“Safety procedures flouted at every stage” (nuke incident at Minot AFB). The series of mistakes

[jody]

documented and the number of officers and airmen punished supports a conclusion that the system broke down.

“Safety procedures flouted at every stage”

The crew at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota had replaced the complex nuclear security procedures with their own informal system.

* * * * * * * * * * *

The missiles remained at Minot without special guard for 15 hours. The first error was that armed and unarmed missiles were stored in the same place – though at Minot this was apparently "routine".

A "munitions custodian officer" then failed to check the colours of the warheads on the missiles. Nuclear warheads are coloured silver and they are also supposed to have a red ribbon attached to the missile. Before the missiles are moved, two-man teams are supposed to check bar codes and serial numbers that also indicate whether they are armed.

* * * * * * * * * * *

The next set of errors occurred when the jet's air crew failed to follow procedures to examine all the missiles before flight.

IMO any DU member with experience in USAF special weapons storage and transport will agree that the system simply broke down because officers and airmen became complacent.

In recent years the dreaded IG inspections that made SAC so successful have been downgraded since the cold-war ended. As a result, systems with humans in the loop fail to do their jobs and serious accidents can and will occur.

ON EDIT ADD: The incident suggests that DOD should install a system that automatically tracks each warhead's location. That should minimize the probability of serious incidents caused by human error.

[warren pease]

1. That's nice, and yet...

The following is a partial list of the procedures involved in handling, transporting and securing nuclear weapons -- all of which would have had to be forgotten, ignored or countermanded for this event to occur:

"Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs Supplement"

This Interim Change (IC) 2006-2 provides new/additional guidance regarding the definition and intent of the Air Force Tamper Detection Program, further clarifies the intent for MAJCOMs to develop and distribute sealing procedures and updates general information. A bar ( | ) indicates a revision from the previous edition.

1. Requirements and Procedures.

1.1. Tamper Control Program. The Two-Person Concept is central to nuclear surety tamper control measures in the Air Force. It is designed to make sure that a lone individual cannot perform an incorrect act or unauthorized procedure on a nuclear weapon, nuclear weapon system, or certified critical component.

1.2. Concept Enforcement. Each organization with a mission or function involving nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, or certified critical components:

1.2.1. Identifies no-lone zones (where at least two authorized persons must be present during any operation or task).

1.2.1. (AFSPC) Apply Two-Person Concept procedures during training with non-war reserve assets to the extent necessary to maintain proficiency.

1.2.2. Enforces the Two-Person Concept

1.2.2. (AFSPC) Before entering a no-lone zone, brief personnel that the Two-Person Concept applies. Supervisors must ensure that individuals are aware of the location of all no-lone zone boundaries, location of certified critical components within the no-lone zone, emergency procedures, and methods for reporting violations and hazards. Do not use signs or devices externally that identify a building as a no-lone zone.

1.2.3. Develops procedures to limit entry to authorized persons who meet the requirements of paragraph 1.3.

1.2.3. (AFSPC) After entry into a no-lone zone, the supervisor/team chief of each authorized team controls individual team members within the no-lone zone.

1.2.4. (Added-AFSPC) After initial entry of an authorized Two-Person Concept team into a no-lone zone, a single, authorized individual may enter providing:

1.2.4.1. (Added-AFSPC) The Sole Vouching Authority (SVA) identifies individuals wishing to gain entry to a no-lone zone, verifies authorization, and validates need for entry into the no-lone zone. Note: SVA is the representative identified as having responsibility for deciding who will enter the no-lone zone. Normally, this is the senior member of the first team entering the area. SVA may transfer between individuals provided the two individuals jointly identify

1.2.5. (Added-AFSPC) An area designated as a no-lone zone may be defined as the interior of a cabinet, a work bay or equipment bay; an entire structure or building, a junction box, a drawer, an area encompassed by an actual boundary established by painted markings, rope, or a fence; and in some instances, the interior of vehicles. Local commanders are authorized to enlarge a no-lone zone. This authority should be used sparingly and only when absolutely required. When used for unattended storage of nuclear weapons or certified critical components the no-lone zone must meet the requirements of AFI 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security Program, and AFI

1.2.5.7. (Added-AFSPC) Any room, computer facility, vault, or similar area where certified critical components are repaired (operationally certified or decertified), manufactured, stored, or processed, is a no-lone zone. For an area in which maintenance is infrequently performed on certified critical components, establish a temporary no-lone zone with signs placed around the work area while components are present.

1.3. Team Requirements. (Refer to paragraph 1.1.6.1 for criteria on foreign nationals.) A Two-Person Concept team consists of at least two individuals who:

1.3.1. Are certified under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), as specified in AFI 36-2104, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program(formerly AFR 35-99 and AFR 40-925).

1.3.1. (AFSPC) Inspectors or evaluators who meet the requirements of paragraph 1.3. may form a Two-Person Concept team in the performance of their duties.

1.3.2. Know the nuclear surety requirements of the task they perform.

1.3.3. Can promptly detect an incorrect act or unauthorized procedure.

1.3.4. Have successfully completed nuclear surety training according to AFI 91-101.

1.3.5. Are designated to perform the required task.

1.4. (AFSPC) Violations to Report. Report violations of the Two-Person Concept, including emergency response, through the command post to the commander. The commander will ensure violations are investigated promptly. A Two-Person Concept team must ascertain if unauthorized acts were performed, inspect involved certified critical components, verify their status, and reestablish the integrity of the system. Accomplish applicable visual and functional checks for components that have such procedures established.

1.6.4. PRP Interim-Certified Personnel Restrictions. Two interim-certified individuals may not form a Two-Person Concept team. Also, do not allow an interim-certified member to pilot a single-seat aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons.


