Frum’s confused defense of Jane Harman and AIPAC

[Fireweed247]

David Frum wants to defend Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) from allegations that she sold her influence to get charges reduced or dropped in an espionage case, but he ignores the corruption in favor of making a confused defense of leaks. In “The Real Jane Harman Scandal,” Frum instead accuses the accusers for attacking Harman and the AIPAC-connected ring while supposedly letting the New York Times off the hook for exposing national-security programs. Frum manages to prove that he can’t tell the difference between apples and oranges, and also to undermine the notion that bureaucrats don’t set policy:

Then, at last, in October 2005 the mole hunters found their man: a career Defense Department employee named Larry Franklin. Franklin’s offense? Brace yourself …

Franklin had learned of U.S. intelligence reports that Iranian sabotage teams were operating inside Iraqi Kurdistan. These reports were being disregarded for a reason very familiar in the Bush years: They contained uncomfortable news that higher-ups did not wish to know.

Franklin, however, thought the information important—maybe vitally important. He thought it needed to be pushed up the organization chart. Lacking the clout to move the information himself, he decided to do what frustrated officials often do: He leaked it.

Specifically, he leaked the information to two employees—American citizens both—of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, in hope that they could galvanize a response from their contacts in the White House. The two, Steve Rosen and Kenneth Weissman, shared Franklin’s information with journalists, colleagues, and the Israeli embassy.

For this action, all three were charged with criminal offenses.

Yes, they were, and for good reason — they all committed crimes. Government employees and contractors with clearances to access classified data get constant instruction on how that data is to be handled and protected. I know this, because for a few years a long time ago, I had such a clearance while working in the defense industry. There are no conscience exceptions to these laws, nor are there any codicils that say that a clearance allows the holder to conduct their own foreign policy or defense strategy. Leaking classified information is a serious crime, no matter who does it, nor to whom they leak it. The government has to maintain control over the handling of classified information, or else there’s no point in classifying it at all.

http://hotair.com/archives/2009/04/23/frums-confused-defense-of-jane-harman-and-aipac/

[Fireweed247]

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