as specific as possible in terms of the standard to be applied so that we will have uniformity. I also think, Your Honor, that if you concluded that it was essential to avoid unfairness or some kind of overweighting of one county's vote over another county's vote, this court has within its equitable power, to have a statewide recount, if you concluded that that was necessary.

WELLS: Well, along that line, I take it then if this court should hold that the 72 hour -- the seven day period was not specifically enforceable, then you would say that there should be a window of opportunity for both sides to request recounts in additional counties?

BOIES: I think the court has the power to order that if it believes...

WELLS: Well, what is your position on it?

BOIES: Your Honor, we don't think that's necessary, because...

WELLS: So would you try to strictly enforce the 72-hour provision in 166?

BOIES: Well, the 72-hour provision in 166 had already passed by the time that the seven day period had passed...

WELLS: But the certification had not.

BOIES: But the certification had not, Your Honor. And it was for that reason that Vice President Gore informally, obviously, he didn't have the power that this court has, but informally proposed, as the court may or may not be aware, that he would be prepared to accept a statewide recount.

We are not urging that upon the court. But certainly that is something that we have indicated that we would accept. And we believe the court has the power to order that or to order, as the court suggests, a window...

QUINCE: Well, how do you think a statewide recount would impact on the whole idea of getting these things done before December 12, is it? And aren't we just adding another layer if we order a statewide recount?

BOIES: You could be, Your Honor. However, since the recount takes place county by county, it will proceed in parallel.

And since the most populous counties are the ones that are already under way, we believe that those recounts -- it would be practical to do those recounts if the court felt it to be desirable.

[OnTheOtherHand]

25. thanks, excellent source

And arguably Boies there planted part of the idea for what the Florida Supreme Court actually ordered.

[kster]

15. Did Gore pick the counties that were hacked

SNIP.... Based on those examples, a hand recount of all ballots in the four counties could produce an additional 3,000 or more votes overall, of which about 60 percent would go to Gore if the additions reflected the same trend as the votes already recorded.

And as usual... The recount is supposed to start Saturday morning in Palm Beach County and Volusia County on the northeast coast, and under Florida law must be conducted in public. But Florida Republicans were preparing Friday for possible legal action to block the recount.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A63637-2000Nov10?language=printer

Are you OK with the fact that in America the SCOTUS stopped the people from counting the ballots?

[OnTheOtherHand]

17. WTF are you talking about?

What would give you the idea that I'm "OK with the fact" that SCOTUS stopped the count? That isn't even what the thread is about.

You are in the position of opposing an audit bill ("Tell em to stick that bill up their ass") because it isn't good enough for you. I support the audit bill. Whose position is more like SCOTUS's in 2000? That would be yours, not mine. You are the one insisting on all or nothing -- and time has run out.

Of course, unlike SCOTUS, neither one of us has any appreciable political power, and it's not likely that anything was going to pass this Congress anyway. The board will probably get more opportunities to argue in circles about the Holt bill.

[aggiesal]

19. It was the purging of names from the voter rolls ...

that caused Gore to lose in 2000. Approximately 95,000 names were removed from the voter rolls, and mostly from Democratic voting areas. Over 50% were African/American, and as a voting block, Af/Am's voted 92% for Gore in Florida.
You do the math. Gore would have easily won by over 40,000 votes instead of losing by 500+.

Also, one more note.
Prince Jeb in Florida, signed a bill into law, making it illegal to use the paper ballots to compare the accuracy of the e-voting machines.
If you don't understand what that means; The e-voting machines might as well be a shreader, because once your ballot is sent through the scanner or you receive a reciept, the paper verification can no longer be used to compare the result the e-voting machine produces. It is literally illegal to compare the paper ballot against the e-voting results.

[OnTheOtherHand]

21. yes, that is one of several sufficient causes

We don't know how many of those folks would have voted, but I agree: take away the purge, and Gore probably wins outright without a recount.

I haven't read the Florida law, but usually if state laws conflict with federal laws -- such as the proposed Holt bill described in the OP -- state laws lose.

