China's Rising Military: Now for the Hard Part

[Purveyor]

By Thomas J. Christensen

China isn't an enemy of the U.S. But coercive diplomacy with China today is arguably more complicated than it was with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, at least after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

One reason for this is that no consensus exists in East Asia on the territorial status quo, as there did between the two Cold War camps in most regions of the world. The People’s Republic of China, in the center of a region of great importance, has maritime sovereignty disputes with several of its neighbors, including two formal U.S. allies (Japan and the Philippines) and one security partner (Taiwan).

Laboratory research on prospect theory, a psychological exploration of risk-based decision-making, demonstrates that most actors accept much bigger risks and are willing to pay larger costs to defend what they believe is rightfully theirs than to obtain new gains at others’ expense. In a world in which conventional conflict could conceivably escalate to nuclear war, this human tendency is a force for stability; attacks across recognized boundaries by either side would be risky, and deterrence against such attacks is relatively credible.

But in East Asia today, governments draw competing maps about the maritime domain. There are significant differences between mainland China and Taiwan about the sovereign status of the government on the island, and between China and Japan over who owns the islands known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. There is also disagreement among China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia over ownership of islands, rocks and reefs in the South China Sea.

We should take no comfort in the apparent sincerity of all the claimants. If all actors truly feel they are defending rightful claims against the revisionism of others, the chicken game of international security politics is more likely to lead to a deadly collision.

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http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-05/china-s-rising-military-now-for-the-hard-part

[Igel]

1. "to defend what they believe is rightfully theirs"

That's an old insight and one that is widely used.

Thirty years ago most of the territorial disputes existed only in the minds of a very, very small number of people. What's happened since then are media campaigns by nationalist governments. Well, primarily originated by one nationalist government in the area, with responses on the part of adjacent governments.

But it's used constantly in political PR. Social Security isn't an entitlement (something you're given a right to by law); it's something that is just yours. Tax breaks to NGOs aren't cases of "the government's not taking money that is theirs"; it's "allowing the NGOs to not pay what is rightfully ours." Same for a lot of other issues. If they're not giving us what is rightfully ours, well, that's really different from not demanding that they pay it in taxes.

However, when politicians need it to be so, it is: If we're asked to pay taxes, then that's government asking us to turn over what is ours. If a tax break to us is allowed to expire, that's taking back what belong to us.

Possessiveness is a wonderful tool. I resent when politicians try to manipulate me using it. Although I'm tempting to start using it as an agent of social control manipulation in some situations. The problem is convincing the population that the claims about what's properly theirs and what isn't is subject to a strong confirmation bias. If a claim that something that's rightfully mine has an obligation attached to it, I'm much less likely to agree to defend it; if it's something I naturally want and something that I think benefits me materially or emotionally, then, well, of course it's mine ... Just as a matter of course. How could it not be?