Video of Sleeping Guards Shakes Nuclear Industry

[unhappycamper]

Video of Sleeping Guards Shakes Nuclear Industry
By Steven Mufson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, January 4, 2008; Page A01

Kerry Beal was taken aback when he discovered last March that many of his fellow security guards at the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania were taking regular naps in what they called "the ready room."

When he spoke to supervisors at his company, Wackenhut Corp., they told Beal to be a team player. When he alerted the regional office of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, regulators let the matter drop after the plant's owner, Exelon, said it found no evidence of guards asleep on the job.

So Beal videotaped the sleeping guards. The tape, eventually given to WCBS, a CBS television affiliate in New York City, showed the armed workers snoozing against walls, slumped on tabletops or with eyes closed and heads bobbing.

The fallout of the broadcast is still being felt. Last month, Exelon, the country's largest provider of nuclear power, fired Wackenhut, which had guarded each of its 10 nuclear plants. The NRC is reviewing its own oversight procedures, having failed to heed Beal's warning. And Wackenhut says that the entire nuclear industry needs to rethink security if it hopes to meet the tougher standards the NRC has tried to impose since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.

The most immediate impact has been felt at Wackenhut, which protected half of the nation's 62 commercial nuclear power plants. Exelon's decision to terminate Wackenhut's contract reduces the number of commercial sites protected by the company to 21.


Rest of article at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/03/AR2008010304442.html?hpid=topnews

[A-Long-Little-Doggie]

1. Is Homer one of the guards??

I know... not funny in real life. But I couldn't help myself.

[in_cog_ni_to]

2. My alcoholic, Marijuana smoking brother was a guard at a Nuclear Plant here in a nearby town and use

to do the same thing! He would go to work either high or drunk, climb up into the rafters and sleep his shift away! They NEVER drug tested. People had to know he was drunk when he went to work. He even took alcohol to work and when he wasn't sleeping, drank it on the job! This was way back in the 80s, so it's been going on forever.:(

[stillcool]

3. rinse and repeat?

POGO's letter to NRC Chairman Diaz criticizing nuclear industry lobbyists' improper influence over critical homeland security tests
http://www.pogo.org/p/homeland/hl-040708-nrc.html
July 30, 2004
Chairman Nils J. Diaz
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852
Via facsimile: [phone]

Dear Chairman Diaz,

We have been encouraged by and supportive of the NRC's recent efforts to develop a credible force-on-force program to test the effectiveness of guard forces and defensive strategies at nuclear power plants. We were led to believe that the NRC would develop its own adversary teams for these tests. Credible adversary teams are essential for these performance tests.

Therefore, we were shocked to learn that Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the lobbying arm of the nuclear industry, has hired Wackenhut Corporation to supply and manage these adversary teams. This is more than a case of the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse. It is not an apparent conflict of interest -- but a blatant conflict of interest. As you know, Wackenhut guard forces protect 30 of the nation's 64 nuclear power plants. At nearly 50 percent of the nuclear plants, then, Wackenhut guard forces would be tested by Wackenhut adversaries. Under these conditions no one would have any confidence in the results of these force-on-force tests, regardless of whatever oversight the NRC might provide. The NRC should not abdicate its responsibility to run security preparedness tests to the nuclear industry, much less hand over authority to the very entity being tested. (Appendix A)

Having a trained full-time adversary force is a good idea, but any benefit gained is lost by the current arrangement. Oversight of critical infrastructure security is an inherently governmental function and must not be entrusted to a private company, particularly one with an obvious self-interest and a poor track record, like Wackenhut.

If this inappropriate arrangement were not enough for the commission to reclaim the force-on-force program, Wackenhut's dubious past performance should. Some examples of Wackenhut's performance:

As recently as last January, DOE inspector general reported that Wackenhut personnel had cheated during a force-on-force exercise of June 2003 at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tenn. This facility houses hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium. The inspector general, Greg Friedman, said the test results were "tainted and unreliable." Moreover, Friedman gleaned from more than 30 testimonies that this was part of "a pattern of actions" dating back almost two decades. (Appendix B)

A stunning case study of Wackenhut's incompetence with nuclear security:

Between 1986 and 2003, Wackenhut provided security at Indian Point #2 Nuclear Power plant, which is less than 35 miles north of Manhattan. The utility, Entergy, that had recently acquired the plant, hired a consultant to conduct an internal probe of security at the facility; and found:

* "Only 19 percent of the security officers stated that they could adequately defend the plant."

