http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/1348/Michael_Scheur_on_Feiths_Qaeda-Iraq_Assessment<snip>
In late 2002, as Feith's report asserting a relationship between bin Laden and Saddam was making its rounds through the intelligence community, George Tenet assigned a small group of experienced CIA officers with the task of re-evaluating every available piece of intelligence on the subject to see if there was any merit to the new conclusions, which contradicted the CIA's understanding at the time.
Scheuer was tasked to head the group, and they worked for a month reviewing approximately fifty thousand pages of material extending back nearly a decade. The result of that exercise led them to reject Feith's conclusions and re-affirm the CIA's stance that there was not a working relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.
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"While I do no claim to have read all of the unit's papers, those I did read struck me as rather amateurish. The bane of the professional intelligence officer's life is that data are available to support virtually any line of analysis one wants to present, or, more dangerous, any line of analysis politicians want to have delivered....
"The analysis of Iraq-al Qaeda cooperation that came from Mr. Feith's unit struck me as either being prepared by inexperienced analysts--those not yet comfortable in discerning quality from inferior information--or by solid analysts who were ordered to produce analysis that would mesh with and support the decisions policy makers intended to make. I have no way of knowing which of the two factors were at play. I would argue, however, that it would be a stretch to describe the analysis from Mr. Feith's unit on Iraq and al Qaeda as a professional product. It certainly was not analysis on which decisions about peace and war should be made."
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