So Many Ways to Make Votes Disappear
I'm currently working with a publisher, Biting Duck Press, to publish a book (title as yet undetermined) on the corruption in our election system. We hope that it will help to make Americans more vigilant and concerned about the way our elections are run. I’ve drafted most of the book. I am posting large portions of it on DU, in the hope of stimulating discussion and obtaining useful feedback.
In Chapter 3, "Can You Trust the Corporations that Make the Computers to Count Your Vote?", I began by discussing the hazards of “black box” voting (i.e. voting on electronic machines that produce vote counts that cannot be verified and have the potential to switch votes from one candidate to another) and presenting evidence of vote switching, in the 2004 and other elections. This post continues Chapter 3 by providing some examples of disappearing votes in U.S. elections.
SO MANY WAYS TO MAKE VOTES DISAPPEAR
Oval stickers to prevent Kerry votes being read – Clermont County, Ohio, 2004
Several volunteer workers participating in the recount in Clermont County shortly after the 2004 presidential election signed affidavits stating that they observed several white oval stickers covering the Kerry/Edwards choice on the optical scan ballots used in that election. Some of these workers noted that beneath the white oval stickers the Kerry/Edwards ovals were filled in. The white sticker would have prevented the optical scan machine from counting those ballots as votes for Kerry. None of these witnesses noted a problem with the Bush/Cheney ovals. Clermont County was one of the three Ohio counties with the largest vote increase for Bush from 2000 to 2004.
Votes disappearing on DRE machines – Florida District 13 U.S. House race, 2006
As explained by Paul Krugman in an article titled “When Votes Disappear”, the 2006 election for the U.S. House in Florida Congressional District 13, which was “won” by the Republican candidate by 369 votes, was almost certainly determined by faulty (whether intentional or not) DRE voting machines. In Sarasota County, which used ES & S voting machines, 15% of voters did not register a vote for the House race (these are termed ‘undervotes’), compared to 2.2% to 5.3% of voters who did not register a vote for the House race in neighboring counties. That amounted to almost 18,000 ballots that did not register a vote for the House race in Sarasota County. Furthermore, those who failed to cast a vote in the House race were shown by their other votes to strongly favor Democrats.
Why did 15% of the voters voting on ES & S machines in Sarasota County fail to vote for a House candidate? The answer to that question can be ascertained from an interview of voters by the Sarasota Herald-Tribune, which found that one third of voters couldn’t find the House race on their ballot, and that 60% said that they did vote for a House candidate, but their vote didn’t show up on their summary page.
Unexplained undervotes – Florida District 24 U.S. House race, 2006
In the 2006 U.S. House election in Florida’s 24th District, Republican candidate Tom Feeney defeated Democratic candidate Clint Curtis by 16% of the vote, despite election eve polls that showed Feeney and Curtis to be in a statistical dead heat. An investigation into that election using door-to-door canvassing to interview voters demonstrated that Curtis received 12% to 24% more votes in every precinct canvassed than stated in the official election results. Sworn affidavits were used to document Curtis’ votes. Curtis’ research team was able to garner substantially more sworn affidavits – far more than needed to swing the election – from voters attesting that they voted for him than votes that were officially counted by the electronic voting machines in the election.
Disappearing Hispanic and Native American DRE machine votes – New Mexico, 2004
An extensive analysis of the 2004 Presidential vote in New Mexico demonstrated serious problems with electronic voting, with much higher undervote rates in Hispanic and Native American precincts than in Anglo precincts. In precincts using direct record electronic (DRE) voting in 2004, Hispanic and Native American precincts demonstrated undervote rates (for President) of 6.3% and 7.6%, respectively, compared to only 2.2% in Anglo precincts. In marked contrast, the average undervote rate was under 2% for each of the three ethnic groups in precincts using paper ballots in 2004, with no substantial difference by ethnic group. And, the undervote rate for governor in New Mexico in 2006, when all precincts used paper ballots, was under 2% for each of the three ethnic groups, again with no substantial difference by ethnic group. It is also important to note that if the DRE precincts in 2004 had had undervote rates comparable to the paper ballot precincts, John Kerry would have won New Mexico in 2004.
What could explain these findings? Why was the extremely high undervote rate confined to Hispanic and Native American precincts? Could that be explained by a propensity of these ethnic groups to voluntary decide, after going to their polling place to vote, not to cast a vote for president? No. If that were the case, Hispanic and Native American precincts that used paper ballots would have demonstrated a similar undervote rate. Instead, where paper ballots were used, the undervote rate was far lower, regardless of race or ethnicity. The only explanation that seems worth considering is that the DRE voting machines used in Hispanic and Native American precincts caused votes to disappear. Theoretically that could have been purposeful or accidental. But why did that occur only in Hispanic and Native American precincts?
Huge undervote rates on Diebold machines, Ohio Senate race, 2006
In connection with my role as a volunteer for the Election Defense Alliance, I conducted an analysis of the undervote rate in the 2006 Ohio race for U.S. Senate. An undervote for the purpose of that analysis was defined as a ballot that was cast, but for which there was no vote registered for Senator.
The state-wide undervote rate for Ohio Senator was 3.9%. But there was a great difference in undervote rate by county and machine type, with the Diebold counties averaging a significantly higher undervote rate (4.8%) than counties using the other machines (3.2% for counties using Votronic DREs, 3.3% for counties using optical scan systems).
Furthermore, there were six counties that were definite and extreme outliers (all Diebold) compared to the other counties. Those six counties (Mercer, Darke, Highland, Montgomery, Adams, Perry) had undervote rates ranging from 11.2% to 16.3%, with an average of 13.8%, while the other 82 Ohio counties had undervote rates ranging from 0.6% to 6.8%, with an average of 3.4%. The undervotes in the six outlier counties amounted to almost a quarter of the undervotes in the whole state, whereas the total votes in those six counties amounted to only 7.1% of the total votes in the state. Without those six counties, the average undervote rate for the other 41 Diebold counties was quite similar to the average undervote rate for the other types of machines.
Another finding of note is that a previous similar analysis of the unofficial Ohio data by Richard Hayes Phillips resulted in findings that were substantially different than my analysis of the official Ohio Senate data (though our general conclusion of high undervote rates in several Diebold counties was similar). This means that in some respects there were major changes in the data from the time of the first unofficial postings to the time that the official results were posted.
What explains the very high rate of undervotes in the six Diebold counties? It seems highly likely that there was something wrong with the Diebold machines, at least a good portion of them, in six Ohio counties, which caused the relatively high undervote rates. That could have been due to difficulties voters had in finding the Senate candidates on those Diebold machines, or it could have been due to failure of the machines to record the votes that the voters intended. Alternatively, it could have been due to the fact that 11% to 16% of voters in six Ohio counties decided not to vote for Senator – but no reasonable explanation comes to mind to explain why that would happen in six Diebold counties and not in other counties.
Why use so many different methods to steal elections?
As I document in my book, the powers that be have used numerous different methods to steal elections in recent years: Electronic machines that count our votes using secret software and produce unverifiable results; ballot tampering, as noted in the first example in this post; illegal voter purging; dirty tricks such as pamphlets distributed to poor neighborhoods telling voters to vote on different days or different places than when and where they are supposed to vote; intimidation; insufficient allocation of voting machines to Democratic precincts, and; sham recounts to cover-up their fraud.
Why so many different methods? If they used only one method a pattern would likely emerge, and it would be easier to expose them. Anyhow, they have nothing of value to offer 99% of American citizens, so who would vote for them in a fair and honest election? The more methods they use the more votes they can get in their effort to overcome the fact that so few people really like what they have to offer.
= new reply since forum marked as read
Thank you so much for all you do, Ghost of Huey Long.
I've read practically each and every one of your awesome posts too!
That's what the Truthers say to anybody who dares to dis their Truther bullshit.
That's what the moon landing deniers say to anybody who dares to point out their moon landing denial crap is conspiracy theory woo bullshit.
Again, all I have to say is this...
brand of conspiracy theory woo woo bullshit.
Whether you buy it or not is another matter. To make blanket statements based on ignorance is really the problem here. Life at DU didn't begin at your deflowerment on this board. Many here came to DU looking for answers for that reason and as group shared live information as it was happening. So tell me what's a ballet definition file? How about EPROM? How caterpillar crawl? If you want to knock the OP have at it, but present some sort of valid argument or shut the fuck up with the constant bullshit you purport. Throwing out one acronym doesn't do it.