* Some officers believed that as many as "50 per cent of the force may not be physically able to meet the demands of defending the plant;"

* Wackenhut allowed guards to take their weapons qualifying tests over and over again until they passed;

* Citing officers' fears of retaliation for raising concerns, the report said, "The security officers stated that a chilled environment existed among security officers... as a result of issues related to Wackenhut site management;"

* Guards told of minimal training, of other guards reporting for duty drunk, of security drills that were carefully staged by Wackenhut to insure that mock attackers would be repelled, and of out of shape guards forced to work 70 to 80 hours or more per week. Entergy subsequently terminated Wackenhut's contract as a result of the investigation. (Appendix C)

The vast majority of the almost 200 guards at both NRC and Energy department sites that have complained to POGO about security problems have been Wackenhut employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wackenhut is owned by Group 4 Falck A/S, a Danish company, which has just merged with a British firm, Securicor, PLC. Securicor is the parent company of Cognisa - the same company that was in charge of airport security on Sept. 11, 2001 when terrorists with weapons passed through checkpoints at Washington-Dulles and Newark International Airports (back then the company called itself Argenbright). We now have one mega-foreign owned corporation with an abysmal record inside the U.S. operating security at many of our nuclear power plants.1
As always, we would be happy to meet with you to discuss our concerns.

Sincerely,

Danielle Brian
Executive Director
1. We are aware of the procedures of the Foreign Ownership, Control and Influence (FOCI) programs. We are not confident that the oversight of the foreign corporation is adequate to ensure that the so-called firewall between the domestic subsidary and the foreign owner is effective.
http://www.pogo.org

The following is a text of the Senators’ letter to the Inspector General of the U.S. Army:
September 25, 2006

Lieutenant General Stanley E. Green
Inspector General
United States Army

Dear General Green:

We have been contacted by a group of current and former employees of Wackenhut Corporation, the private contractor that handles security for the Holston Army Ammunition Plant in Kingsport, Tennessee, who describe serious security lapses at the plant.

As you know, the Holston plant produces explosives used in U.S. weapons systems, including the Sidewinder, Hellfire, Tomahawk and Javelin missiles. As one Army spokesperson has explained, “I think you can safely say if it goes boom, it comes from here.”

These whistleblowers tell us that Wackenhut provides lax security at this key facility and have described several specific incidents. The whistleblowers’ accounts include the following:

*
Wackenhut has failed to secure the facility. Civilians in rowboats have gained access to the plant by water. Holes cut in the fence around the perimeter are frequently found. Buildings containing high explosives are often left unlocked. Expensive specialized equipment, including an x-ray machine and explosive detection technology, purchased to secure the facility is not used.
*
Wackenhut does not take security breaches seriously. Guards rarely patrol some of the buildings containing high explosives. And to save gas, Wackenhut has cut back on perimeter patrols.
*
Wackenhut has misled investigators during drills and inspections. For instance, hydraulic vehicle barriers are installed for official inspections and then removed once the inspections are completed. Similarly, during one inspection, the company enlisted the on-site mailman (a Wackenhut employee) to do a “plain clothes perimeter patrol.” Wackenhut did not disclose the mailman’s actual job responsibilities to inspectors.

Given the threat of terrorism facing our country and the dangerous explosives manufactured at this facility, these allegations raise grave concerns.

We would note that earlier this year we requested that the Inspector General at the Department of Homeland Security conduct an investigation of allegations by Wackenhut whistleblowers of similar, serious security problems at the DHS Washington headquarters. Subsequent to our request, Wackenhut was dropped from that contract, and replaced with a different contractor.

In view of the above, we request that you conduct a prompt investigation of these allegations. Because of the sensitivity of these alleged security breaches, we will forward you the detailed information we have obtained from the whistleblowers under separate cover. Please have your staff contact Gabriel Adler in the Dorgan office at [phone] or Alex Perkins in the Wyden office at [phone] to arrange this.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Sen. Ron Wyden
Sen. Byron Dorgan
http://www.salem-news.com/articles/september252006/wyden_wackenhut_92506.php

[frylock]

4. the entire nuclear industry needs to rethink security if it hopes to meet the tougher standards..

i guess they feel it's unreasonable to expect that their security guards stay AWAKE at their fucking post.