Must See 4-minute Sarasota video - this says it all!

[garybeck]

http://www.therighttocount.com/shorts

[SharonAnn]

1. They did a good job with this. It raises some of the right questions.

[sasha031]

2. I hope the Dem's have the sense to take every voting machine

in the country and have them crushed, something like they did with the electric cars yrs ago. But will they, when i hear receipts from the machines I ant to :puke: there is only one way to get our country back (well many actually, chop the media into tiny pieces) and PAPER BALLOTS!

[jgraz]

7. Like anything, they won't unless we make them.

We've all got a lot of work ahead of us.

[kster]

3. KNR,,nt

[stevenstevensteven]

4. Two points

1. regarding the bad time stamps and machines not being zero'd, all of the machines were obviously not L&A'd prior to election day. I bet they ran out of time, or just decided to L&A "some" machines. VVPAT would not help in this situation.

2. regarding high undervote rates, its the ballot definition files in those machines.... they weren't the same as BDFs in other machines. VVPAT may have helped in this situation, if pollworkers caught the problem at the precint. But if aint on the ballot, it aint going to show up electronically or on the VVPAT.

[philb]

5. What do you mean about BDFs??

Are you saying that Jennings was intentionally left off the ballot in the BDF?
Or Jennings was accidentaly left off the ballot in the BDF?
Or both were possibly left off the ballot in the BDF?

there were no voters who saw Buchanan vote disappear. Does this mean only Jennings had a BDF problem?

[stevenstevensteven]

6. BDF

Ballot Definition File - electronic version of a blank paper ballot. They used 9 ballot styles in Sarasota. Which style you got depended on what precinct you voted at.

[eomer]

9. Why would VVPAT not help with the zeroing out problem?

Admittedly it would depend on what kind of VVPAT system we are talking about but at least for a VVPAT system where the DRE prints a paper ballot that the voter takes into her hand, reviews, and then deposits into a ballot box, such a VVPAT system would surely help with regard to the failure to zero out.

[stevenstevensteven]

10. VVPAT not help with the zeroing out problem

Well, now you are talking about a ballot on demand system and not a VVPAT system. If the county used a ballot on demand system, where the paper ballots in the locked ballot box were the ballots of record, then yes, the zero'ing issue would be irrelevant. But VVPAT systems are not ballot on demand systems.... I was referring to VVPAT because that is in much wider use on DRE's... and because VVPAT is traditionally just a backup to the electronic vote count.

My point here was that if they forgot to zero the machines, either through the L&A process or via poll opening procedures, then the VVPAT would not have helped prevent the situation. But it was really meant to be a minor side point that VVPAT is only a partial solution (while needed) to the many issues that we currently have with our election system.

[eomer]

11. OK, I see what you were saying now

but even if the system in place is a VVPAT (by your definition) then wouldn't the pollworkers make a mark on the paper roll and sign it and wouldn't the votes that are on paper then be clear (in the absence of other problems with the VVPAT) and be able to serve as a record of the votes? I'm missing why that would not be the case.

[stevenstevensteven]

12. re: VVPAT

"but even if the system in place is a VVPAT (by your definition) then wouldn't the pollworkers make a mark on the paper roll and sign it and wouldn't the votes that are on paper then be clear (in the absence of other problems with the VVPAT) and be able to serve as a record of the votes?"

Yes, you could count the ballots on the VVPAT to confirm the electronic count, assuming that the VVPAT functions properly.

If the machine was not zero'd on/or before election morning, and the machine was equipped with VVPAT, then you could review the time stamp at the beginning of the roll (assuming machine time is correct) and make sure that all ballots cast on the roll were cast after poll opening time. Under those circumstances, you could count the paper and have good confidence that you counted all of teh ballots on that machine.

My initial point about VVPAT was to say that it does not help prevent the situation that appears to have developed in Sarasota, namely non-zero'd machines or incorrect machine time.

Voter verification and independent audibility are clearly a requirement in this system. But there are lots of other places where checks and balances (or quality controls) are equally important, yet are being ignored and therefore non-existent. One example is that the vendors delivered no way to inventory control or track memory cards. Now, each memory card can hold hundreds of ballots - each is like its own ballot box. You'd think these pupplies would be tracked like they are gold. Well, they aren't. It's basically a trust system.

[Cookie wookie]

15. L & A testing is a different process from

printing out the zero tapes. That isn't clear in your post. Zero tapes are supposed to be run on all touchscreen voting stations on the day of elections, but prior to the entry of any votes on the machines. They are run so that paper evidence will be available to indicate that no votes were been entered on the machines before the election began, and are kept with the end of the day results tapes from each machine as part of the election records from each precinct or polling place.

[Sancho]

8. This is going on all over Florida...

A great video...why isn't it on HBO?

[mom cat]

13. Or NBC, CBS, ABC, CNN et? ... Another question, What were the totals on

the three "certified" machines and how did they compare to all the other machines that had not been zeroed out?

[In Truth We Trust]

14. K&R Hand Counted Paper Ballots NOW!