Strategy in Afghanistan

[unhappycamper]

Strategy in Afghanistan
Daily Jang, Pakistan
By Saleem Yazdani
15 September 2010 and 16 September 2010
Edited by Sam Carter

America, its European allies and their war game experts were wrong when they estimated that they could win a war in Afghanistan without encountering much resistance. The main reason was their view of Afghanistan as a poor country that wouldn't be able to tolerate the destruction of the economy and chaos that would be consequences of war. Another major reason was their view of the Taliban as being defenseless. They had neither modern weapons nor techniques that they could employ to fight against powers equipped with the world’s latest in weapons technology. All the assessments of American war experts proved wrong when they encountered resistance in Afghanistan, which they did not expect at all. That resistance has continued in full force for more than eight years, and now its intensity has not only increased but the Taliban have also changed their war strategy.

Before we talk or write about the war strategy of the Afghan Taliban, it is important to point out that the type of planned change that the U.S. was bringing to this area was not successful. In the first stage, the U.S. attempted to expand the Afghan theater of war and also contrived to extend it to Pakistan's tribal areas and some remote areas. The objectives for this attempt were, first, to trap the Pakistani armed forces in this area and, second, to destroy the safe abodes of the Taliban and al-Qaida. Thirdly, as a result of this strategy, American and NATO forces in Afghanistan were to escape military pressure. Subsequent circumstances showed that the Americans failed in their strategy. Pakistan acted successfully against terrorists in the tribal areas; American and NATO military experts do not tire of praising this effort. Pakistani forces did not get trapped in the area, and the situation is in the control of the military. It is correct that pressure on American and NATO forces in Afghanistan had been eased; however, Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida military experts had already been studying this situation. They therefore made several changes to their military strategy, resulting in the present condition in which American and NATO forces have suffered a heavy loss of lives.

It is not at all difficult to conclude from certain attacks carried out by the Taliban that American forces are safe nowhere in Afghanistan. This situation has become very worrisome for the Americans. CIA commanders who controlled the system of spy networks and drone attacks in Afghanistan, and who were located at the heart of an extremely safe American base, were eliminated during one such action despite all of the fortifications. Other key individuals were killed as well. This was a suicide attack carried out by a Jordanian doctor, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal. This doctor was a CIA agent and a very dependable spy. He blew himself up during an important meeting. Seven of the CIA's most important senior officers were killed in less than a minute. Among them was the chief of the operations carried out in Afghanistan under the CIA's supervision. His deputy was injured. The negative effects of this incident had a great impact on the American government’s military policy. When details of the incident were revealed by American media, the American populace was amazed: they had been unaware of such military maneuvers by the Taliban.

When President Barack Obama announced that American forces would begin to withdraw from Afghanistan around the middle of 2010 (sic), and when he also expressed the intention of negotiating with the Taliban, hawkish military policy makers said that this would have a negative impact on the morale of soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal was dismissed for making such remarks about the civil administration. The Afghan Taliban are advancing toward American and NATO centers via strategic successes from highly complicated guerrilla warfare. When the U.S. sent 30,000 troops to Afghanistan as reinforcements, the Taliban readied their fedayeen for campaigns in the north. News dispatches indicated that the Taliban were increasing their activity in the north and their control over certain northern areas started to become apparent. When multiple NATO and Afghan soldiers were killed in an action in Kunduz, 5,000 American troops were immediately dispatched to that area. Americans should be prepared to face a major military loss if the Afghan Taliban succeed in expanding the theater of war.

How long had the Jordanian doctor Al-Balawi been working for al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban? There is no information on this score, but it can be stated with certainty that military reports of great importance would have reached al-Qaida and the Taliban through him. At this time 150,000 troops under American command are present in Afghanistan. But if the Taliban extend the theater of war to the north and conflict increases in that region, its effects will be felt in the former Soviet states — and those areas will also become unsafe for the Americans. This clearly means that the U.S. and NATO are not succeeding in Afghanistan. Now President Obama and the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, are both talking about negotiating with the Taliban. They think that the present time is highly appropriate for this purpose. President Karzai has quietly made considerable progress in this regard. However, a new difficulty is that policy disagreement between the command of the NATO forces and the leadership of the Afghan government has increased and become visible in the media.




unhappycamper comment: The best strategy? Get out while they still will let us out.