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Edited on Mon Apr-16-07 11:40 PM by UNCLE_Rico
Certainly, in the case of the actual government, official WH servers, yes, certainly a qualified IT professional using a reliable archival process such as you describe should have to be in place, and I assume things would be as you say.
However, I can tell you 4 certain that if you administer the rnc or gwb43 mail servers (for example), and your job is to make sure that centralized backups DON'T get made and CANNOT ever be recovered, it is equally possible to do so.
Millions and millions of emails will easily fit on ONE hard drive, mi amigo. It takes me less than one second to remove any one of my hard drives, as it is what they call 'hot swappable' and slides right out the front. Certainly the RNC could have similar hardware as I do. And, surely, there are all sorts of devices out there in the world that could quickly make a hard drive go bye-bye forever once it was removed.
Seeing as how we already know that *'s cronies were all well aware of the "security issues" involved (i.e. accountability) in using the actual WH based accounts, it seems safe to assume that the 'juiciest' emails are NOT going to be found on anyone's .gov accounts. WE NEED the emails from the non-WH, RNC, et al, servers, and the simple fact of the matter is, if they were administered from day one by professionals with a 'leave no traces behind' mandate from on-high ... we could be easily be screwed.
The only hope, if this is the case, would be to track them down on the destination servers ... which would only exist if these professionals were really lame. The only sensible way to run a system like this, if the goal was internal security, would be to make sure that your mail server only allowed correspondence WITHIN the domain that it administers, and that the ONLY way mail could be sent or read was via a web client.
Imagine, if you will, you have an account called karlrove@gwb.com. Say the .gwb (outbound AND incoming) mail server is in the torture chamber below *'s ranch in Crawford. This server is set up so that when you send email out, you are restricted to sending it to OTHERS with a .gwb email account. Trivial to implement. When you send or view your email, you use a web browser (like you do when you have a yahoo or hotmail account), the browser is your mail client. A professional would make that the only way you could send or view your email. Sort of like if you have a yahoo account, and you send email to another yahoo account. See how that works? It never LEAVES the control of YAHOO, except in the form of an html page generated by the web server, which absolutely doesn't HAVE to create a log of what it's sent out, very simple to turn logging on/off. Thusly, the administrators can be assured that no other mail server has a copy of anything, nor could a local copy get retained/downloaded on any sender or recipients actual hard drive. This is all very trivial to implement, provided all the conspirators are on the same domain.
In a closed system such as this, these emails NEVER EXISTED ANYWHERE but on THAT ONE hard drive (assuming the web server that serves up the html page for the web client resides on that same hard drive, which is also simple to implement). At $50 bucks for a 200GB hard-drive, these guys could pull them out EVERY DAY and destroy them if they had the slightest inclination to do so.
In such a system, unless someone physically cut/pasted the text into a .doc or something like that ... the emails NEVER LEAVE THE RANCH.
The fact is, I'm afraid, that a completely untraceable system could EASILY EASILY EASILY have been implemented and utilized by these assholes. It all depends on how smart they were in PLANNING the need for covering their tracks (when it comes to the non-WH servers). It's as simple as that.
Leahy, et al, I hope you get on the ball on this fact, cause time's a WASTIN' ...
>>>edited for punctuation<<< >>>edited for clarity<<<
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