TAMPER DETECTION PROGRAM

2. Tamper Detection Program. Seals help to verify that no one has tampered with or accidentally activated a certified critical component.

2.1. Sealing Requirements. Certain items must be sealed because either:

2.1.1. Air Force nuclear weapon system safety rules require it, or,

2.1.2. In the case of some certified critical components, seals protect their certification status while in storage or during transportation, as specified in AFI 91-105, Critical Components (formerly AFR 122-17).

2.2. Sealing Methods. Authorized sealing methods include:

2.2.1. Safety Wiring and Lead Seals. In this method, you place a lead seal on a safety wire connected to certain switches, covers, handles, or levers and impress the lead seal with a distinctive mark using a crimping device and controlled die. An unauthorized act breaks or alters the wire connection so that you can detect activation. Use this method only in no-lone zones.

2.2.2. Tamper Detection Indicators (TDI). In this method you place an approved TDI so that it will indicate when someone has activated or had access to the interior of a certified critical component. Once the TDI is installed, evidence of tampering is visible to the naked eye or can be detected through the use of special equipment.

3.3.1. (AFSPC) Where AFSPC directives do not cover a particular local situation, wings will develop local standard publications or checklists to ensure adequate control of certified critical components or nuclear weapons and application of the Tamper Control and Detection Programs.

3.3.2. Develop and distribute procedures for sealing, where appropriate. As a minimum, these procedural directives:

3.3.2.1. State when and by whom seals can be applied and removed.

3.3.2.1. (AFSPC) Units will designate personnel authorized to apply and remove tamper

detection indicators (TDI). TDIs will be applied and removed by a Two-Person Concept team when required by technical orders or directives.

3.3.2.2. Establish controls for the handling, receipt, storage, issue, inventory, and disposal of TDIs (including all residue), controlled dies and self-locking, non-reversible seals. (example: roto-seals)

3.3.2.2. (AFSPC) Develop local controls for handling, receipt, storage, issue, inventory, and disposal of TDIs not covered in technical orders, directives or this supplement.

3.3.2.2.1. (Added-AFSPC) The Aquila Cobra Seal TDI-1 (ACSTDI-1) is used to maintain certification of the Missile Guidance Set (MGS) during shipment. Task-qualified personnel must install, remove, and verify the ACSTDI-1.

3.3.2.2.2. (Added-AFSPC) The ACSTD-1 system kit requires special handling. The kit

which includes special tools, camera, printer, video disks, ACSTDI-1 bodies, and fiber

optic cables does not require special handling. Maintain the video disk used during the

ACSTDI-1 installation process under proper Two-Person Concept control until all information recorded on the disk has been properly verified by the unit receiving the MGS. Maintain the master pictures taken during the installation process under Two-Person Concept

control until TDIs on MGS shipping containers are verified by the receiving unit.

3.3.2.2.3. (Added-AFSPC) Prior to shipping a certified MGS to another unit, ensure the

receiving unit has a copy of the master pictures taken during the seal installation process.

Transmit the master pictures by facsimile machine or overnight mail. Immediately upon

receipt of the master pictures the receiving unit will contact the sending unit via telephone to confirm that the pictures have been received and are under Two-Person Concept control. The sending unit will verify the caller,s identity by immediate call back. Accomplish this verification procedure prior to shipping the MGS.

3.3.2.2.4. (Added-AFSPC) The sending unit must inspect installed ACSTDI-1s immediately prior to loading the MGS shipping container for shipment. The same inspection is performed upon receipt of the MGS.

3.3.2.2.5. (Added-AFSPC) Dispose of the ACSTDI-1 by destroying the body and discarding it along with the cables.


Have a blast, as they say.

wp

[jody]

2. Those procedures apply to nuclear warheads. The incident was started when personnel stored

missiles with nuclear warheads in the same area with missiles with dummy warheads.

Things went from bad to worst thereafter when personnel at each subsequent checkpoint assumed the cruise missiles had dummy warheads for which the procedures you cite do not apply when in fact six of the missiles actually had nuclear warheads.

It seems possible that the most critical error was in storing nuclear warheads with dummy warheads.

[warren pease]

3. You do know that that's virtually impossible?

Storing dummies and nukes together is absolutely verboten and should never, ever happen if SOP is followed correctly. Here's a link to a Military Times forum.

It's a collection of comments on the B-52 incident, featuring much info from current and former AF personnel who have had nuclear weapons handling experience.

Skim through these posts and you'll find quite a few insiders who have a pretty tough time swallowing the "mistakes were made" scenario.

wp

[jody]

4. "should never" but in this incident it did happen. You admit that possibility by using "should".

The rank of the officers directing the investigation and the number of people involved means it will be absolutely impossible to cover up a covert operation in the report of the investigation.

There are tens of thousands of "current and former AF personnel who have had nuclear weapons handling experience" not all of which is relevant to the subject incident.

I'll wait for the report of the investigation.

[lateo]

5. Such BS

I'm sorry but for this big a breach in security it would have taken an order from higher up to make it happen. This is just the cover up.

[jody]

8. See #4 post above. n/t

[blues90]

6. I just can't buy that this was a mistake

I heard that only two pilots were blamed for this . I could be wrong , it was late while I was listening to the radio .

I still don't feel this was a mistake . They were caught transporting nuclear missiles that were possibly destined to be sent somewhere in the ME .

[jody]

9. See #4 post above. n/t

[bemildred]

7. Oh, bullshit. nt

[jody]

10. See #4 post above. n/t

[bemildred]

11. Oh bullshit.

Anybody that says "absolutely impossible to cover up" something has his head up his (or her) ass. Covering up fucked up "operations" is the one thing our government does best, they have lots of practice.

[jody]

12. I see we disagree and I can live with that. Have a great day. n.t

[bemildred]

13. You have a great day too.

:hi: