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:shrug: It seems to me that there's a fundamental failure to comprehend the "daisy chain" of 'securities' ... how a group of mortgages can be sliced and diced into 'tranches' and sold as 'securities' (CDOs) and then the buyer can package them yet again and sell them as DERIVATIVE 'securities' (CDO-2s) and also trade in 'insurance' (CDSs) on the debtors' continued payment ... and have ALL these paper transactions treated as "money" (assets) but then have a problem forming a "free market" in which the VALUE of these assets (mark to market) is represented on the owning company's balance sheet and how that affects their solvency ... and how that solvency, in turn, triggers the conditions of CDSs (the location and volume of which is known only to the owners) ... and so on.
What beggars the imagination is the way in which the daisy-chain of 'derivatives' can effectively amplify every DOLLAR of mortgage debt (by some working class schmuck) into THIRTY DOLLARS of 'money' (called assets, securities, or whatever) on the books of banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, and other companies worldwide.
There's about $11 TRILLION worth of mortgages in the U.S. The total residential housing in the U.S. amounted to about $20 TRILLION until the 30% (or more) of burst bubble ... having an unknown impact on the $11 TRILLION worth of mortgages , actually ... by guesstimate being about $2 TRILLION. HOWEVER, the daisy-chain of derivatives has magnified this to an aggregate of 'assets' held on balance sheets of about $60 TRILLION. So ... isn't it 'worth' a trillion or so to keep the $60 TRILLION House of Cards from collapsing? (And this doesn't even count the other kinds of debt besides mortgages that are collapsing as well.)
It's like trying to repair the engine of an airplane while it's in flight, I guess.
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