[aggiesal]

22. With these new e-voting machines ...

I see a 6-8% flip in the actual votes .vs. exit polling.
To me, if a Dem has a lead of 6% or less going into election day,
then he/she (or she/he) will lose.
8% if it is a district that the Rep's really, really want.

[OnTheOtherHand]

24. I think that's the wrong approach

First of all, exit polls (at least the national ones) won't be in House races. Too many races, too few interviewers. Also, they aren't that reliable anyway. (The Carter Center recommends against using them to check election results.)

Second, Dems have won close races on every kind of voting equipment. I'm not making any predictions or guarantees about what will happen in 2006, but there's no reason to write off the close races.

[aggiesal]

27. I hope your right .

But, I've already seen it in San Diego's 50th district.
Busby was even if not ahead on all pre-election polls,
but ended up losing by 5%.

Things that make you go hmmmmm!

[OnTheOtherHand]

28. even or ahead in every poll?

Looks to me like Survey USA had Bilbray +11 in their final poll -- with a big margin of error. A special election in July would be pretty hard to poll reliably, because it is hard to tell who would vote.

In order to see the dates, go to http://surveyusa.com/electionpolls.aspx and then search for "San Diego", twice (July poll followed by June poll, which was basically even, Bilbray +2).

Anyway, that's a side note. We have no way of knowing which machines hackers might have access to. As someone said, we don't know the probability of our votes being counted if we do vote, but we know the probability is zero if we don't.

(EDIT to change subject header because it read very strangely without the message context!)

[Awsi Dooger]

26. I agree with that

I'm sure the number of lost net votes for Gore in that purged block would be lower than most estimates, but certainly much higher than 528 or whatever the margin was.

So that was strategic theft. Then came forfeit via the majority Gore supporters who overvoted via the butterfly/two-page ballots. I call it forfeit even though that's harsh and certainly wouldn't meet a dictionary definition. Self-inflicted screwup influenced by a hopelessly flawed system.

I voted on those damn Dade County punch cards beginning in the '80s and they never should have been allowed to survive into 2000. I remember complaints every time and I literally had to jostle with the machine especially if I voted late in the day when chads were flooding the bottom of the tray. Then I'd pick at the ballot to make sure the chads were off.

[Gamey]

5. Disagree because of personal experience

Don't get me wrong, a paper trail can go a long way to help the situation, but it still has major weaknesses. Such as my situation while voting in the 2004 elections. I voted for Kerry on a touchscreen. The button was clearly far from the Bush button. But in the summary at the end, it said I had selected Bush! I had to change it! So that's my point. How many people would actually catch such a gaffe?

[EFerrari]

9. Welcome to DU, Gamey

:)

[DeepModem Mom]

12. That's worrisome, Gamey. Thanks for posting, and welcome to DU!

[JAYJDF]

6. It's worse than you think!

There have already been challenges to some elections.
Recounts just haven't been allowed.
Doesn't matter if there is a paper trail or not.
Look back at San Diego.
Swift action and delays put the matter into Congress' hands.

There is no simple fix.

The only fix I see is, elected Dems actually standing up and fighting, making a scene.

Sorry, I do hope for a miracle, but expect more of the same cheating and lieing.

[aggiesal]

20. In San Diego ...

Brian Bilbray was sworn into congress before the election was certified.
2 voters in the 50th district, sued to have the election overturned because
of voting "Irregularities".

We tried to show that the SD ROV displayed different numbers just after the
election that did not sync with the final voting results.

Unfortunately, we (voters) did not capture the preliminary ROV data, and
the judge eventually ruled that "Congress can swear in anyone based on
their rules". (No kidding, this was the judgement).

What does this mean? If the election is tight, and a clear winner has not
been decided, congress can swear in the candidate of their choice before
the election is certified. Anyone!

Your vote does not matter.
Only congress' vote counts, based on the judges ruling.

[niceypoo]

13. Whenever we point out the dems huge lead to the republcans in my chatroom

...they all start typing stuff like, "Diebold, we vote republican so you dont have to," and statements simular. The only thing they are paranoid about is losing fair and square.