UK : Sarah Catt jailed for full-term abortion of baby
Source: BBC News
A woman who aborted her own baby in the final phase of her pregnancy has been jailed for eight years.
Sarah Louise Catt, 35, of North Yorkshire, took a drug when she was full term, 39 weeks pregnant, to cause an early delivery.
She claimed the boy was stillborn and that she buried his body, but no evidence of the child was ever found.
Catt made a "deliberate and calculated decision" to end her pregnancy, a Leeds Crown Court judge said.
Read more: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-york-north-yorkshire-19621675
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Last edited Wed Sep 19, 2012, 04:13 PM - Edit history (3)
When a wife, or a child or a servant killed their Husband/Parent/Master, under the common law that was the crime known as "Petit Treason" (as oppose to "High Treason" when someone plotted against his king, or later his or her state or the Federal Government). The crime was NOT the felony of Murder. The punishment was the same for Murder or Petit Treason, the killer was executed, the only difference, under the Common Law, was who ended up with the property of the killer after the execution. Murder, being a Felony, the property went to the Mesne Lord of the killer (After one year, during that year the property remained in the hands of the King), in Petit Treason cases, being "Treason" NOT a Felony, the property went PERMANENTLY to the King.
In most of England the Mense Lord and the King were the same, thus it made no difference if the killer was charged with Murder or Petit Treason, but sometimes it was different. The last case I know of Petit Treason was in the early 1700s in Massachusetts. Given the nature of Massachusetts being at the time a Royal Colony, the Mesne Lord was viewed as the Colony itself represented by its colonial assembly. The Royal Governor, on the other hand, was the agent of the King. Thus the Governor wanted to try the Murderer for Petit Treason, for then the Governor ended up with her property (which she inherited from the husband she had killed) instead of the property going to the Colonial Assembly. Thus unless there was a difference in who received the property of the accused, the punishment for Murder and Petit Treason was the same.
Similar rules applied to the killing of a child in the last trimester, may NOT have been technically murder, under the common law, but the punishment was the same except who received the property of the killer. Blackstone calls it a misdemeanor, thus no permanent forfeiture took place i.e. her husband or other heir received her property instead of her Mesne Lord or the King (In the cases of Misdemeanors, except for the year AFTER the conviction and execution, when the Mesne Lord had full use of the property of the killer, the killer's heirs received her property).
As to fetuses and the law today, 38 states have passed laws defining killing a fetus as murder or manslaughter:
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx
New York State law on this is a mess, let me quote the National Right to life group:
http://www.nrlc.org/Unborn_Victims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html
New York: Under New York statutory law, the killing of an "unborn child" after twenty-four weeks of pregnancy is homicide. N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.00 (McKinney 1998). But under a separate statutory provision, a "person" that is the victim of a homicide is statutorily defined as a "human being who has been born and is alive." N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.05 (McKinney 1998). See People v. Joseph, 130 Misc. 2d 377, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328 (County Court 1985); In re Gloria C., 124 Misc.2d 313, 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984); People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Co. Ct. 1987).
http://ypdcrime.com/penal.law/article125.htm
And it is a mess in New York. §125 clearly states the following:
S 125.00 Homicide defined.
Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in the first degree.
§ 125 then goes on and defines "Person" as follows:
S 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Person," when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human
being who has been born and is alive.
Then § 125 goes on to define the various types of Homicides and uses the term "Person" only as to the victim when those types of homicides are defined. My position would be that since the term "person" is defined AND used in defining the various types of Homicides, then the killing of an unborn child is NOT covered by those definitions of various homicides for the term "Unborn Child" is NOT used (or that the term "Person" was used, when another term could have been used IF the law was to cover such unborn Children"
. The problem is then that leaves it up to the Courts to define what was meant when the Legislature put those words into § 125 and that opens the possibility of the courts citing § 125 to extend those sections to cover a unborn child. As I said above, the Common Law did include the killing of unborn third trimester fetuses (Through NOT a Murder) and the rule is, unless it is clear that the Common Law was repealed by the Statute in question, the Common Law Rule still applies.
I am NOT familiar with how New York Courts have addressed this conflict, I suspect they have done what courts do in such cases, avoid making a decision if at all possible. i.e. in some plea bargain, give up the charge relating to killing the fetus in exchange for the defendant to plea guilty to some lesser charge related to the same attack on the woman (i.e. Give up on a Murder Charge for Killing the Fetus, in exchange for a guilty plea of aggravated assault on the mother).
This position is supported by People v. Vercelletto, 135 Misc. 2d 40 where the court dismissed Vehicular Homicide charges against a Defendant when the Defendant had caused an accident hitting a woman, caused her to miscarriage and lose her fetus of seven months at the same time of the accident due to the use of the Word "Person" in defining who a victim of various homicides could be, On the other hand the Court held that the injury that caused the miscarriage was a serious physical injury to the woman (Who technically suffered no other injury) and thus meet the definition of Vehicular assault under New York Criminal Code for it only used the term "Person" as to the person injured, i.e. the expected mother, not the unborn child. The court did make the following footnote:
Confronted with similar statutes in criminal cases an overwhelming number of sister States have likewise taken the position that is not within judicial province, under the guise of interpretation, to encompass within the various statutory definitions of "person" an unborn fetus unless specifically included by the Legislature. ( Meadows v State, Ark , 722 SW2d 584; Keeler v Superior Ct., 2 Cal 3d 619, 470 P2d 617; State v Gonzalez, 467 So 2d 723 [Fla App 1985]; People v Greer, 79 Ill 2d 103, 402 NE2d 203 [1980]; Hollis v Commonwealth, 652 SW2d 61 [Ky 1983]; State v Brown, 378 So 2d 916 [La 1979]; People v Guthrie, 97 Mich App 226, 293 NW2d 775 [1980]; see, State v Anonymous, 40 Conn Supp 498, 516 A2d 156, for further citations.) * Two States have reached a contrary result. Both Massachusetts and South Carolina are so-called common-law States. The courts in both States took the position that, based on medical technology, they could change the law; and they both based their decisions in part on developments in each State in civil law tort liability involving a fetal death. (Commonwealth v Cass, 392 Mass 799, 467 NE2d 1324 [1984]; State v Horne, 282 SC 444, 319 SE2d 703 [1984].) Even in the two minority jurisdictions, due process considerations dictated that the interpretations enlarging common-law standards could not be applied retroactively but could only be applied prospectively. While New York civil law recognizes that an infant injured in utero by the tort of another should when born alive be allowed to sue ( Woods v Lancet, 303 NY 349), the death of an unborn child will not support an action for wrongful death. ( Endresz v Friedberg, 24 NY2d 478.)
Here is a Washington University Law Review (Out of the State of Washington) talking about killing of Fetus:
http://lawreview.wustl.edu/inprint/80-4/Cook_Note_book_pages.pdf
Please note, the above Law Review, states it was NOT a crime under the Common Law to kill a Fetus, but then in a footnote calls it a "Misprison" not Murder, which is correct, but Misprison was and is a CRIME just NOT a Felony which is the position Blackstone took.
Just a comment, that killing of a Fetus, by anyone other then its mother, was actionable under the Common Law, in Most states today through maybe not New York State.
More on Misprison, which is generally the concealment of a Felony:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misprision
Side Comment in regards to Killing a Spouse under the common law, it was NOT Murder:
because it most definitely was not. 
The baby was term.
