|
Edited on Fri Feb-08-08 09:05 PM by Postman
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_Air_Flight_655 Independent sources
John Barry and Roger Charles of Newsweek wrote that Rogers acted recklessly and without due care in their July 13, 1992 article. <21> They also accused the U.S. government of a cover-up which Admiral Crowe refuted. <22> An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire.<23> The Vincennes had been nicknamed 'Robocruiser' by crew members and other US Navy ships, both in reference to its AEGIS system, and to the supposed aggressive tendencies of its captain.<2>
On November 6, 2003 the International Court of Justice ruled that "THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST IRANIAN OIL PLATFORMS on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED AS MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA."<24> However, the case relating to the Airbus downing, "the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)", was dropped 22 February 1996 following settlement and reparations by the United States.<25>
Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe ADMITTED on American television show Nightline that the Vincennes was INSIDE Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles.<26> This CONTRADICTED earlier Navy statements.
According to Commander David R Carlson of the USS Sides, the Vincennes was not under attack by Iranian forces and "the conduct of the Iranian military forces in the month preceding the incident was pointedly non-threatening."
Captain David Carlson, commander of the USS Sides, the warship stationed near to the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago." His comment referred to incidents on June 2, when Rogers had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within 2-3 miles (3.2-4.8 km) of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't a smart thing to do." At the time of Rogers' announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He’s climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.
According to the BBC documentary of 2002, Carlson identified IR655 as a civilian craft based on its radar signature, its 'squawk' (IFF) code, and the fact that it was ascending at low speed — an attacking military aircraft would be descending towards the Vincennes at high speed. At first Carlson thought that the 'Iranian Tomcat' identified by the Vincennes must be some other aircraft, as it was difficult for him to believe that the Vincennes crew could mistake a civilian airliner for a Tomcat. The Vincennes’ warnings were on a military radio channel, addressed to 'Iranian Tomcat'. When Carlson concluded that the Vincennes was referring to IR655 in its warning to turn away or receive fire, he urgently warned IR655 on a civilian radio frequency that it was in danger, having been mistaken for a military aircraft, and should turn away. IR655 immediately complied and changed course onto a trajectory away from the Vincennes. The Vincennes fired regardless. Carlson expressed the view that the incident was a mistake brought about by an overly-aggressive approach by the captain of the Vincennes.
Craig, Morales & Oliver, in a slide presentation published in M.I.T.'s Spring 2004 Aeronautics & Astronautics, as the "USS Vincennes Incident," commented that Captain Rogers had "an undeniable and unequivocal tendency towards what I call 'picking a fight.'" On his own initiative, Rogers moved the Vincennes 50 miles (80 km) northeast to join the USS Montgomery. An angry Captain McKenna ordered Rogers back to Abu Musa, but the Vincennes helicopter pilot, Lt Mark Collier, followed the Iranian speedboats as they retreated north, eventually taking some fire:
"…the Vincennes jumps back into the fray. Heading towards the majority of the speedboats, he is unable to get a clear target. Also, the speedboats are now just slowly milling about in their own territorial waters. Despite clear information to the contrary, Rogers informs command that the gunboats are gathering speed and showing hostile intent and gains approval to fire upon them at 0939. Finally, in another fateful decision, he crosses the 12-mile (19 km) limit off the coast and enters illegally into Iranian waters."<[br />
|
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
